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ABSTRACT.
The Leadership of N. S. Khrushchev: a reassessment.
Triumphs and Limitations 1961-2.
This thesis provides a reassessment of the policies of the Soviet 
government in the years 1961-2, examining Khrushchev's leadership role 
in particular. It looks at the internal and external pressures put 
upon Khrushchev during this period, where possible drawing on recent 
primary sources for more material.
The thesis can be seen as dealing with three main areas. Internally, 
Soviet political life is viewed in the context of the Twenty Second 
Party Congress of October 1961. In the realm of foreign policy, two 
case studies are carried out, one on the building of the Berlin Wall 
in August 1961, the other concerning the Cuban Missile Crisis of 
October 1962.
The aim of this thesis is therefore to achieve a balanced perspective 
on the successes and failures of Khrushchev as leader, bearing in mind 
the constraints of Soviet and international pressures.
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The Leadership of N. 5. Khrushchev: a reassessment. 
Triumphs and Limitations 1961-2.
Introduct ion.
This thesis is intended to offer a reassessment of the policies of 
the Soviet government in the years 1961-2. It aims at giving a new 
interpretation of the factors underlying the formation of Soviet 
policies, both internal and external, and a reevaluation of the 
nature of the leadership of N S Khrushchev himself. The first most 
obvious question that needs to be asked at this time is "Why is there 
a need to offer a reassessment of this period of Soviet history at 
all?" There are three important reasons for this, and they will now be 
elucidated upon.
1. The Cold War is Over?
Since M S Gorbachev became First Secretary of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union in March 1985, there has been a fundamental change in 
the climate of international world politics. With his policies of 
perestroika and glasnost, major economic, political and social changes 
have taken place within the Soviet Union, and these have lead to 
radical changes, ultimately culminating in the disintegration of the
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Soviet Union itself. There have been a series of new developments in 
foreign policy also, with an increased emphasis on economic co­
operation between countries, including joint enterprise schemes etc, 
and a series of increasingly fruitful international conferences and 
negotiations on topics ranging from ecological issues to arms 
control.So great have these changes been,that some international 
commentators have defined this era as "the end of the cold war".
These changes have had enormous reprecussions, both on contemporary 
life, and the way that we view the past. If this is the "end of the 
cold war", when did it start? What are the identifiable 
characteristics that comprise this concept of "cold war"? We've looked 
in the preceding paragraph at some of the signs that recently have 
seemed to indicated that something has fundementally changed in the 
area of Soviet policy, but does this provide us with a reliable 
general principle which helps to define "cold war"? If it was taken at 
face value this would then seem to indicate that the "cold war" was a 
result of Soviet policy-making alone. Can this be a satisfactory 
definition of the term? A general definition is perhaps that of "cold 
war" as a state of ideological warfare between countries with 
differing political goals and belief systems .However, these questions 
demand a more specific answer, and one way that we can attempt to find 
this is to look at what is generally accepted as a period of intense 
"cold war" in the past, ie 1961-2, containing both the Berlin Wall 
crisis and the Cuban missile crisis, and to try to assertain the key 
characteristics of such periods of tension. One issue of particular 
interest here is the demolition of the Berlin Wall in November of 
1989. With the fragmentation of many seemingly unassailable
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stereotypes, the physical destruction of the Berlin Wall underlines 
the need for a fresh investigation on why it was erected in the first 
place, and the circumstances and possible motivations involved. How 
far could the traditional concept of "cold war" be a relevant factor 
here? Although the building of the Berlin Wall has been seen as 
symbolic of the intensification of ideological warfare, in fact the 
underlying factors involved might not really suggest this.
One of the reasons why the period 1961-2 is interesting is thus 
because when one begins to explore it in any detail, concepts of 
different governments making assumptions and decisions based on an 
ideological framework of "cold war", ie with the United States and the 
Soviet Union perceiving each other as the enemy, are not consistently 
valid. Certainly such concepts are to be found in abundance in the 
rhetoric of both Soviet and American speeches, but how far were they 
actually valid in practice? While perhaps the American government, 
especially the military may have acted on them to a degree, 
surprisingly this dosn't seem to have been true on the Soviet side. A 
brief time spent looking at the events of the early 1960's give an 
indication why. This was a time of increased technological 
development, with a corresponding sophistication in forms of 
international communication. It was a time when Khrushchev in the USSR 
appeared to be successfully attacking the bastions of Stalinism and 
revitalising Marxist-Leninist theory, while in the United States a 
youthful J F Kennedy had just been elected President, inspiring in the 
American people a new pride and hope in their country. In the midst of 
these events, many missed the significance of one of the most profound 
changes of the time - the emergence of a deep ideological rift between
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the USSR and China. This dispute effectively finalised the split in 
the communist movement, and irrevocably splintered the accepted "two 
camp" theory of international politics prevalent in the 1940's and 
50's. The Soviet government, unlike the Americans were well aware of 
what was going on, and thus were often acting, more looking over their 
shoulder towards China, than towards their "cold war" opponent, the 
United States. Today's awakening to the realisation of the fact that 
"cold war" has not perhaps been such an accurate or pervasive state as 
has been previously been thought stimulates the historian to challenge
conventional stereotypes when interpreting sources. Thus one of the
aims of this thesis is to submit that the Soviet government was not as
constricted by cold war ideology as is sometimes thought.
2. Historiographical balance?
The breaking down of stereotypes is also needed at another vital 
level-that of historiography itself. In the historical debate as to 
when the "cold war" started, is another controversial subject - who 
started it? This issue has encouraged a historiographical trend 
towards the politicisation of international history in terms of the 
"traditionalist" and "revisionist" interpretations of history. In the 
1940's and 50's, American historians tended to analyse Soviet actions 
in terms of their own personal and national experiences, reflecting 
the mood of American politics as much as anything else. Thus, in the 
McCarthyist era, fear of all Soviet actions ran deep, and it was only 
with the growing realisation of the mistakes made over Vietnam in the 
late I960's, that previously unscutinised American foreign policy
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became the subject of closer analysis and criticism. It was during 
this time that the "revisionist" school" of historians came to 
prominence, people such as W Lefeber, G Kolko and G Alperovitz. Thus 
historiography has been very much influenced by the prevailing 
political climate. In his article "The Emerging Post-Revisionist 
Synthesis on the origins of the cold war " , J L Gaddis argues that a 
more balanced view-point is now emerging, a post-revisionist position 
which gives greater priority to the nature of the available material 
on a subject. Gaddis criticises the:
"curious American habit of writing about the cold war as if only 
the United States had a major role in bringing it about" 1 
and also points out the absurdity that "not one of the New Left 
revisionists was a Soviet specialist; few if any knew Russian. "Yet in 
his assessment of areas for further research, Gaddis concentrates on 
the perception of the American leadership towards the USSR, rather 
than the need for an examination of Soviet policy-making and also the 
need to consider the role of "third parties" in international 
disputes, eg Korea, Germany and Cuba. This is surely necessary if an 
objective viewpoint is to be achieved.
The accuracy of Gaddis's claims concerning the imbalence of 
historical sources utilised can be seen when surveying the literature 
available on the character of Soviet foreign policy. In 1973, A 
Horelic, A Ross Johnnson and J Steinberger wrote:
"In contrast to the rich accumulation of US foreign policy case- 
studies, the Soviet foreign policy case-study literature is 
small fragmented and generally underdevelopped. This applies 
not only to theory-orientated works that employ case-studies as
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vehicles for generating or testing hypotheses about crisis or 
foreign policy decisionmaking, but also to traditional historical 
narrative case studies designed to advance knowledge about a 
particular international crisis or foreign policy decision.
As the primary external actor in most major US crisis 
decisionmaking situations since World War Two, the Soviet Union 
has figured prominently in most US foreign policy decision 
making case studies. However, Soviet behaviour has been treated 
in such studies not as an object of inquiry per se, but as an 
input to US decisionmaking, part of the external setting in which 
US decision makers have operated. The object of emperical 
research has been American decisionmakers' perceptions of 
Soviet behaviour not that behaviour itself. Rarely have any new 
insights about Soviet foreign policy behaviour or the Soviet 
decisionmaking process emerged from such a work; few studies of 
American foreign policy have either been equipped or found it 
necessary for their purpose to engage in original research on 
Soviet behaviour.
The small case study component of the academic literature on
Soviet foreign policy is disproportionate to the size of the general
literature and to the intrinsic importance of Soviet crisis behavior
for the broad field of international relations." 2 
Although this was written 17 years ago, till very recently not
very much had changed. For example there have only been two major and
in any way detailed studies on the Berlin crisis of 1962- that of R M
Slusser The Berlin Crisis, and that of H. Adomeit Soviet Risk-Taking
and Crisis behaviour. Both of these works came to diametrically
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opposed conclusions over basic issues, and there still remains much to 
be discovered and clarified concerning the fundemental relationships 
and practical workings of the Soviet policy-making process,
In his article,"In the grip of the adversarial paradigm: The Case of N 
S Khrushchev In Retrospect." A Yanov makes a similar plea for a 
reappraisal of Soviet history. He argues, somewhat controversially:
"Some people on the conservative extreme of the political spectrum 
in America assume that Soviet Russia is implacably hostile to the 
West because of its communist ideology. Others who see the world 
in terms of realpolitik consider the geographical interests of 
the superpowers irreconcilable. Still others in the liberal camp 
believe that, in the face of common annihilation in the nuclear 
age, there is enough common ground to work out some accomodation. 
These differences notwithstanding, most Americans, including 
scholars, perceive Russia as an adversary.
What, however, if this adversarial paradigm itself is no more 
than a transient convention? "3 
While Yanov's stereotypes here are not very helpful, there is an 
important point in what he is saying. Many historians interpret Soviet 
history in terms of rivalry with America, and fail to see it in 
relation to Russian history as a whole. Therefore there is a good case 
for reassessing Soviet policy-making, paying less attention to 
conventional stereotypees of cold war on a historical and a 
historiographical level.
3. New primary Sources.
This process of reassessment is greatly assisted because of the recent
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political climate in the Soviet Union. The active encouragement of 
individuals to take the initiative and to express their ideas has had 
some remarkable effects. "Glasnost" as applicable to Soviet history, 
has revealed much new material, which was unavailable in the Brezhnev 
era,or the "period of stagnation" as it is now known. Although 
information specifically related to foreign policy has been more 
limited, there have been a number of new sources about Khrushchev's 
times generally. One of the most exciting results from glasnost,has 
been the more open debating of modern Soviet history, and from this 
discussion , it it possible to build up a more comprehensive and 
accurate picture of events. One of the first examples of this type of 
discursive articles on the Khrushchev period, is that of Fedor 
Burlatsky in Literaturnava Gazeta in Febuary 1988.
In his analysis, Burlatsky recognises the need to speak more openly 
about the past:
"at present, twenty five years later, in a comparison of the 
period before and after October 1964, we see better the 
st rengths
and weaknesses of Khrushchev"4 
and the need to challenge the official view of Khrushchev:
"Time has not scattered the countless myths around the name of 
Khrushchev in our country or abroad. Sharing the fate of other 
reformers, Khrushchev didn't gain objective recognition in the 
consciousness of the masses. "5 
Thus Burlatsky shows that it is now necessary to reinvestigate the past, and 
to try and discover what Khrushchev was really like, as a person and as a 
leader. Burlatsky tries to give a more balanced picture of Khrushchev,
-  9 -
admitting that he made mistakes- his political misjudgement of some 
matters, his liking of grandiose schemes, of which too many were 
implemented too fast. Yet he also probes more deeply, recognising the 
extent of the opposition that he faced especially amongst the cadres 
and the apparat,and giving him credit for his enthusiasm and sense of 
justice,his exposure of Stalinism, for his dealing with the cult of 
personality and his policy of the political rehabilitataion of those 
wrongly convicted. Thus this article seeks to redress the balance after 
"the years of stagnation",and to present a more accurate picture of the 
past.
An article in Moscow News three months later, in May 1988, took a more 
critical view of Khrushchev, emphasising the inconsistency of his 
reforms and the outright failure of some of his attempted improvements, 
especially concerning Lysenko's ideas on agriculture, the Riazan 
initiative etc. Despite this criticism, again two important concepts 
provide the final thoughts of this article, that you: "cannot learn to 
swim without entering water" and that even although change was not 
accepted, it laid the foundations for Gorbachev today, that "after two 
decades the seeds brought shoots" 6.
There are many other recent articles, providing new light on 
Khrushchev, for example by V Tendrakov in Novy Mir, but one of the 
most interesting developments is the appearance of autobiographical 
accounts of the period, previously unseen. One of the most interesting 
of these, is contained in the series of articles published in the 
autumn of 1988 in Ogonvok by Sergei Khrushchev, Khrushchev's son.
These articles give a startling new account of how Khrushchev fell 
from power on 13th-14th of October 1964, revealing the chief
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instigators of the "coup" and their motivation for the removal of 
Khrushchev. While this is not directly relevant to foreign policy 
decision making in 1962, it does provide insight into some of the 
stresses and strains in the relations between some of the key members 
of the Presidium, and provides an excellent basis for trying to 
decipher some of the policy changes and political manoeuvering during 
the earlier period.
Other autobiographical accounts of particular interest are those of G 
Bolshakov, Soviet Information counsellor in their Embassy in 
Washington, and of Khrushchev's Foreign Minister A A Gromyko. G 
Bolshakov's account of the Cuban missile crisis in Soviet Weekly 
emphasises a number of points, one of the main ones being the way that 
unofficial channels of communication were used between the American 
and Soviet governments. According to Bolshakov, there was a real 
division between Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry, and Khrushchev 
himself. He recounts:
"Both sides made the most of the informal channel, and the 
Khrushchev - Kennedy dialogue gained in frankness and 
directness from message to message. Sometimes Robert would 
interupt to say,"Georgie, skip it. That's been written by 
Gromyko's men, not by Khrushchev. Stick to Khrushchev's 
words."7
He tells also how the American announcement of there being Soviet 
missiles in Cuba came as as much of a surprise to him as to anyone 
else. These comments suggest that perhaps it's possible that even 
Gromyko didn't know about the existence of the missiles, and that this 
had been kept from him. This would account for his silence before
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Kennedy on the 18th of October, and for his failure to respond to the 
American announcement on the Tuesday in his speech in East Berlin.
The next step must be to examine Gromyko's Memories themselves in 
order to find an answer. On the crucial meeting with Kennedy on the 
18th of October, Gromyko asserts that:
"Contrary to later assertions made in the West, at no time in 
our conversation did Kennedy raise the question of the presence 
of Soviet rockets in Cuba, consequently there was no need for me 
to say whether there were any there or not. "8 
Certainly from the stenographic records of the meeting, the question 
of the weapons was not asked specifically, but to anyone who knew what 
was going on, the meaning of Kennedy's words could hardly be hidden.
It is difficult to believe that such a consummate negotiator as 
Gromyko would not have given some form of implicit retort to Kennedy's 
remarks,unless he didn't know to what they referred.
The general background given in Gromyko's Memories, combined with 
other more recent sources of information, conferences and exhibitions 
on Khrushchev's life etc are helping to expose some previously held 
myths about Khrushchev and bring hope that further material will be 
forthcoming. The publication of Khrushchev's Secret Speech of the 20th 
Party Congress of 1956, in the Soviet Union in 19&9 is another great 
step forward. Thus the new material already available has provided new 
perspectives on past events, and confirmation of some views already 
held, eg about different factions in the Presidium.
A general outline only has been given here of some of the new 
material recently published in the USSR concerning the Khrushchev 
period. From this however, we are already beginning to glimpse some of
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the ramifications of such new accounts of this period, and to see why 
a more detailed study of such documents is now so important. Having 
been freed from the limitations of conventional "cold war" stereotypes 
past and present, the historian is more able to discern clearly the 
significance of events and statements made, and is thus able to 
integrate the recently available material with traditional sources, to 
give a more comprehensive and accurate account of the period.
The reason for giving such a detailed description of the 
current position concerning primary and secondary sources, is because 
they to a large extent influence the form and the aims of this thesis. 
The object of this thesis is to use the currently available material 
in order to discover more about the nature and function of the Soviet 
government in 1961-2. There are many questions to be considered in 
this matter, and some of the main objectives for analysis are as 
f ol lows:
1.To analyse the domestic political situation in the USSR, and to 
identify the most contentious policy issues.
2.To discover the nature of informal domestic political factions 
over these issues, to identify the main figures involved, and to 
discern their influence on the leadership of Khrushchev.
3.To assess the impact of ideology, and specifically the ideological 
revival of the 22nd Party Congress on the formation of foreign policy.
4. To understand the factors that determined foreign policy, central 
and peripheral, in theory and in practice, and to ascertain how they 
contributed to the crises over Berlin and Cuba.
5. To offer an evaluation of the effectiveness of Khrushchev's 
leadership within the political elite in 1961-2, and from this to
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reassess the historical significance of his time in power, both in a
domestic and international context.
Structure and Methodology.
The above objectives are to be realised within the following general 
framework; ie to utilise information and insights gathered from the 
22nd Party Congress to provide a theoretical formulation with which to 
examine and explore two specific foreign policy case-studies. By 
examining material from a domestic and a foreign perspective, this 
should provide a comprehensive picture of Khrushchev's leadership 
strengths and weaknesses during the period 1961-2.
Chapters 1-3 will concentrate on the theoretical and ideological 
implications and variations in Soviet politics. They will try to 
illuminate trends in policy - making, and will examine mainly domestic 
issues, especially in relation to the 22nd Party Congress.
Chapter One will begin with a look at the political structures that 
operate within the Soviet Union, and makes an theoretical assessment 
of the potential influences on Soviet foreign policy decision-making. 
This helps provide an indication of the pressures exerted by key 
groups and individuals in the policy-making process.
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Chapters Two and Three will concentrate on the 22nd Party Congress of 
October 1961, analysing various aspects of political interest. Part of 
this analysis will utilise database techniques to gain a fuller 
picture of events.
Chapter Two will be concerned with the chief domestic issues 
recurring in the speeches of delegates. This will include economic, 
agricultural and administrative discussions. The predominant area 
discussed will be the differences of opinion concerning de- 
stalinisation, both in general and in particular with reference to the 
anti-party group.
Chapter Three will look at foreign policy, and the variations of
ideological positions apparent amongst the speakers. This will relate
to Berlin, Cuba, China and Albania, as well as giving an analysis of 
the wider implications of these statements. More recent sources eg 
the memoirs of Sergei Khrushchev, will also be used to evaluate the 
extent of Khrushchev's power as leader. This chapter will also draw 
extensively on information from the Congress using database 
techniques. This database contains, amongst other material, 
information extracted from the speeches of all the Soviet and many of
the foreign delegates to the 22nd Party Congress.
At this point,there should be beginning to emerge a pattern of the 
differing political issues important at the time, and an indication of 
the position of individual political figures on these issues. In order 
to see if these observations are accurate, two case-studies will then 
be made, to verify whether the political factions and groupings
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suggested by the Congress material significantly affect policy-making. 
These case studies will also provide the opportunity to assess 
Khrushchev as an international statesman and as leader of the 
communist movement. These case-studies will form Chapters Four to Six.
Chapter Four will examine Soviet policy towards Berlin in 1961. It 
will attempt to identify the most influential factors in Soviet 
foreign policy decision-making, looking at the internal political 
situation as well as the pressures placed upon the leadership by 
fraternal communist powers, especially China and East Germany.
Chapters Five and Six will concentrate on Soviet policy towards Cuba 
in 1962. They will look specifically at the build-up to the decision 
to place nuclear weapons in Cuba, and to assess the ideological
and practical factors involved. They will also try to get beyond 
"cold war" images of this crisis, to discover when and why the 
decision was made and what the intention behind it was.
The conclusion of the piece will then follow, summarising the 
conclusions arrived at concerning the Congress, and assessing their 
validity in terms of day-to-day decision-making in the USSR in 1961-2 
with regard to foreign policy. It will reach conclusions about the 
nature of the distribution of power in the Soviet government of the 
time, and give a description of Khrushchev's leadership position based 
on this assessment. A reevaluation of Khrushchev's position in Soviet 
and international history can then be made.
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C M P I E R _ L
Foreign and domestic policy in the U S S R : the theoretical approach
Foreign policy, ie the policy of a country towards the rest of the 
world, initially seems quite a simple concept to understand. The 
primary function of foreign policy is usually to ensure the continuity 
of the country, and to defend it against any danger. However while such 
a definition is helpful, it doesn't explain or clarify the system of 
priorities that lie behind the perception of a country's "best 
interests". The nature of foreign policy formulation is further 
complicated by its close relationship with the internal policy 
proccesses. Some historians such as H. Adomeit argue that domestic and 
foreign policy-making are in fact two largely independent areas,eg as 
when he asserts:
"contrary to widely held assumptions there does not appear to be 
a direct correlation between orthodox views on ideology, 
military policy and economics on the one hand, and high 
proclivities for risk taking on the other."1 
and he concludes:
"Decision-making in international crises in the Soviet system is 
shaped much more by consensus on political issues than by 
domestic confiict"2 
However, by just considering some of the mutual qualities of the two 
policy processes, foreign and domestic, this doesn't seem a very 
credible viewpoint- they both work in the same political context, 
often involve the same personalities, they have close institutional 
links etc. Hence the conclusion of D, Dallin seems more apt:
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"The hypothesis that there is a significant connection between 
Soviet domestic developments and Soviet foreign policy is 
supported by common sense, empirical evidence and political 
science theory. "3
Having established that there must be such a link, the next step is
to establish its nature. About this there are many theories, V. I.
Lenin himself wrote:
"the very deepest roots of both the internal and foreign policy 
of our state are shared by economic interests: by the economic
situation of the dominant classes of our state."4
In this statement, Lenin characteristically sees the underlying 
economic situation as being a common factor, but the sources of 
foreign policy are more varied than this analysis would allow. The 
phrase "sources of foreign policy" was coined by an American G Kennan
in his famous article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct"in 1947, in which
he argued that Soviet foreign policy was to a large extent dependent 
on power struggles in the Kremlin itself. This idea has recurred again 
and again, from Truman's comment about Stalin - he's: "a decent 
fellow, but he's a prisoner of the politburo"5
to the present day, and indeed the political situation amongst the ‘
most powerful Soviet leaders must be of relevance. Obviously there are 
many other sources of foreign policy, the chief of these being 
ideological. Another historian, Barrington Moore Junior, draws our 
attention to the often reactive nature of foreign policy.
These various threads which interweave in order to form criteria for 
action,can interact between foreign and domestic policy in four 
different basic models. These are:
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orientation guiding both.
2. the dominance of a group of Soviet institutions which are in 
positions of influence.
3. the effect of one or more dominating political figures exerting a 
centralising control.
4.a reciprocal linkage relationship, ie having a simultaneously 
radical foreign policy and a conservative domestic policy.
5. policies ruled by practical expediency.
These various forms of linkage provide useful concepts for identifying 
some of the basic types of possible relations between differing 
sections of foreign and domestic policy. Now it is possible to examine 
these different areas in more detail. In 1966 the Soviet historian 
A. A. Arzumanyan emphasised the importance of three fields when 
considering Soviet foreign policy-ideology, economics, and the role of 
leaders within the framework of the political system. We shall now 
look at the first two, and then later assess their influence in terms 
of individuals and institutions, in order to break down these general 
theories into more tangible and specific elements.
a.IDEOLOGY
It is a commonly held view today that Marxist-Leninism is dead, and 
that Soviet politicians are now men of pragmatism. With the recent 
events in the USSR, ie the failed coup attempt and the official 
rejection of communism, this view has been confirmed, but in the early 
I960's it was a very different situation. .As S Bialer points out, the
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idea that communist ideology was redundant then is misleading, and 
implies that political realism has made ideology redundant. While it 
is naive to believe that Marxist-Leninist theory has a predominant 
influence in Soviet affairs, foreign or domestic, in the 1960's it 
still exerted considerable influence in a variety of ways.
One of the most obvious roles of ideology in the USSR, is to give 
legitimacy to the regime and to provide the rallying cry in order to 
unite the Soviet people behind the Communist Party and hence the 
Soviet government. In this incidence, ideology performs a vital 
function, both within the USSR and in the communist bloc, where there 
is a very diverse range of peoples, cultures, languages etc. If 
nationalism were to be used as a rallying force in the USSR, this 
would increase the expression of anti-Russian feeling,and intensify 
ethnic disputes and racial tensions. Thus in seme ways it could be 
argued that ideology served as an instrument of Russian nationalism, 
and certainly it played an important role in extending Russian control 
in the USSR and the Communist bloc. This would seem to support the 
concept of an ideological congruence between foreign and domestic 
policy^indicating that ideological rhetoric functions as a political 
control in the Russian Republic's internal and external empires. This- 
abstact theory is borne out by Stalin's methodology in the 1930' s, when a 
repressive and rigorously enforced domestic policy was matched with a 
rigid and inflexible foreign policy, both being shaped by ideological 
conservatism.
Ideology also has an important, if often unacknowledged part to play 
in Soviet politics, in that it forms the language of 
communication, through which different individuals and groups express
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their position. It provides the terms of reference and framework of 
concepts within which communication is made possible. This 
terminological framework thus restricts lateral or creative thought. A. 
G.Meyer defines ideology as:
"the body of doctrine which the Communist Party teaches all 
Soviet citizens, from school children to the higher party 
leadership. "6
While this definition doesn't really explain the nature of ideology, 
it is useful because it draws attention to the pervasive nature of 
ideological orientation at all levels of society. It is true that many 
individuals will not conform to ideological stereotypes, but because 
of the intensive nature of ideological pressure, some influence is 
bound to remain. Although it is impossible to measure the extent of 
such conditioning, it must influence domestic and foreign policy, as 
the ruling elite is especially strongly exposed to such pressures. In 
order for an individual to hold a high position in the Soviet power 
structure, he must at least outwardly conform to a Marxist-Leninist 
line. The Prethus theory concerning the strength of ideological 
orientation of the politically upwardly mobile, that:
"ideology helps to create and educate those upwardly mobile
figures of authority........ needed by the administrative
machine. "7 
would reinforce this perception.
Another objection to the relevance of ideology, is that its influence 
is superficial only, and has little actual influence on decision­
making or policy in practice. Hence the conclusion of some historians 
that by the 1960's there was a : "practical emancipation from
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ideological sterectypes"3 and that: "action has become a guide to 
theory" 9. However this type of statement doesn't seen to be 
appropriate to Khrushchev's regime. Ideology remained the legitimising 
factor in Soviet politics at this time, although it would also have to 
be admitted that the nature of that ideological basis did change 
considerably . A.G, Meyer comments on the:
"intellectual problems the regime has willingly endured for the 
sake of maintaining doctrinal orthodoxy"10 
Why did Khrushchev trouble himself to change the official ideological 
stance of the Soviet Union in 1956, and to further amend it in 1961, 
against much opposition, if ideology lacked power or political 
credence?
Part of the answer to this question lies in the specific nature of 
the period 1955-64. The reason that Khrushchev himself gave for his 
Secret Speech of 1956 and his further denunciation of Stalinist 
excesses at the 22nd Party Congress was that:
"as long as we continue working, we can and must find out a 
great deal and tell the truth to the Party and the people. It is 
our duty to do all in our power to establish the truth now, 
because the longer the time that passes since those events, the 
more difficult it will become to re-establish the truth."11 
In the short-term such a speech can be seen to be politically 
expedient in that it implicitly emphasised Khrushchev's own 
predominant position, but long-term he must have been aware of the 
negative repercussions of the implementation of such a policy. After 
exposing the falsity of Stalinist society, Khrushchev went on to 
emphasise the changing nature of the world in order to justify a
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change in ideology.In his 1956 Central Committee Report, he talks of: 
"a Marxist-Leninist precept that wars are inevitable as long as 
imperialism exists. This thesis was evolved at a time when (1) 
imperialism was an all embracing world system and (2)the social 
and political forces which did not want war were weak, 
insufficiently organised, and hence unable to convince the 
imperialists to renounce war. "12 
and goes on to say that with the event of the nuclear age, this thesis 
needs modification, and hence justifies his policy of "peaceful co­
existence.” Thus Khrushchev was admitting the ideological bankruptcy of 
the Stalinist period, and deriving from that the need for a new 
relevant ideological framework from which to operate. This adaptation 
of ideological theory to contempory circumstances did not just mean 
that it had become subordinate to pragmatism, but that an attempt was 
being made to render its principles more effectively. Meyer's 
observation that:
"The intensity of indoctrination and the rigidity of official 
dogma are inversely proportional to the credibility of the 
doctrine. "14
is implicit in Khrushchev’s line of thinking. In order to revitalise- 
staid ideological rhetoric, it is necessary to allow a certain amount 
of dialogue in a less restrictive, more creative atmosphere.
This is not to support the argument that once ideology was declared 
fallible, that it henceforth lost its prominence in Soviet thinking.
In fact in the period 1956-64, ideology gained a whole new lease of 
life. Khrushchev was uniquely in the position after his exposure of 
Stalinism, to offer a new interpretation of Marxist-Leninism which
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because of its timing, seemed to offer a fresh and coherent strategy 
for the future. Amongst a population still suffering from the excesses 
of Stalinism, this revised ideological approach was welcome and seemed 
to offer a new hope comparable in some respects to the early days of 
the Russian revolution itself.
Additional insight into the importance of ideology in Soviet society 
at this time, is given by the priority of the Soviet government to the 
eradication of all those who challenged this ideological line. While 
the censorship and suppression of some of the more liberal writers and 
journalists can be seen as having a political motivation, ie to 
prevent possible challenges to Party author!ty,the targeting of other 
groups for persecution cannot be explained in the same way. An example 
of this, is Khrushchev's religious policy. The harshness and brutality 
of this campaign especially against the Christian Church in the years 
1961-3, initially seems very much at odds with Khrushchev's more 
liberal cultural policy and desire for individual initiative. It is 
only in terms of ideology that the severity of the measures against 
the Church can be explained. This theory is given added credence by 
the timing of the anti-religious campaign with the renewed ideological 
attack of the 22nd Party Congress, and would also tie in with the 
policy of the current Soviet government which doesn't have such a 
strong ideological orientation and recognises the positive and 
constructive role of the Church in society. Thus this is another 
arguement to support the strong position of ideology in the Soviet 
Union under Khrushchev.
Despite the new respect for ideological innovation at this time, 
there were also some counter-productive elements which obscured its
effectiveness. As in all Communist theory, of whatever date, in 
Khrushchev's theories of "peaceful co-existence" and "state of all the 
people", were ambiguities and contradictions. Thus attempting to 
actually implement these theories was problematic. Also while 1961 was 
a time of ideological resurgence, it was also a year in which the 
practicality of many Soviet ideological assumptions was challenged- 
with continued tension over Berlin and Laos, problems in the 
agricultural sphere etc. Despite these difficulties, ideology still 
had a strong role to play, and its importance often seems to have been 
under-estimated. A comment by Aspaturian:
"The persistence of ideological goals in Soviet foreign policy, 
which tend to raise international tensions, reflect socio­
functional interests which have been traditionally associated 
with the Party apparatus and professional ideologues"14 
raises some interesting questions on the effect of ideology on the 
Soviet political landscape. This statement on the connection between 
ideological outlook with political forces within the Soviet power 
structure will be examined in more detail later, but even the fact 
that such a question should come up would indicate that ideology did 
have a strong role to play in domestic and foreign policy processes.-
b. ECONOMIC
As we have seen, there appears to be an ideological congruence in the 
relationship between domestic and foreign policy - both being more 
flexible and adventurous in the times of Khrushchev. Another closely 
related and key influence in policy-formulation is that of the
-  26 -
economy.
Since the times of Peter The Great, Russian trade relations can be 
depicted in terms of huge cycles of concentrated international 
involvement and increased technical imports and then periods of 
autarky and stagnation, as Russia reaches out, and then withdraws 
into herself, and this pattern can be seen also in Soviet times. Since 
1917 however the condition of the economy has become not just a prime 
political concern, but also has a unique self-legitimising aspect 
which makes the Soviet government unwilling to admit any shortcomings 
or failures. Economic priorities are thus of great significance in the 
Soviet government, as the right/left political dichotomy over ecomomic 
issues can affect the whole ediface of the political structure. In the 
immediate years after Stalin's death, there was a reaction against his 
predominantly heavy industrial and militarily orientated policies, with 
priority to revitalise the sluggish economy, improve agricultural and 
technical development and increase the standard of living of the 
Soviet citizen. Thus to accomodate these new policies, there had to be 
a corresponding thaw in foreign relations, ie a policy of "peaceful 
co-existence" with non-socialist states. This would allow improved 
prospects of trade, especially in specialised technological and 
agricultural areas. A less conservative foreign policy also provided 
the opportunity for the type of political relaxation needed 
internally, in order to encourage individual initiative and creativity 
in the economic field.
That economic criteria affect both domestic and foreign policy can be 
seen throughout the Khrushchev period - eg in the 1961 Party Programme 
it calls for an increased emphasis on consumer goods, only if the
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international situation doesn't worsen thus increasing defence 
expenditure. The political see-sawing involved in trying to balance 
the budget is an important source of policy-making, as in 1962-3 when 
the test-ban negotiations were seen as a way of releasing money from 
military to consumer-orientated investment priorities. A time of 
economic reform then necessitates political reform, and also a 
corresponding decrease in international tension. Therefore there is 
an inverse correspondence between increasing economic restructurcng and 
growth and the aggressiveness of foreign policy directed to the chief 
industrial producers in the Western world.
That economic motivation had a large influence on foreign policy can 
be clearly seen, and all the indicators so far would seen to indicate 
that domestic economic factors generally had precedence. However the 
debate must have been pretty lively, as PIoss observes there was; 
"simultaneously and obviously inter-related conflict over economic and 
foreign policy within the Soviet hierarchy"15. The type of conflict 
that could arise, is revealled in the case of Cuba itself. On one 
hand, from an ideological view-point, the Soviet Union was interested 
in cultivating friendly links with "vulnerable"<ie potentially 
politically unstable) under-developed countries. From an economic 
perspective however, the Soviet Union desired good relations with the 
West which would be technologically beneficial. In the case of Cuba 
the two policies clashed, between the desire to placate the Western 
powers and the ideological drive to support developing countries. In 
this case, when the political ramifications of placing nuclear 
missiles in Cuba became clear, the need for peaceful international 
relations was seen to be paramount. When it came to the crunch,
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political and humanitarian considerations outweighed both economic and 
ideological ones. While this is only a very superficial reading of the 
crisis, it does allow a better appreciation of the complexity of the 
issues involved.
The orientation of economic, ideological and foreign policies 
constantly intertwine, and now the political and institutional 
ramifications of these different theoretical positions will be 
outlined briefly.
THE SOVIET CONSTITUTION.
At this stae;e, a brief look at the nature of the Soviet Constitution
<_) '
would provide a helpful background to the processes of decision­
making. The position of the Communist Party is paramount at all levels 
of government and administration. Party members occupy the majority of 
State offices,and constitute almost without exception all officials 
involved in foreign affairs. In Article 31 of the Party rules adopted 
in the 22nd Party Congress in 1961 it states that: "The supreme organ 
of the CPSU is the Party Congress"16, and that from it is elected 
firstly the Central Committee, then the Presidium: "the paramount
collegial organ for the formulation of Soviet foreign policy"17. 
Therefore the Presidium lies at the heart of all domestic and foreign 
policy decisions, and being composed of twelve full and four candidate 
members, considerable power is being wielded by a very limited number 
of men.
The importance of the Secretariat although sometimes overlooked, is 
in fact second only to that of the Presidium in terms of power. It is
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responsible for the appointment and dismissal of personnel, formulates 
the agenda and priority of issues placed before the Presidium and is 
responsible for executing Party decisions. The position of General 
Secretary is one of immense prestige and influence over ail areas of 
Party life, including Agitprop which controls Pravda, Kommunist and 
has considerable control over other Soviet publications. The Party 
also has a large influence over other State institutions, the Supreme 
Soviet, the Council of Ministers and its Presidium. In practice, the 
Russian Republic has the paramount perogative to implement foreign 
policy decisions. The Council of Ministers is formal head of a whole 
network of administrative bodies dealing with foreign policy, 
directing embassies, consulate operation, overseas missions, trade 
delegations and also with responsibilities for the official state 
ministries - defence, foreign affairs and TASS. As such the Council of 
Ministers itself has a considerable part to play in influencing and 
implementing foreign and domestic policy. Using the above information 
as a guide,it can be seen that the organs of domestic and foreign 
policy overlap considerably in the Presidium, the Secretariat and the 
Council of Ministers. Hence there is a need to try and distinguish 
between different interest groups in these bodies, and to discover how 
they interact.
As we have seen, ideological and economic aspects of the political 
processes, are closely linked to policy formulation. While the 
left/right alignment has a role to play in this, there are many 
additional complexities - personal animosities and rivalries, regional 
conflicts, institutional interests in the Soviet political processes. 
As Aspaturian comments, unlike the American political system, there is
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a lack of distinction between public and private sectors in the USSR, 
instead there being an interplay of pluralistic groups. These groups 
can be roughly divided in their attitude towards foreign policy, along 
the economic/ideological lines already related.
Hence the groups who favour a relaxation of international tension can 
be identified as:
(a)those involved in areas of the economy that benefit from a more 
flexible trading policy abroad, such as those concerned with 
technological and specialist resources.
(b)those favoured by a less military orientated foreign policy, ie 
the manufacturers of consumer goods, managers of light industry and 
those working in agriculture.
(c)those who benefit from an increased standard of living as a 
result of finance made available due to reductions in military 
expenditure— consumers, white-collar workers, the working classes and 
peasant ry.
(d)those involved in the cultural and intellectual life of the 
USSR,eg academics who benefit from the cross-fertilization of Soviet 
and foreign ideas.
These groups are composed of the majority of Soviet citizens, but as 
Aspuriatian points out , in any power— structure there is:
"an inverse relationship between the size of the group and what 
might be called effective power density."18 
That Khrushchev was aware of the potential political power wielded by 
these groups can be seen in his ideological concept of "the state of 
all the people", and in such measures eg as in August 1964, the 
introduction of better salaries and pensions for the white-collar
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wo rk 6 rs.
There were also a considerable number of people and groups opposed to 
any reduction of international tension with the West, although for 
widely different motivations.
(a) bureaucrats and conservatives in the Party Apparatus, who wanted 
a strong set of ideological norms with which to perpetuate their power 
and to articulate policy. They felt threatened by Khrushchev's 
ideological flexibility in internal and foreign Soviet policy.
(b) the military whose very status was dependent on a perpetual fear 
of capitalist encirclement. During periods of good East/West relations 
eg when the test-ban agreement was signed in June 1963, there was an 
amount of demobilisation in the army, and a corresponding decrease of 
military prestige in society.
(c) those involved in heavy industry favoured an unstable 
international situation, to emphasise the priority of industrial goods 
and armaments production in the economy.
(d) the KGB and intelligence agencies, who thrive on uncertainty and 
intrigue, and who resented Khrushchev's attempts to limit their sphere 
of operations.
(e) groups opposed to Khrushchev personally, tended to oppose his • 
policies. Thus the "anti-party" group who opposed Khrushchev openly in 
1957, composed of such men as Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich,
Voroslilov, Bulganin, Shepilov and the heavy industry managers 
Pervukhin and Saburov.
The division of the Soviet political spectrum into these two groups 
obviously is not the definitive analysis, but it does provide a useful 
guide to some of the alignments possible between differing groups in
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Soviet society. There are many other divisive issues operating - 
regional differences such as the dispute between Siberia and the 
Ukraine over resources, also specialist rivalries as in the army 
between traditionalists and innovators over the favouring of rocket 
and nuclear forces. Personal rivalries, the influence of cliques and 
factional disputes complicate the picture still further. When 
examining Soviet foreign policy however, consideration of these 
tensions are vital to a deeper understanding of how policy is formed. 
This framework of allegiances will be tested in the case-study made, 
and by a process of deduction a more satisfactory and sophisticated 
model should emerge. We are now ready to look in more detail at the 
actual period in question.
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CHAPTER TWO. The 22nd Party Congress of the CPSU.
When the name of Khrushchev is mentioned, often the first thing to 
come to people's minds is the 20th Party Congress of 1956. Khrushchev's 
name is synonymous with his famous "secret speech" made at that 
Congress. The 20th Congress is often singled out as the most important 
event of the Khrushchev era. Why is this claim made, and how is it 
validat ed?
The 1956 Congress has been described as being the most crucial event 
in Khrushchev’s time in office,and it is undoubtably of fundamental 
importance to any understanding of Khrushchev and of the Soviet 
political system. The most significant event connected with it however, 
was in fact Khrushchev’s "secret speech", which was made just after the 
official Congress came to a close. This speech set an important 
precedent, as for the first time it was revealed something of the truth 
about the nature of the Stalinist regime, and of the large-scale 
repressions and deaths that took place.
"the cult of the person of Stalin became at a specific stage
the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave 
perversions of Party principles, of Party democracy, of 
revolutionary legality."1
and:
"Stalin used extreme methods and mass repressions" and "showed in 
a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality and his
abuse of power...... he often chose the path of repression and
physical annihilation, not only against actual enemies, but also
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against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the 
Party and the Soviet government. "2 
Khrushchev went on to give an account of the individuals who were 
falsely accused and killed through the Stalinist "terror" - Eikhe, 
Rudzutak, Kossior, Chubar etc.
This speech had enormous repercussions, as the truth about the last 
twenty-five years of Soviet history was directly acknowledged by the 
Chairman of the CPSU, and as delegates returned to their own regions to 
discuss the issues raised and their consequences. The impact of this 
speech was manifested not just in the reaction to it within the USSR 
itself, but also in the ensueing revolts in Poland and Hungary in 1956.
Some qualifications have to be given as to the significance of the 
speech, the most important being the "secret" nature of the speech. 
Although it was Khrushchev himself who gave the speech, it was done in 
a closed unofficial session, and its contents although published 
abroad, were not published in the USSR itself. Thus although radical 
change did result from this speech, it was mainly one resulting from 
exposure of truth, ie recognising the mistakes of the past and the need 
to turn away from them. It led. to a change of attitude, and to a 
greater awareness of the deficiencies of the system. It tended to be a 
slow and largely passive phenomena however, rather than anything of a 
more official or tangible form.
In many ways, the 22nd Party Congress of October 1961 was an attempt 
to implement some of the implications of this recognition of past 
errors in a more practical and lasting manner, a very much more 
difficult and demanding process. The 22nd Party Congress provided 
Khrushchev's one and only opportunity to consolidate the new
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ideological position that he had adopted as a response to the need to 
break away from Stalinism, and to see that take a more definite 
political shape. The 22nd Party Congress attempted to deal with major 
issues: to acknowledge an often hard truth of the scale of innocent
deaths resulting from political oppression and to reinterpret Soviet 
history from the mid-twenties in the light of this, for individuals to 
take responsibility for past actions, and to initiate changes in 
society to guard against similar events recurring, eg a resurgence of 
the cult of personality. At the 22nd Congress, more specific 
allegations and accusations of corruption and criminality were made, 
issues and events were publicly exposed and discussed, this process 
culminating in the passing of the resolution to remove Stalin's body 
from the Mausoleum. In this way the 22nd Congress was much more radical 
than the 20th, in that it publicly faced controversial and highly 
sensitive issues, and tried to deal with their implications.
The 22nd Party Congress is also much more representative of 
Khrushchev's period in power, as it clearly demonstrates his 
limitations, eg his failure to implement the calls for the expulsion 
of key individuals from the party. In the months before the Congress 
there had been much political instability, and while there was great 
triumphalist talk of "the building of communism", the name of Stalin 
had not in fact been overtly criticised. Thus the sudden emphasis of 
destalinisation was one used by Khrushchev to strenghthen his own 
position. There were 5,000 delegates at the 22nd Congress, 3 1/2 times 
more than at the previous ones. Khrushchev's use of such grass-root 
support was thus planned to overcome entrenched neo-Stalinist 
influence in the communist party. That this was not successful reveals a
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fundamental though understandable inability of Khrushchev to operate in 
a more open and therefore less predictable political system. As has 
been seen time and time again in the USSR and Eastern Europe recently, 
it is almost impossible for those who have held power in a fixed 
communist structured system to adapt to the concept of freedom of 
speech, political responsibility and answerability etc. Khrushchev, 
despite his undoubted talents, proved that he was unable to cope with 
mastering political techniques of influencing and manipulating power in 
a subtle but effective manner, especially when the Soviet people had no 
experience of how such a situation could function, and were not very 
responsive. Therefore his attempt to use "de-Stalini sat ion" as a 
political weapon backfired, and in fact contributed to his own 
political demise. Thus the 22nd Party Congress can be seen as the most 
fitting symbol of the Khrushchev period-depicting the hopes and ideals 
of a new generation, but the practical and cumbersome ideological 
restrictions of a people conditioned and scarred by the past. In the 
22nd Party Congress can be seen the synthesis of the major traits of 
the time, the ideological development of the revelations from the 
"secret speech", the stubborn opposition of vested interest groups and 
the strange mixture of general confusion and duplicity, reticence and 
stubbornly held beliefs contained in the political world. In the 22nd 
Congress can be seen a clear manifestation of the limits of 
Khrushchev's power, and the seeds of his downfall. The records of the 
22nd Party Congress depict the contradictions and confusions of Soviet 
political life, and give an indication as to the processes of Soviet 
decision-making.
This Congress provides the historian with insight into the political
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conflicts and tensions in a key period of Khrushhev's time in power, 
and this knowledge can be utilised to bring illumination to the 
political priorities of many of those in the Soviet leadership over a 
broader time period. This was not a Congress characterised by a facade 
of monolithic unity, and there are in fact many significant differences 
in the speeches of the delegates which can be fruitfully analysed. The 
following three sections intend to examine key themes and positions 
adopted by the delegates at the Congress. These themes can be discussed 
and analysed under the following headings :
1. domestic considerations: a. economic and administrative
b. ideology and the arts
c. the Party Programme and Personnel 
changes.
d. general aspects of the de-Stalinisation 
campaign
e. the anti-party group
2. foreign policy considerations:
a: looking at attitudes towards Berlin and
Cuba.
b: the relation between de-Stalinisation
and relations with Albania and China, 
c: the wider significances of the Soviet
Chinese split.
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3. Khrushchev as leader: a: a brief outline of Khrushchev's
leadership based on a general 
summary of the above, 
b: a consideration of Khrushchev's
character will be given, 
c: with reference to information from 
Sergei Khrushchev.
With this knowledge we will then be equipped to see how far the pattern 
of decision-making discerned can explain policy formulation both pre 
and post October 1961.
SECTION ONE: DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS.
(a)Economic and administrative issues.
The subject of industry and of agricultural administration was one 
of great controversy and debate in the USSR at this time, and this can 
be clearly seen in the speeches made at the 22nd Party Congress. Out of 
the 103 speeches made, at least 10% of them were highly critical of the 
current situation (see appendix, table 12), while many more made a 
number of serious criticisms of the governmental structures of 
administration. One of the most hard-hitting speakers was D S Poliansky 
who provided a whole range of examples of acute economic mismanagement. 
He says:
"Production and construction plans are often not well co-ordinated
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with plans for material and technical supply and co-operative
deliveries..... the construction base lags seriously, and the
funds allocated by some economic councils are not being used 
up. ... there are serious shortcomings in selecting the orientation
in capital work poor use of land a fundamental reorganisation
of the training of specialists'^
Voronov singles out "serious shortcomings"4 in the All Russian Economic 
Council,the Council of Ministers and the local party cadres, and many 
others echoed this complaint. Kirilenko heavily criticises the State 
Planning Committee and the all Russian Economic Council as being:
"to blame for the unsatisfactory state of capital construction; 
they are making serious mistakes in planning the opening of 
capacity,doing a poor job of working on long-range designing of 
equipment for new enterprises under construction etc..."5 
There was a general impression given of poor management in many of the 
Republics, and a call for greater co-ordination between the different 
groups involved. Different methods of reaching this goal were proposed, 
with Brezhnev calling for increased involvement of the masses in 
administration, Krotov talking of the need for more forward planning, 
to have a more incentive based economy etc. Again on this issue it was 
Poliansky that spoke out using the most direct language:
"Unfortunately, we still have in our midst a highly tenacious 
category of people who consistently make a mess of things and yet 
for some reason remain numbered amongst the "reponsible officials" 
year after year"6 
Thus there was a very visible dis3tisfact ion not just with the 
decisions of the various planning bodies, but with the nomenklatura.
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itself. Although very often specific names were not mentioned, everyone 
knew the groups referred to. Some delegates went to great lengths to 
avoid attributing blame to identifiable individuals. Thus M T Yefremov 
makes the point that criticisms of the planning bodies mentioned, are 
not a reflection on those in charge of them, ie Novikov, Gerasimov and 
Afansyev, as they have only taken up their posts comparatively 
recently. Thus despite much rhetoric and heavy criticism, no-one seems 
to be directly to blame. Everyone is afraid for their own reputation 
and no-one is prepared to cast the first stone.
In the agricultural arena also, there are many criticisms, although as 
one would have expected, there is considerable regional variation. The 
predominant complaints are however the shortages of equipment, the need 
for advancement in animal husbandry, changes in the grass-crop rotation 
system,the need for more specialisation etc. There was also a certain 
amount of advancements acknowledged, and predictably enough some praise 
of Khrushchev in this particular area. Khrushchev is praised by V M
Kavun for his intervention on a Ukrainian working farm, while A V
Gitalov earnestly and emotionally thanks him for his role in bringing 
about greater corn harvests. Smirnov manages even to put in a word for
Khrushchev in advocating the use of automatic welding gear at the
Baltic shipyards, and comments on the wonderful change that this 
brought. Despite these favourable mentions however, Khrushchev's name 
is not in fact mentioned as many times as might have been expected.
Talk is centred around mismanage meat and unsatisfactory conditions, and 
the predominant tone was one of frustration.
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(a) Ideology in the arts and society.
Khrushchev, in his Central Committee Report given to the Congress on 
the 17th October, states:
"Our Party conceives the whole point of its activity to lie in 
raising the people's well-being, in cultivating the material and 
spiritual demands of Soviet man and satisfying them more fully."7 
Khrushchev talks of there being "the most favourable opportunties 
created for the flowering of free artistic creativity and for active 
participation by the masses in the creation of cultural values" and 
asserts that:
"art is called upon to educate the people first and foremost on 
the basis of the positive values in life, to educate people in the 
spirit of communism. "8 
This view was the general concensus of the delegates, although the 
Minister of Culture, Ye. A Furtseva commented that more writers were 
needed that had closer ties with the people. Only two main speakers 
elaborated on the didactic element that was seen to characterise sound 
communist literature. Adzhubei called for increased humanitarianism and 
compassion in artistic work saying that the:
"callousness towards the sincere impulse of a man who wants to do
41
something good and useful is intolerable.53 
Tvardovsky, while admitting that "writers have been called the Party's 
right hand helpers", perceptively commented that this did not mean that 
novels should concentrate on issues like whether Grunya should milk 
above capacity to increase the efficiency of her unit, but that the 
complexity of life should be characterised.
"One of the astonishing features of art is that unless the artist
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himself is moved. ... no miracle occurs"54
It is surprising that there was not more open debate about the role of 
the arts by the delegates, as it was a sphere of continued and vigorous 
controversy in the early i960's. A brief survey of the happenings in 
the cultural affairs of the Soviet Union at this time will be given as 
it's illustrative of Khrushchev's leadership style. As we have seen at 
the Party Congress, while greater freedom in artistic endeavour was 
encouraged, art and literature's function was still seen as a way of 
promoting communist goals and inspiring the Soviet people to greater 
achievement.
Certainly when Khrushchev came to power there was a thaw in the 
literary world, and from 1956 onwards books such as Dudintev's Not By 
Bread Alone, which was highly critical of the Soviet system was 
published. This apparent freedom continued into the early I960's when 
a number of controversial works were published. However this "freedom" 
was as always carefully channelled towards the one end, ie to encourage 
criticism of the previous regime, and to inspire people to take the 
initiative and to work for a better future. This ideological aspect can 
be seen in the publication of works such as the poem Stalin's Heirs, 
and Solzenitsyn's One Day in the life of Ivan Denisovitch in 1962, a 
novel which is famous for presenting a gruelling and bitter portrayal 
of the Soviet labour camp. It Ls interesting that the decision to 
publish such works did not reflect a general attitude of the 
recognition of literary merit. There was much international criticism 
of the Soviet decision of 1958 to ban Pasternak's Dr Zhivago, and this
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seemed to be a reflection of the fact that this novel was not seen as 
serving a Marxist-Leninist goal.
If, as has been suggested above, Soviet arts were strongly manipulated 
for political reasons, to what extent was Khrushchev himself involved 
in this? It is interesting to note that the body officially in charge 
of cultural policy was the cultural section of the Central Committee. 
However this was a very conservative body, and it was not in favour of 
more radical publications of any kind. In fact true power lay not with 
the committee, but with influential figures amongst the intelligentsia 
that were favoured by Khrushchev. Khrushchev took a keen personal 
interest in the arts, and was very much influenced by men with more 
liberal sympathies. Two of the most important of these men were VS. 
Lebedev, on the Council of Ministers, and A.Tvardkovsky, Editor of Novy 
Mir. Both men worked hard to get more outspoken pieces of work 
published, and it is highly significant that they did so by going 
directly to Khrushchev. Khrushchev operated to bypass official channels 
that did not agree with him by creating personal coteries of advisers 
who gained influence over issues far exceeding their official capacity. 
One of Krushchev’s most trusted advisers was A.Adzubei, Khrushchev*s 
son-in-law. Adzubei wrote glowing reports of Khrushchev's achievements 
in the press, in 1959 even writing a book to recount all the details of 
Khrushchev's trip to the United States. Adzubei is an interesting 
figure in a number of ways, as Khrushchev also used him in other 
spheres, particulary in foreign policy, where he was often used as link 
man to relay information to foreign officials.
Policy formation in the arts then is highly instructive, as it
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confirms Khrushchev's methods of bypassing departments or committees 
with whom he was not in sympathy. Khrushchev instead often relied on 
his own instinctive judgement as in the Manege, or got his own way by 
acting on the advice of a small band of select advisers who received 
privileged information and status because of this. Khrushchev's 
willingness to "hold court" in this way alienated many, and can be seen 
as symbolic of his failure to work effectively within the Soviet 
political system.
(b)The Party Programme, and Personnel changes.
The very fact of there being a new draft party Programme in 1961 in 
itself is indicative of the extent of Khrushchev's influence. This was 
only the third party programme since 1903 (the second one being in 
1919). It was thus long overdue, and its very existence was due to 
Khrushchev's recognition of this fact. Tucker says of the draft 
programme that "the imput of Khrushchev's political orientation lies 
clearly upon it."11 He uses the following examples, the re­
organisation of MTS's (ie machine tractor stations),the virgin land 
scheme etc. Certainly in the field of agriculture Khrushchev seems to 
have had considerable influence. Much of the tone of the Party 
Programme is very much of Khrushchev, the optimistic assertion that 
there would be huge improvements in living standards, housing and 
education etc. However there is one vital area where Khrushchev's 
influence is not so clear, that of industry. In any society it is in 
the industrial sector that the critical battles are fought and won, and 
it seems to be precisely here that the limits of Khrushchev's power can
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be seen,
Political reform also, the introduction of the rotation of all senior 
positions and the cadres, the increased number of central committee 
members (in 1956 there were 133 full members and 122 candidate members, 
in 1961 175 members and 155 candidates), and the concept of the 
withering away of the state seemed to reflect Khrushchevian views 
stressing the importance of the individual. Khrushchev understood that 
the only way to overcome the nomenklatura and the inertia of the 
bureaucrat was to encourage individual initiative:" It is the millions 
of such innovators that are the flower and pride of our Soviet 
society."11. A reflection of his attempt to achieve this is that 110 of 
the 175 Central Committee members of October 1961 were new. To this 
extent Khrushchev was successful. However in practice many of 
Khrushchev's plans were not in fact carried out. One area which 
reflects this is that of personnel changes.
In terms of personnel, an examination of changes in the membership of 
the Presidium and the Secretariat are enough to show the political 
trends of the time, and to demonstrate something of Khrushchev's power 
in practice. The Presidium was reduced from 14 full members to 11: A. B. 
Aristov, Ye. A. Furtseva, N. G, Ignatov and N, A. Mukhitdinov all were 
demoted, whilst G. I. Voronov entered into the Presidium. In this case 
Khrushchev lost two of his allies Furtseva and Ignatov. Khrushchev 
appears to have had more of a say in composing the voting lists for the 
Secretariat, in that there is a greater number of young officials 
coming in - I. V. Spiridonov, P. N.Demichev, A. N. Shelepin, L. F Ilyichev 
and B. N Ponomarev. Out of these as has been seen from the speeches made 
at the Congress, Ilyichev and Shelepin both played a prominent role in
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the de-Stalinisation drive. Thus on the whole Khrushchev does not seem 
to have a firm or consistent influence on the major political 
appointments of the day.
DE-STALIM SATIN.
De-Stalinisation is as the name suggests, a campaign which aimed at 
reducing the influence of the Stalinist philosophy on all aspects of 
Soviet political life. This process had been gaining momentum ever 
since the death of Stalin in March 1953, and had been given an enormous 
boost as we have seen at the 20th Party Congress, where the evils of 
excessive Stalinism were clearly seen. It's important to notice when 
considering the issue of de-Stalinisation, that there was no indication 
before the Congress that this would even be mentioned, never mind that 
it would become the major issue of the entire Congress. As M.Fainsod 
comment s;
"The highlights of the Congress were the open airing of the Sino- 
Soviet differences over the treatment of the Albanian Workers 
Party and the full-scale attack on Stalin and the anti-party 
group. Neither was foreshadowed in the Agenda"13 
In the days leading up to the Congress, the main topic of conversation 
was the Third party programme, and the new ideological emphasis 
contained therein. While this fact has been noted earlier, it would be 
interesting to attempt to develop this further. Was this a deliberate 
policy by Khrushchev to surprise delegates with possible Stalinist 
sympathies? Even that looks unlikely, as in his opening speech, 
Khrushchev talks about the struggle against the anti-party group in the
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past tense: "it was a struggle of principle, a sharp political 
struggle, a struggle between the new and the old"14, and even gave 
qualified praise to Stalin:
"Of course J. V.Stalin did make great contributions to the Party 
and to the Communist movement, and we give him his due."15 
Thus there was little indication given about the primacy that de- 
Stalinisation was to have in the days to come. Another anomaly is that 
Voroshilov, one of the targets of the later campaign of anti-party 
rhetoric was sitting on the dais with the other members of the congress 
presidium. Perhaps this was a result of Khrushchev wanting to display 
publicaiy his magnanimous heart, but that appears to be the only 
explanation unless the implications of the de-Stalinisation campaign 
was not anticipated by Khtrushchev himself directly before the
Congress. Therefore if there was a change of emphasis or policy, it
must have taken place in the early days of the Congress itself.
On first perusal, there are no obvious clues contained in the 
philosophical and theoretical justification given by delegates as to 
why this issue was raised with such force at this particular time. 
Statements like that of Semenov:
"The Stalin cult, with its dogmatism and gross violations of 
socialist legality, was alien and hostile to Soviet scientists"16 
and of D. Razulov;
"Life has fully borne out the soundness and timeliness of the
measures taken by the Central Committee of the CPSU to expose and
put a stop to the divisive activities of the anti-party group of 
Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Bulganin and others. "17 
didn't provide any reason of why it had become so important to discuss
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these issues further. Certainly there was a general realisation that 
Stalinism had done much damage, but it was seen by many as an issue 
solely relating to past events, and there was not so much indication as 
to why the issue was raised with so much vehemence and so unexpectedly 
at the Congress.
Perhaps a greater insight into the whole issue can be gained from 
looking at some of the stated aims of de-Stalinisation. Here the 
ideological framework being introduced seems especially important - the 
concept of the "new man" and "the state of all the people". The stated 
aims of the new Party Programme: the construction of the foundation of
communism, the concept of "the state of all the people" and of the need 
for individual initiative were a radical departure from those of Stalin 
and were a developement even of the ideas propounded by Khrushchev in 
1956. The new Party Programme emphasised individual initiative and 
responsibility, so here at least a change of attitude towards the past 
was needed, plus a method of translating this into practical terms. De- 
Stalinisation was thus partly to increase individual awareness of the 
past, and to create an realisation of the creative potential and 
opportunities for the present. This concept is reinforced by the new 
emphasis on party legality also, in order to try to provide people with 
a greater sense of security and confidence. Thus the justification and 
reinforcement of the Party Programme remained one of the main aims of 
the Congress. The de-Stalinisation campaign became a vehicle for this.
There were of course other reasons also for the ferocity of the de- 
Stalinisation campaign, and as you begin to study the nature of some of 
the speeches made, this soon becomes more apparent. The first speech of 
significance in this area is that of P. A.Satuikov. He singles out
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Molotov particularly for vilification as a Stalinist who flouted the 
laws of socialist legality. In the 1920’s, Molotov was apparently 
described as being accused of:
"lack of proper tact....the factual groundlessness of the 
accusations and completely inadmissable demagogy have forced the 
conference to censure the afore-mentioned comrades"18 
also that in the 1930's Molotov was described as "guilty of flagrant 
abuses of revolutionary legality"19. Ail then becomes clear, when at 
the climax of this speech, Satiukov states: "The delegates to this 
Congress should know that in October of this year, just before the 
Congress opened, Molotov sent a letter to the Central Committee. "20 
Although the contents of this letter has never been publicly 
disclosed, an understanding of the contents does become discernible. It 
is described as an attack on the draft Party Programme and Central 
Committee. Another delegate, Pospelov revea I ingiy talks of "the anti­
party attacks by Molotov against our programme"21, implying that the 
anti-party group still has some influence at that time. He then 
proceeds to state: "There is no doubt that the 22nd Congress will
unanimously approve the proposal of a number of delegates to exclude 
these fanatics from the Party's ranks."22 Thus Pospelov in his 
influential position as Director of the Institute of Marxist-Leninism, 
perhaps unwittingly reveals that Molotov, and all that he represents, 
is still seen as some type of threat. Yet again it must be asked, why 
make such a fuss about a letter from a discredited political leader?
There are two main reasons that can be derived from the speeches made. 
The first is related to the nature of the de-Stalinisation campaign, 
and particularly to the denunciation of the anti-party group. This
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group of eight people; Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, 
Bulganin, Pervukhin and Saburov and Shepilov, derive their identity 
from being the key political figure who acted against Khrushchev in 
the 1957 coup attempt. Yet this is not presented as the main accusahon 
against them, ie their main crime is not one of ideological deviation. 
Instead, attention is drawn to their role in the "mass repressions" in 
the 1930's themselves. Thus F, N. Petrov declares that:
"This group bears direct responsibility for the mass repressions 
against honest Party members, including the infamous persecution 
of many old Bolsheviks"23,
L N Yefremov puts it even more bluntly:
"The bitter attacks made by Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, 
Voroshilov, and the other members of the anti-party groups on the 
Party's Leninist policy reflected their anxiety to escape personal 
responsibility for the mass acts of repression against many Party 
and state officials."24.
The matter was not left to rest there either, and a later speaker, 
the head of the KGB, A.N, Shelepin made the following statement:
"Numerous documents in our possession prove irrefutably that the 
members of the anti-party group were guilty of illegal mass 
repressions against many Party, Soviet and Young Communist League 
workers and military people, and bear direct personal 
responsibility for their physical destruction."25 
Shelepin then goes on to give more details about the Kirov 
assasination and the purges in general in the 1930's. Some of this 
information was new to the delegates there, eg Shelepin spoke of 
Voroshilov's mistreatment of Yakir, Malenkov’s involvement with the
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Leningrad case etc. The point that seems to have been being made
especially with the phrase "numerous documents" was that the whole area 
of personal and culpable responsibility for the purges was not a closed 
matter, but could be re-opened at any time. Coming as it did from the 
head of the KGB, this then, was surely an ominous warning to those 
with Stalinist political outlook that if they made their views too 
blatant, they too might be subject to scrutiny about their activities in
weapon used by Khrushchev to intimidate and divide the opposition to 
the ideological theory and implementation of the Third Party Programme.
The second reason why Molotov's letter was perhaps treated in a more 
serious way was because of Khrushchev's awareness of the ideological 
congruence of Molotov's position with that of the Chinese Communist 
Party. This divergence of opinion between China and the Soviet Union 
had been worsening for some time, and statements like Molotov's 
accusation that the draft Party Programme was "anti-revolutionary, 
pacifist and revisionist"26 was deliberately intended to be both 
provocative and divisive. Kuusinen was the only delegate to draw out 
this inference, commenting that:"
"In essence, Molotov is trying to concoct a kind of sectarian 
platform for his further anti-party profiteering. He apparently 
has decided to stir up the waters in order to try later on to 
catch a fish in these muddy waters. Perhaps the bait will be 
swallowed by some bony sprat if not here in home reservoirs, then 
at least somewhere in foreign waters. "27 
The dispute between the two communist parties became painfully obvious 
during the heated exchanges between Khrushchev and Zhou Enlai,
Thus de-Stalinisation was partly a political
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especially over Albania, with the attitude of the Chinese delegation 
to Khrushchevian ideology being thinly veiled criticism, eg:
"Openly exposing disputes between fraternal parties and fraternal 
countries for enemies to see cannot be regarded as a serious
Marxist-Leninist approach The Communist Party of China
sincerely hopes that the fraternal parties between which the 
disputes and disagreements exist will reunite on the basis of 
Marxist-Leninism"28 
Some form of alliance between certain factions in the Chinese communist 
party and key individuals on the Soviet political scene was a real 
possibility, and again this made the form of Molotov's attack more 
potentially powerful and troublesome. Tatu offers an interesting 
perspective on this. Of Khrushchev he states:
"his 1961 attacks against these men now defeated, were really 
aimed at other opponents, still in the saddle, whom he was
trying to eliminate...........And who were they? To begin with,
probably Suslov.. . . Who seemed a likely candidate for "guilt by 
associat ion".
But even men like Mikoyan and Kosygin might eventually feel 
threatened."29
With Khrushchev’s position under threat in the worldwide communist 
movement, he didn't want to have to face increased political pressure 
from within also.
The effect that Molotov's letter appears to have had on Khrushchev 
again would seem to indicate the insecurity of his position. This is 
backed up in a number of ways. Firstly Khrushchev himself was open to
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suspicion concerning his actions in the 1930's and 50's. Attention was 
brought to this, probably completely inadvertantly by Ye. A. Furtseva. Of 
a Central Committee Presidium meeting in late 1957 she comments:
"The meeting was discussing the complete rehabilitation, including 
rehabilitation in the Party, of persons who at one time had been 
prominent in our army's leadership - Tukhavevsky, Yakir,
Uborevich, Yegorov, Eideman, Kork and others. So obvious was 
their innocence that even Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and 
others declared for their rehabilitation, although they had had a 
hand in their tragic deaths.
And at that point in the discussion Nikita Sergevich very calmly 
but bluntly asked them: "When were you right, then? When you 
voted to doom them, and that doom was so tragically sealed, or 
now that you are for completely rehabilitating them? Tell 
us, when were you right?" This blunt behaviour infuriated and 
flustered them"30
This question could equally well have been asked of Khrushchev himself.
Another area which shows ironically both the apex and the nadir of 
Khrushchev's power are the events concerning de-stalinisation in the 
aftermath of the Congress. Yes Stalin's body was removed in dramatic 
fashion from the Mausoleum, yet it is likely that this decision was 
taken on the basis of the ratification of the Congress itself, and not 
of the Presidium. In Khrushchev's closing speech to the delegates he 
st ates:
"Mass repressions began after the assassination of Kirov. 
Considerable effort will still be required to establish who
was guilty of Kirov's death The man who guarded Kirov was
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killed. Afterwards the people who had killed him were shot. This 
was obviously not an accident but a deliberate crime. Who 
could have committed it? A thorough study of this complicated 
case is now being made. "31 
Despite all this rhetoric however, the matters that Khrushchev raises 
are not brought up again. This would seem to indicate that there was 
too much opposition from Khrushchev's political colleagues for this 
issue to be aired more fully. Khrushchev's power seems to be strongest 
when he has support outwith the Presidium, eg with the direct vote on 
the removal of Stalin’s body. However in other areas, he seems to be 
very much restricted.
Some of the nuances of the various possible political alignments 
involved in these disputes are further explored in the section 
"Khrushchev as leader".
(c) The Anti-Party Group.
The mechanics of de-Stalinisation involving the anti-party group 
itself are also worth investigating at some length, as it was one of 
the most controversial issues at the Congress, and therefore also one 
of the most revealing. While the issue of de-Stalinisation generally 
was one mentioned by practically all the delegates (unless they were 
one of the more obscure functionaries), the way in which this was done 
often varied radically. As we have seen, the anti-party group was seen 
as the embodiment of Stalinism, yet it was defined and associated with 
greatly differing concepts. Therefore an investigation of these 
differences by the use of a database provides a good way of gaining
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insight into different individual's positions and attitudes to 
fund mental questions of ideology and politics. The study of the 
controversy over the anti-party group is one of the most fascinating 
and revealing phenomena of the Congress.
In the initial speeches of the Congress, the issue of the anti-party 
group was not really central. This can be explained through examining 
the political background concerning the fate of the anti-party group in 
the period between June 1957 and October 1961. At the June plenum in 
1957 there was an attempt within the Presidium to oust Khrushchev from 
his position as First Secretary, a move which Khrushchev countered by 
involving and gaining the backing of the Central Committee. Of the 
eight main characters (Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, 
Bulganin, Pervukhin, Saburov and Shepilov) involved in this coup 
attempt only Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich and Shepilov were 
expelled from both the Presidium and the Central Committee, Saburov was 
dropped from the Presidium and Pervukhin was demoted to candidate 
member of the Presidium. Despite the seriousness of the accusations 
brought against the anti-party group not one of them was expelled from 
Party membership, this being indicative even at this early stage of the 
limitations of Khrushchev's power. While at the 21st Congress 
confessions were made by Pervukhin and Saburov as to their involvement 
in the plot, again little action was taken. By October 1961 there was 
no obvious reason to resurrect this whole sensitive area.
In October 1961 therefore, while passing reference was made to the 
anti-party group, initially it was not a main concern. It was only as 
the Congress progressed that it became a central issue. There was a 
wide variety of reasons given for criticising the anti-party group at
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the 22nd Party Congress. There were three predominant and significantly 
different themes. These can be defined in terms of the particular time 
period referred to.
One main group of speakers composed of slightly over 1/5 of the 
delegates, ie twenty two , emphasised in their speeches the crimes of 
the anti-party group in the 1930's (see appendix, table 8). Very often 
speakers would single out specific leaders who brought devastation to 
their particular republic or area in the USSR. Hence Podgorny and A.Ye. 
Korneichuk talk about Kaganovich's crimes in the Ukraine, while I. V. 
Spiridonov talks of Malenkov's destructive ways in Leningrad. These 
speakers talk of the anti-party group's criminal behaviour, with 
thirteen talking of "arbitrariness" and "mass repressions". Thirteen of 
these called for the expulsion of the individuals concerned on these 
grounds. Thus Ignatov says "the factionalists realised that the time 
would come sooner or later when they would have to answer for their 
villainous deeds"32 and Abramov declares:"the factionalist activity, 
collusion and outright crimes that we have heard about are incompatible 
with the title of Party member. "33 (It is worth noting here that both 
these men lost their positions at the end of the Congress, another 
factor suggesting Khrushchev's lack of influence.) On examining this 
group as a whole, it should be noticed that out of the thirteen 
delegates involved here, most of them were in their late fifties and 
ten of them were party members by 1930 or before (app, table 1). Thus 
the delegates who were most prepared to speak up about the repressions 
of the 1930's were the ones who lived through it and had perhaps seen 
relatives and friends losing their lives. This generation were aware of 
the injustices of Stalinism, yet were not closely enough involved that
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they would feel vulnerable to accusation. The nature of the action 
desired against those accused of criminal behaviour is ambiguous, as 
expulsion from the Party was a formal prerequisite before a Party 
member could be prosecuted in a Soviet court of law for a criminal act. 
Thus calls for expulsion could either be an end in themselves or the 
beginning of a. major purge. A sense of proportion seems to evaporate as 
the distinction between criminal acts in the past and political 
deviance in the present seem to become confused.
Another train of thought emphasised the 1957 struggle, with nineteen 
delegates taking this line (table 10). One of them Ponomarev the 
historian argued:
"The struggle proceeded around fundamental questions of the 
Party's line, including questions of ideology"34 
This more impersonal emphasis of ideology was one of just under a 1/10 
of the delegates who spoke (table 7), and perhaps suggested a desire 
not to delve too deeply into the past, and instead demonstrate a 
contemporary concern with finding approval for the Party Programme.
Most of these delegates interestingly enough, six out of the nine, were 
relatively young men who were in their forties^who hadn't joined the 
Communist Party until the late 1930’s.
A third group of delegates related these two different set of 
circumstances in explicit fashion. Thus there were comments regarding 
the anti-party group eg: "fearing it would be exposed and brought to 
responsibility, it simply clung to power"34. Poliansky too links it all 
together. Of the anti-party group he says: "They feared exposure. This 
united them, bound them in a mutual conspiracy." 35. Skolnikov took the 
matter further:
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"It is horrible to even think about the ruinous path onto which 
the factionalist Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov and 
their accomplices were pushing us"35.
Again the whole issue of the anti-party group is given a very direct 
relevance to the past and present conduct of individuals. Four of the 
delegates Adzubei, Iliachev, Mzhavanadze and Pospelov actually directly 
talked of their chief crime being the way that they conducted 
themselves in 1961 itself (table 9). This would again tie in with an 
opposition group focused around the position taken in Molotov's letter. 
This is further backed up by the fact that 9 delegates saw the anti- 
party group's chief crime as ideological, a significant proportion when 
the new Party Programme was being introduced.
Some participants mentioned and censured the anti-party group, but 
stressed that it was all in the past. Thus Kosygin says;
"It is not because the anti-party group constitute a force at the 
present time, or a danger to our party in its work, that we are 
speaking about them at our Congress. Our party is stronger and
more unified than ever But we are doing this to show the
Party and the People once again what the cult of the individual 
leads to. . . "37
Considering some of the many voluable exhortations to Khrushchev 
personally, there is an underlying note of threat in this remark. This 
provides a suitable reminder of the way in which the whole campaign 
against de-Stalinisation could have had detrimental ramifications not 
only for many senior delegates at the congress, and also for 
Khrushchev himself.
There are many areas of confusion over this whole affair, eg the
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position of Voroshilov one of the conspirators. Many people called for 
the expulsion of Voroshilov from the Party, because of his role in the 
attempted coup of 1957. All the way though the Congress, Voroshilov as 
part of the platform delegation, had to listen to accusations against 
him, till at the end on receiving forgiveness fron Khrushchev, he was 
re-elected. As we have seen previously this could well provide a 
suggestion that the ferocity of the anti-Stalinist campaign was not 
part of a long term plan of Khrushchev.
Having looked at the background to the de-Stalinisation campaign, and 
realised some of the issues involved, it would be enlightening here to 
pause and see what results we can obtain from a database analysis of 
the speeches on this issue.
The very definition of the anti-party group in terms of the number and 
the specificity of those mentioned by the delegates is informative in 
itself. Out of the speeches used La this database survey ,jr<:nnl03 
delegates, 48 of the delegates defined the anti-party group 
specifically as containing between 3-8 members ( table 3). That means 
that 55 delegates only briefly mentioned the anti-party group as having 
two main members, and hence failed to give any detail or any real 
attention to them. Only 13 of the delegates indeed mentioned all 8 
members of the anti-party group - a very low proportion. These 
delegates were Brezhnev, Furtseva, Grishin, Ignatov, Kirilenko,
Kosygin, Kuusinen, Mikoyan, Mukhitdinov, Nuriev, Ponomarev, Satiukov, 
and S'nvernik. It is significant that these were all leading members in 
the Communist Party hierarchy, and it could be speculated that 
Khrushchev was relying on men such as these to persuade and influence
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the majority of delegates because of their personal positions, as 
opposed to having an overall numerical superiority.
The accusations against this group varied enormously, with over half 
the delegates who spoke, ie 55, denouncing the anti-party group in the 
mildest and non-committal of terms, talking vaguely of the group as 
violating "party legality". 9 emphasised the ideological element, 
possibly in order to emphasise the contemporary relevance of the anti- 
party group to the Third Party Programme. Only 13 of the delegates 
admitted people within the group as being guilty of " mass and 
arbitrary repression", although 27 demanded the expulsion of the anti­
party group from the party, (table 1). As has been seen it was 
necessary under the law that a person must be expelled from the ranks 
of the party if they were going to be tried for criminal acts. Thus the 
number of 26 delegates demanding expulsion, 1/4 of the delegates is a 
little ambiguous, as there is no way of telling to what lengths they 
wanted the anti-party group to be punished.
The statistics given in the above examples, and which can be examined 
in more detail from the information in the appendix, clearly show the 
pressure that Khrushchev was under. Over half the delegates barely 
referred to the de-9talinist campaign, and most of the "old guard" had 
a vested interest in not examining their own past actions in too much 
det ai 1.
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CHAPTER THREE.
Foreign policy considerations.
(b) While the issue of Albania was perhaps the most controversial 
in the realm of foreign policy, there are other interesting areas 
covered. Concerning Berlin, the silence was perhaps more meaningful 
than what was actually being said. Out of all the speeches analysed, 
only 8 actually mentioned the German situation in any detail. In fact 
a reader of the official reports of the Congress could be forgiven for 
not noticing anything in particular going on in East Germany. This in 
itself must be highly significant when one considers that the Berlin 
Wall had been erected only eight weeks previously, and that there was 
still a considerable amount of tension in the whole area. A number of 
explanations could be put forward to account for this, one of which 
being that Soviet action in Berlin was rather an embarrassment because 
of the hard-line military action, but also possibly because Soviet 
action there could not credibly be justified by line of Marxist- 
Leninist doctrine being espoused at that time. It could be responsibly 
argued that in this case, Soviet action proceeded the doctrinal
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justification that it was meant to follow.
Out of the eight delegates who referred to the situation even in 
passing, the two who talked about it in most detail were exploiting 
the issue in order to further their own interests. Thus Malinovsky, 
the Defence Minister suggested that Western countries were preparing 
for war over Berlin, and that hence the Soviet Union needed to re-arm. 
He criticises Adenauer as being bellicose, and speaks of the Soviet 
Union's need for new missiles, anti-aircraft and anti-missile 
defences. Gromyko is the only delegate apart from Khrushchev, who 
discusses the diplomatic position in any detail. While Gromyko talks 
of the Vienna meeting with Kennedy as "one of the outstanding events 
of our time", he comments that if war is coming from anywhere it is 
coming from the U.S. He describes the world situation as "tense and 
unstable", and places a large part of the blame for this on West 
German militarism. Gromyko tries to make out that the U.S. government 
has no vital interest in Berlin, and that:
"If for certain figures in the West the German question is simply 
a "theoretical concept", for us it represents the millions of 
lives laid down by our compatriots for our country's freedom and 
for the liberation of Europe from fascist barbarism, it is a 
question of our security and the security of our allies." 1 
Gromyko thus speaks of the German question as an issue of defence.
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and calls for a German peace treaty as a way of "normalising" the 
situation and of establishing Berlin as a "demilitarised free city". 
Gromyko tries to justify the need for a German peace treaty, a 
pressing matter of international concern at this time. That Gromyko 
seems to emphasise this seems partly to reinforce his own belief in 
the need for a hard-line foreign policy. It is interesting that he 
does so by indicating that Soviet policy in the German dispute is 
defensive, as this doesn't seem to have been generally accepted by 
delegates at the Congress. Perhaps it was the tenuous nature of 
Gromyko's arguments combined with the aggressive rhetoric that 
accompanied it that seemed out of step with the mood of the Congress 
as a whole. This again could suggest that the decisions taken over 
Berlin only a couple of months before now looked difficult to justify. 
Does it also indicate a change of political alliance within the Soviet 
Presidium? That matter will be considered in more detail later. Only 
Kuusinen and Shelepin followed a line of reasoning in any way similar 
to Gromyko, Kuusinen talking of NATO as an aggressive body, and 
Shelepin emphasising the extent of CIA subversive activities being 
carried out there. The above mentioned speeches were very much the 
exception to the general rather embarrassed silence on the whole 
subject of the German question, the most likely reason for this being 
that it was not easily integrated into the ideological framework 
advocated at the Congress.
The speeches of Khrushchev himself are most revealing concerning the 
German question. In his opening speech to the Congress, Khrushchev 
makes a very significant statement:
"If the Western Powers show readiness to settle the German
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problem, the issue of a time limit for the signing of a German 
peace treaty will no longer be so important; in that case, we 
shall not insist that a peace treaty absolutely must be signed 
before December 31, 1961."2
This deadline had been imposed by Khrushchev....... , and the
withdrawal of the deadline, largely unnoticed within the Soviet Union, 
marked a significant policy shift. That this whole matter was still a 
live issue can be seen in some of the events in East Germany. On the 
21st of October the New York Times recorded Ulbricht as saying that he 
desired a peace-treaty to be signed "with no delay". Later in the 
week, on Friday the 27th it was noted by the same paper that Soviet 
tanks had moved into East Berlin, a sight not seen for several years. 
On Monday the 30th of October the Soviet Union exploded its first 50 
megatonne bomb. Thus while at the Congress itself the German question 
was barely mentioned , it seemed to be a difficult issue for the 
Soviet leadership to agree on>judging by the contradictory signs sent 
out. That this issue wasn't aired more openly is more evidence to 
support the contention that Khrushchev was feeling vulnerable.
Cuba also was very seldom mentioned in speeches, except in general 
terms - Mikoyan refers to Cuba as a beacon of light in Latin America,' 
while Adzhubei talks of Khrushchev's meeting with Castro and the need to 
support Cuba in the time to come. Again there is no indication of the 
decisions that were going to be made concerning Cuba in the next six 
months.
<b) The relationship between De-Stalinisation and relation?with 
China.
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Khrushchev's Secret Speech of 1956 was not just significant in that 
it exposed something of the truth about de-Stalinisation in the Soviet 
Union, but also because it reinforced Khushchev's line on foreign 
policy. His concept of "peaceful co-existence" was strengthened by the 
realisation of the paranoid nature of Stalin's reaction to events 
abroad. By 1959, Khrushchev was challenging three of Lenin's 
perceptions of the international order, that there was a capitalist 
conspiracy to fight the Soviet Union, that war was inevitable, and 
that Soviet military action was necessary to intervene in Third World 
countries was now outmoded and that wars of "national liberation" were 
more effective instead. Thus Khushchev called for creative Marxist- 
Leninism, an application of Leninist principles to the world at that 
time, which he argued had changed quite dramatically since the times 
of Lenin. Thus Khrushchev wasn't just reviewing and reinterpreting 
Stalin's regime internally, but the basic precepts of Marxist-Leninism 
as well.
At the 22nd Party Congress this trend was developed, with Khrushchev 
pursuing a flexible approach to foreign policy emphasising the 
political and economic aspects of communist expansion as much as the" 
military one. As might be expected there was much opposition to this 
within the communist party hierarchy, with many viewing it as a "soft" 
and feeble approach. This was especially true of the position of the 
army, who were fearful that this would mean a cutback in their power 
and influence. Thus Malinovsky's speech sounds very different in 
emphasis to Khrushchev's, with him describing:
"the intensified practical preparations for war being made by the
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Western countries with the "Berlin crisis" as pretext" 
and saying:
"We have no intention of attacking anyone, but at the same time 
we are firm in stating that we shall destroy any aggressor who 
ignited the torch of a world war"3 
Khrushchev by contrast said in his closing speech:
"if the Western powers show a readiness to settle the German 
problem, the issue of dates will not be so important. . . . The 
important thing is not the date, but a businesslike and 
fair solution of the problem. "4 
Khrushchev attempted to strengthen his position by identifying all 
those who opposed him on this ideological issue as "Stalinist" and as 
being vulnerable to charges of having connections with the anti-party 
group. That this was not an entirely fictitious manoevre is 
demonstrated at the Congress itself. In the speeches of some of the 
delegates, a letter was referred to, written by Molotov to the Central 
Committee shortly before the Congress. This letter, although the 
content of which was never officially disclosed in detail, seemed to 
contain accusations against Khrushchev and his philosophy of "peaceful 
co-existence". Thus Satiukov states of Malenkov:
"His contentions lead to the conclusion that it is impossible to 
continue the advance to communism without the most serious 
political conflicts with the imperialist countries and hence 
without war. "5
In this way, Malenkov is said to have exposed himself as "a 
factionalist and a plotter". How then was this difference of opinion 
over foreign policy manifested at the Congress?
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This issue had a direct relevance to all the countries represented at 
the Congress, and this was manifested most openly in relation to 
China. The Chinese delegate at the 22nd Congress was Zhou Enlai, Vice 
Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, who 
made his speech very near the beginning of the meeting. Zhou Enlai 
goes to great lengths to praise Soviet achievements in space, and then 
speaks of the Soviet desire for peace, saying that "the resumption of 
test explosions of nuclear weapons " by the Soviet Union was also a 
decision for peace. A more traditional Marxist-Leninist line was 
espoused: "the capitalist system is continuing its decline and decay 
and the imperialist camp headed by the USA is day by day nearer the
point of breaking up. "6 The USA is portrayed as determinedly
embarking on military action, and the Kennedy Administration is 
depicted as:
"insidious and adventurous. Seeking to make itself more 
attractive with an "olive branch", it spouts "peace", "progress" 
and "the prosperity of mankind", while under the cloak of 
"peace" it is actually making even more frenzied efforts in
the arms race and in preparing for war. "7
Thus Zhou Enlai sees the world purely in terms of militant Marxist- 
Leninist theory, and characterises the USA as war— mongering.
Another major difference can be witnessed through Zhou’s comments on 
unity between the Communist Parties. In his initial speech, Khrushchev 
had made a number of comments concerning Albania stating:
"the Albanian leaders have lately reversed their policy for no 
apparent reason, despite their previous assurances and contrary 
to the decisions of the Congress of their own Party, and have
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set out to seriously worsen their relations with our Party, with 
our country. They have begun to depart from the common agreed 
line of the Communist movement of the whole world on major 
issues of the day"8
The reaction of the Chinese delegation to Khrushchev’s speech was
noticeable: "they got slowly to their feet during the ovation, 
chatted, and then casually clapped "38a. Meantime Albania looked to 
China for support, a role which the Chinese communists were more than 
willing to take on. The Chinese leadership used the issue of Albania
and the ideological differences that it symbolised with great
vehemence, in order to encourage other communist parties to see that 
there were possibly two different viewpoints held by the two major 
communist powers, and that individuals had the opportunity to choose 
between them, ie the Chinese Communists were using the issue to 
challenge Soviet supremacy within the Communist world. This approach 
can be seen in the following quotation from Zhou Enlai's speech:
"...if, unfortunately, disputes and disagreements have arisen 
amongst the fraternal parties and fraternal countries, we should 
resolve them patiently, being guided by the spirit of 
proletarian internationalism and by the principles of equality 
and the achievement of identity of views through 
consult at ions....
Openly exposing disputes between fraternal parties and fraternal 
countries for enemies to see cannot be regarded as a serious 
Marxist-Leninist approach. Such an approach can only pain 
friends and gladden enemies. The Communist Party of China 
sincerely hopes that the fraternal parties between which the
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disputes and disagreements exist will reunite on the basis of 
Marxist-Leninism. ... "9
It is revealing to note that TASS didn't publish Zhou Enlai's 
comments on Albania. Zhou Enlai left the Congress unexpectedly early, 
again in a bid to embarrass Khrushchev. As it was Khrushchev who was 
openly challenging the leadership in Albania, Zhou Enlai was obviously 
criticising Khrushchev's judgement and his fundamental loyalty to 
Leninist principles, thus also directly challenging Khrushchev's 
position as head of the communist movement. The implications of this 
issue can be demonstrated in that at the Congress, N Korea, N Vietnam 
and Japan were silent on the issue of Albania, whilst India and 
Indonesia "tacitly" sided with China. This helps to show why 
Khrushchev felt he was under so much pressure.
It is interesting again to note the number of Soviet communists who 
went out of their way to show support for Khrushchev's position. 
Ignatov describes the Albanians as "moving further and further from 
the internationalist position" and says that "We cannot hush this 
matter up"10, while Mukhitdinov claimed "the anti-Marxist conduct of 
the present leaders of Albania stand out like a dirty spot"11. In 
total 5 of the 103 delegates surveyed support this position.
<c> The wider significances of the Soviet-Chinese split.
Before we leave the question of foreign policy discussed at the
Congress, it would be useful to view the issues involved in a wider
context, firstly in terms of ideological justification and then in 
terms of the practical implications for the world communist movement.
As we have seen shortly after Khrushchev came to power as First
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Secretary of the Communist Party in 1953, he revised traditional 
Leninist foreign policy. War was no longer seen as inevitable, and it 
was felt that by economic competition socialist forces would have the 
victory over capitalism, which would decline and collapse. In the case 
of "Third World " countries "wars of National Liberation" were 
favoured as a way of freeing them from capitalist bondage. Khrushchev 
argued that because of the existence of nuclear weapons, there
was a need too for an adaption of Leninist principles and that a new 
flexibility was needed. This is spelt out by him in some detail in his 
opening speech. The philosophy justifying this change is laid out 
here:
"This (Leninist) appraisal of the nature of imperialism fully 
retains its validity. Our Party, far from denying the accuracy
of this appraisal, reaffirms it, and proceeds from it always in
shaping its policy, in elaborating the strategy and tactics of 
the revolutionary struggle, as our Draft Programme clearly 
shows. At the same time the Party must, if it is to adhere to 
creative Marxist-Leninism, take account of the important 
changes that have come about in the world since Lenin furnished
his analysis of imperial ism. "12 
It is important to keep this statement in mind when looking at Soviet- 
Chinese relations.
The wider implications of Khrushchev's split with the Chinese over 
this issue of who was the true heir of Lenin are of profound 
significance. The severity of the attack on Molotov as has been 
demonstrated, was indicative of the mood against the Chinese and all 
those who held a similar political viewpoint. Fainsod sees to the
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heart of the questions raise at the congress:
"The vision of the communist future unveiled at the Congress left 
a most important question unanswered - whose vision,
Khrushchev's or Mao's?"13 
This had an immediate relevance for communist parties in emerging 
third world countries, countries especially in the Asian, Indian and 
Indonesian areas, where communist parties were readily influenced both 
by the ideological line and scale of practical help given by either 
super-power. Ultimately it was the ideological dispute between the two 
super powers that split the communist world in two, and changed the 
shape of the political map of the world.
Khrushchev as leader.
There have been many different evaluations of Khrushchev's 
leadership. There is controversy over Khrushchev not only in terms of 
his ideological orientation, but of his political effectiveness. In 
trying to make an objective decision about Khrushchev's leadership 
abilities we have to look not just at his rhetoric and presentation, 
but also at the extent of his power to influence policy and make 
decisions. The historian Fainsod, writing at the time of the Congress 
comment ed:
"for the moment at least, Khrushchev's status as leader of the 
Soviet communist party appears to be beyond challenge."14 
That this wasn't by any means a unanimous view is illustrated by an 
article written in the New York Times on the 2nd of November:
"The key fact about this Congress is that it did not go off as
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planned and that on balance it probably represents a major 
setback for Premier Khrushchev himself."15 
The French political journalist Michel Tatu tries to evaluate all this 
saying:
"For the period under survey no one was thinking of replacing
Khrushchev as First Secretary  neither he nor anyone else
had the slightest doubt.... that he would be triumphantly
"re-elected."16
One of the main aims of this section is to try to piece together from 
all the evidence that has been considered to what extent Khrushchev 
had control within the Soviet leadership.
One way of approaching such an issue is to attempt to discover how
far Khrushchev's policy preferences were carried out, and to what 
extent personnel favoured by him retained their positions by the end 
of the Congress. As the model for this, Khrushchev's initial speech to 
the delegates will be used. While it is recognised that this will to 
some extent be flawed because of the constraints put upon him, it can 
still act as a guide, especially when used in conjunction with other 
speeches made by him in the preceding years. Thus the extent of 
Khrushchev's influence in a number of areas will be assessed.
(a) Khrushchev's leadership position
<b) Khrushchev's personality.
(c) Conclusion taking into account recently released information.
We will then set this in perspective of the other material already 
gathered, eg concerning the economy, the anti-party group etc, to
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build up a comprehensive picture of the strengths and weaknesses of 
Khrushchev's leadership position during the Congress.
(a) Khrushchev's leadership position.
As we have seen, Khrushchev's leadership was challenged in most of 
the principal areas of Soviet politics, both internal and external. In 
terms of domestic politics, Khrushchev had some victories - the 
adoption of the new Party Programme, increased liberalisation in the 
Arts, bringing more party members into the decision-making process and 
the symbolic removal of the body of Stalin from the Mausoleum at the 
end of the Congress.
However, it has also been clearly demonstrated from the speeches 
themselves that Khrushchev's position, even at this time, looked 
distinctly shaky. The whole issue of renewing the attack on the anti­
party group seems to stem largely from Khrushchev's awareness of the 
insecurity of his own position. There was criticism of Khrushchev's 
policies in every sphere from agriculture to industry, and the 
fundamental tenets of Khrushchev's ideological beliefs were being 
openly undermined by a still powerful opposition. There were other * 
areas too which starkly revealed Khrushchev’s limitations. The 
closing resolutions that the Congress voted on contradicted Khrushchev 
on two key points. On discussing Stalinism it said:
"The Party has told the people the whole truth about the abuses 
of power in the period of the cult of the individual and has 
vigorously condemned the mistakes and perversions and the 
methods alien to the spirit of Leninism that were spawned under
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the cult of the individual"17 
However; it never mentions the seriousness of the charges speci f ically, 
or that they could be characterised as "repressions". This statement 
also makes the ridiculous assertion that "the whole truth" had been 
told, a statement which was blatantly untrue, and which Khrushchev 
himself had contradicted, Khrushchev stating, as we have seen, that 
more investigations should be called for. No mention of this delicate 
topic was ever heard again however. Thus Khrushchev's aims and 
objectives seem to have been very different from his political 
associates.
The congruence between the political alignment of Khrushchev's 
detractors within the Soviet Union are strikingly similar to the 
problems he faced with the Chinese in the battle for the leadership of 
the world communist movement. This helps to explain the way that 
Khrushchev must have felt pressurised from all sides at times, at home 
and abroad, and perhaps also accounts for some of his more erratic 
decisions in foreign policy.
(b) Khrushchev's personality.
Achieving a degree of understanding of the character and motives of 
Khrushchev is essential in making an appraisal of Khrushchev's 
leadership. Often the image of Khrushchev that most people hold is 
that of the "harebrain schemer", as he was so vividly described by 
the Pravda article of October 1964. Yet this image needs to be 
reassessed in order to obtain a more accurate and historically 
researched view.
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As we have seen, Khrushchev constantly talks of the need to revive 
true Marxist-Leninism, and it would seem from the consistency with 
which this view was held, eg from his own memoirs Khrushchev 
Remembers, and indeed right to the end of his life, that it was a 
sincere belief. Certainly Khrushchev pursued de-Stalinisation and 
democratisation to bolster his own political position, but there was 
more to it than this. Khrushchev went to extraordinary lengths to 
enact his belief re the injustices of Stalinism, eg in the late 1950's 
over eight million people were released from Soviet jails, and six 
million were posthumously rehabilitated. Khrushchev won international 
respect as a result of measures such as these. Some historians 
recognise that Khrushchev had a "genuine feeling for his own country 
and its people", and that he "had a vision for the Soviet 
Union. ... which he was driven to implement"18. While this last 
statement captures one of Khrushchev's greatest strengths, it was also 
his major weakness, as at times the grandness of his vision obscured 
his recognition of the obstacles to achieving it, thus leaving him 
with ideas which were impossible to translate into practice in a 
tangible form.
Over the years Khrushchev has been cast in a number of different 
roles. Medvedev, the dissident historian describes Khrushchev as 
being hard-working and uninspired, portraying him as "a victim of his 
own exhuberance. " 19. For a long time many people in the West have 
seen Khrushchev as the antithesis to Stalin, the reforming and 
liberalising hero. Yet this view from the other side of the political 
spectrum is also misleading, as it fails to take account of the 
Khrushchev who was uncertain about too much liberalisation in the
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arts, and who introduced and enforced some of the harshest anti- 
religious laws in Soviet history, ie the anti-parasitism laws. As we 
have seen in terms of the arts, Khrushchev seems to embody many 
Leninist ideological ideals, paradoxically, simultaneously attempting 
to allow the people a greater say and responsibility, as long as it
didn't challenge the official line of Marxist-Leninist thought as he
defined it. One historian describes the Soviet regime under Stalin as 
undergoing "an inner deradicalisation of revolutionary ideologies. "20a 
What Khrushchev seemed to seek was to reenvigorate these revolutionary 
ideologies within the Soviet political structure, ie while he rebelled 
against the conservatism and inefficiencies of the Soviet system he in 
fact sought to reintroduce the ideas of 1917. In this way Khrushchev 
could be seen as the orthodox rebel, whose "crime" was to wish to
reinstate, a creed which under Stalin had long since died, but which
officially had never been negated. In accusing the Soviet political 
system of such duplicity, Khrushchev was thus challenging the 
legitimacy and integrity of all involved in Soviet political life.
<c) Khrushchev: the current theories elucidated.
Since Gorbachev came to power in 1985, much has been written about N 
S Khrushchev. Under Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko, Khrushchev's 
name was not acknowledged in any way, so when "glasnost" began to 
become a reality, the opportunity for Soviet people to assess and 
discuss Khrushchev's achievements and true place in history for the 
first time was eagerly taken.
There have been two very differing conclusions regarding Khrushchev's
-78-
achievement. In an article in Time on 14th November 1988 written by 
Sergei Khrushchev, Anushavan Arzumanyan is openly critical of 
Khrushchev. He records the plenum of October 1964 as where:
"Khrushchev was accused of various sins, the unsatisfactory 
situation in agriculture, the disrespectful treatment of 
members of the Central Committee Plenum and disregard for their 
opinions and many other things,"20 
He goes on to say:
"The accusations that Khrushchev had undervalued other members of 
the Presidium and was tactless in dealing with them was a serious 
one. There was a considerable measure of truth in it."21 
As has been seen from this study, Khrushchev did undermine the 
official decision-making process in a number of important areas, so 
this specific criticism of Arzumanyan seems to have a factual 
f oundat ion.
An article in Moscow News by Levada is harsher, blaming the 
development of "our first perestroika at a jerky pace"22 directly on 
Khrushchev's own inconsistencies. He argues that Khrushchev didn't 
break free from the old ways, claiming:
"One of the tragic paradoxes of our development is that the 
reformers who carried out the 20th Party Congress, while 
condemning Stalin's theory about the aggrevation of the class 
struggle, revived it in a somewhat mitigated form as the 
"aggravation of the ideological stuggle. "23 
On foreign policy he says:
"Inconsistency and frequent sharp turns in foreign policy played 
up to aggressive forces in the West, complicated the
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international system and deflected resources."24 
While Levada admits that "the people, just emerging from political 
unconsciousness, were unprepared for change", he still blames 
Khrushchev personally for acting in a way that is inconsistent with 
his own words and ideals.
As we might expect, in his recent articles and interviews, Sergei 
Khrushchev, Nikita's son, attempts to justify many of his fathers 
actions and character. In an interview published in Sobesednik in 
November 1988, Sergei portrays his father : "everything that could
bring possible quick and practical benefit (for the Soviet people) 
caused his burning interest and active participation. "25 He describes 
the "decade of Khrushchev" as:
"the original prologue to our perestroika: the restoration of
truth and historical justice, success in the economic sphere, 
much promise, and important steps in the foreign policy of our 
state - all this is now justly associated with the name of N S 
Khrushchev. "26
Obviously Sergei Khrushchev is eager to give what he sees as his side 
of things in support of his father, but at times S Khrushchev's 
judgement or memory have been subject to question.
Sergei Khrushchev has written a four part account in Ogonyok giving 
new information regarding the overthrow of Khrushchev in October 1964. 
He describes how V. I.Galyukov telephoned Sergei to warn him of the 
plot against his father, but that when confronted with this 
information Khrushchev dismissed it feeling that: "No, that can't be,. 
Brezhnev, Podgorny, Shelepin - they're completely different 
people."27. Khrushchev then recounts how his father then went on
-80-
holiday to his dacha at the Black Sea, how the conspirators called him 
back, and finally how Khrushchev decided to leave his posts without a 
fight. This presents a much more dignified Khrushchev than F. Burlatsky 
portrays, Burlatsky claiming that Khrushchev twice tried to divert 
the plane from Pitsunda to Moscow. A.Adzhubei also casts doubt on 
Sergei's reliability as a witness when he says: " Sergei didn't know 
anything his father did: I don't believe that for a minute. "28
referring to Sergei's assertion that Castro had wanted the missiles 
fired at the height of the Cuban missile crisis. In this particular 
case, Sergei's words have subsequently been confirmed, but Sergei 
himself says in his Sobesednik interview:
"Concerning affairs of state, father could not bear the least 
interference on the part of his family. This area was absolutely 
forbidden to us, and I never even tried to push my opinion."29 
This would suggest that Sergei's knowledge comes largely from when he 
helped his father with his Memoirs in the later I960’s, and not from 
direct experience at the time. A reviewer of S. Khrushchev's book in 
the weekend section of The Times remarks that Sergei tends to portray 
himself as rather an innocent, and Sergei's account could well not be 
telling the full story. (NB. also rather a refined version)
F. Burlatsky has written a number of interesting articles on the place 
of Khrushchev in history. One of these in particular makes a number of 
perceptive points. Burlatsky tends to see Khrushchev as rather a 
romantic character, who: "saw his mission in bringing peace and a 
better life to the Soviet nation" and that this was the "main aim of 
his work"30. Burlatsky rightly gives Khrushchev much credit for 
speaking out against Stalinism:
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"In the composition of the post-Stalinist leadership there was 
not one other leader who decided to come forward with a similar 
speech about the cult of personality. "31 
Burlatsky sees Khrushchev acting because of " a sense of personal 
guilt; a protest built up over a decade, which under strain broke 
free, as steam pours out of a kettle." Burlatsky sees Khrushchev's 
main achievement as:
"on his own initiative put forward the task of creating solid 
guarantees against a recurrence of the cult of personality. He 
struggled without compromise for this within the country and in 
the international arena, not considering the cost which such a 
struggle would introduce in relations with other member nations 
of the socialist camp. 32 
This would seem a very perceptive remark, as this would explain much 
about Khrushchev's attitude and frustrations towards the Chinese, his 
main preoccupation being with trying to secure guarantees for a fairer 
society within the Soviet political arena.
Burlatsky's comments about Khrushchev's limitations are also 
perceptive. Like many other commentators he identifies one of the main 
problems as:
"Khrushchev was inclined to rely on flatterers rat hertKan genuine
supporters of reforming changes. Therefore he surrounded himself
with such flatterers eg N. Podgorny He had little use for
people of an independent nature, of substance, of scope. . And
this became one of the causes of his fall."33
This as we have seen, is an accurate viewpoint. Burlatsky also claims
as one of the reasons for Khrushchev's fall:
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" 'the fate of a man - is in his temperament. ' Nikita Khrushchev 
was a victim of his own temperament, but was also a victim of 
his surroundings. Haste, speed and emotion were for him his
I)
insurmountable features.34 
As has become apparent , many recent authors have concentrated on the 
reasons for Khrushchev's fall in October 1964. Yet these remarks are 
relevant to earlier years also, as many of them are applicable to the 
character of N 5. Khrushchev himself. It is interesting to see that many 
of the perceptions about Khrushchev's leadership style made during the 
analysis of material from the 22nd Party Congress are confirmed by 
people who knew Khrushchev well, and are writing about him now for the 
first time.
From all the different sources looked at in the last two chapters 
concerning the 22nd Party Congress and more recently available 
material, it can be recognised that while Khrushchev may well have 
been sincere and even idealistic in his beliefs, he alienated people 
by the political methods he used and thus made himself vulnerable to 
accusations from an attentive and growing opposition. This opposition 
was composed of the "old Guard", the army, staid Party apparatchiks, * 
conservative bureaucrats in establishments like the foreign ministry, 
and people who were frustrated with Khrushchev's inconsistency and 
heavy-handedness. This background gives important information of the 
pressures that Khrushchev was under even as early as 1961, and this 
must surely help to explain some of the contradictory signals given 
out in Soviet foreign policy around this period.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE BERLIN CRISIS.
"Time past and time present 
Are both perhaps contained in times future 
And time future contained in time past."
Burnt Norton, Four Quartets. T. S. Eliot.
In order to understand contemporary events it is always first 
necessary to look to the past. A time of particular importance to this 
process is the period June 1961-August 1963, a decisive time in the 
shaping of the contemporary world. With the last major resurgence and 
abatement of the Berlin crisis, many of the ghosts of the Second World 
War were laid to rest, and a new era of apparent "peaceful co­
existence" seemed possible. In both the USSR and the USA, major and 
significant changes were taking place: in the USSR, Khrushchev seemed
to be successfully attacking the traditional bastions of Stalinism and 
revitalising Marxist-Leninist theory, while in the USA, a youthful 
John F. Kennedy had just been elected President, inspiring in the 
American people a new pride and hope in their country.
Internal changes in domestic politics often have important 
ramifications on the international scene,and this period was no 
exception. Of far the most long-term significance was the ideological 
conflict between the USSR and China, as it effectively finalised the 
split in the Communist movement and irrevocably splintered the 
accepted "two camp" theory of international politics prevalent in the 
1940's and 50's. This example of the way in which domestic 
developments can have major international repercussions helps
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demonstrate the increasing degree of interdependence between domestic 
and foreign policy. As Hanrieder comments, it becomes necessary to see: 
"foreign policy as a continuous process that bridges the 
analytical barriers between the international and domestic 
systems. "1
In the years 1961-3, with the advent of increased technological 
development and a corresponding increase in the role of the press in 
international communication, there was a fundamental change in the 
form and pace of international relations. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev 
deliberately used the press as a way of delivering veiled signals and 
informal dialogue between the two super-powers, in a way which as we 
shall later see brought a new style and substance to international 
politics. Through a more detailed look at developments in 
international relations and in Soviet foreign policy, greater 
understanding of Khrushchev's position within the Communist movement 
and within the Soviet leadership should be derived.
The Berlin Crisis 1961.
Historians hold widely differing viewpoints about the nature of 
Soviet policy determinants and actions over the months of tension over 
the status of West Berlin in the summer and autumn of 1961. Certainly 
Soviet policy seems varied in character, and any underlying policy 
determinants are not easily ascertainable. In order to try to make 
some sense of this period, the following approach will be taken.
1. A brief outline will be given concerning the controversy amongst
historians on some of the issues to be discussed concerning Berlin.
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2. The background to the period - looking at some of the major areas 
of contention between East and West in the summer of 1960-1, and 
examining some of the barriers to communication resulting from this.
3. A more detailed examination of the period from the Vienna Summit 
in June 1961 till the 13th of August. This will cover the Soviet 
internal position, the nature of communication between the Soviet 
leadership and other relevant countries and from this will try to 
discern the most influential figures holding power in the Soviet 
Union.
4. The period from the 13th of August onwards will be assessed in 
some detail, using all the available sources to identify why the 
border between East and West Berlin was sealed and what the intention 
behind this move was.
5. Conclusions will be drawn from the material considered, and these 
will be viewed in the light of the additional knowledge that we have 
about the 22nd Congress itself.
1. Berlin: the theoretical and historical issues.
There are a wide variety of theories concerning the Berlin crisis, 
about why it happened and what its significance was. In order to come 
to terms with these different approaches a short time will be spent 
looking at the different arguments, with a view to later trying to
discover their accuracy and value as the case study itself progresses.
Some historians identify the military dimension of the European 
strategic situation as being a primary source of Soviet interest in a 
revision of the German situation. Thus Khrushchev's sudden
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announcement that the Allied occupation of West Berlin must end soon,
made on the 10th of November 1958, is seen as a direct response to his
perception of growing American strategic nuclear superiority in
Europe. Hence too the idea of an ICBM missile gap was introduced by
the Soviets. This idea is developed in Schickt's book The Berlin
Crisis, in which he talks of the Soviet desire to conclude a German
peace-treaty as a reaction to the decision of the Eisenhower
*
administration to deploy ICBM's in Europe. The possibility of 
stationing nuclear weapons in West Germany at this time was a live 
issue, and this could have been a contributory factor in the Soviet 
decision. Historians, such as Mackintosh feel that the Soviet 
leadership were pursuing the idea of securing central Europe - 
Germany, Austria and Switzerland as a demilitarised zone. There are 
theories that the aim of this new Soviet pressure was to pressurise 
the NATO alliance and to divide West Germany and France from Britain 
and the United States, thus weakening the military power of the 
Western governments. All these theories would stress the importance of 
Soviet military stategic objectives in Europe.
Other historians such as Isaac Deutscher assert that it is only 
against a background of the world Communist movement as a whole that- 
Soviet actions can be understood. He sees the Berlin crisis within the 
context of Sino-Soviet tension, and feels that Khrushchev took a 
hardline aggressive foreign policy stance over Berlin in order to 
demonstrate that he was not being "soft" with capitalism or betraying 
Marxist-Leninist theory. Deutscher argues that the dispute with China 
was especially important at this time, because of its intensity and 
because of Khrushchev's concern over the fate of the Communist
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movement as a whole, and especially in underdeveloped countries. By 
initiating a more aggressive foreign policy, the Soviet leadership was 
thus attempting to influence other communist countries, especially 
those vulnerable to Chinese influence eg in Asia, that the Soviet 
Union was still the leading communist power and hence the one to be 
aligned with.
An important influence on the Berlin crisis was obviously the 
situation in Germany itself. The role of East Germany in particular 
must have been of great importance in determining the policies of the 
Soviet Union. In i960 Ulbricht, the East German leader, launched a new 
and ambitious 7 year economic plan, which in turn lead to an 
increasingly inflexible and authoritarian mode of implementation. The 
process of intensive socialisation and the total collectivisation of 
agriculture had a devastating effect on the people of East Germany.
Not only was there a forced movement of people from one area to 
another, but there was a disconcerting economic instability, food 
shortages etc, and these pressures combined with a long term awareness 
of the comparative economic stability and freedom of West Germany> 
meant that many decided to flee from the Es^ st via the East German 
frontier. The professional classes were particularly aware of the 
possibilities and the attractions of the West. The numbers of East 
Germans fleeing to West Berlin increased as the Soviet propaganda 
against the capitalist West intensified. This became an urgent problem 
of crucial importance. On an already precariously balanced economic 
system, the effect of this drain on the labour force, especially 
amongst the skilled and professional classes, meant that Ulbricht was 
under enormous pressure to take some kind of counter-measures. His
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desire for urgent action must have put pressure on Khrushchev also.
Throughout the period 1958-61, Ulbricht's statements were 
consistently more virulent and aggressive than those of Khrushchev. 
Many historians feel that there was considerable East German pressure 
on Khrushchev to pressurise the West into signing a German peace 
treaty, which was seen as a way of relieving some of the internal 
pressure building up in East Germany. When this line of reasoning is 
pursued, then statements like those of Hanrieder seem relevant: "The 
building of the wall. ... had antecedents and causes that were not 
entirely under the control of Moscow. "2. This idea is also prevalent 
in Windsor's book in which he sees the local moves against Berlin in 
1960-61 as being made on East German initiative, and as often 
conflicting with Soviet policy. In this way some of the anomalies of 
what the American government and press saw as the Soviet communist 
monolith attitude towards the German issue could be explained. While 
the USA and the USSR saw the Berlin question in terms of global 
strategy and the fight for stategic predominance in Europe, East and 
West Germany at the ground level of this dispute were concerned that 
their respective superpowers might make concessions that would impair 
the economic and political position of their country. Hence at local 
level, the stakes see-mad very much higher than for the two super-powers, 
and local actions could be misinterpreted by either side as being part 
of a constant and provocative policy directed by the other. The idea 
of East German pressure for action within the Soviet Union, and of a 
pro-Ulbricht faction in the Presidium seem very credible in a number 
of ways. As we have seen there were a number of hard-liners in the 
Presidium who could well have supported a harder military line. This
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could correlate with a pro-Chinese faction who favoured a similar 
line, with the two working together. Two major studies have been made 
of the relation of foreign and domestic policy in the Soviet Union 
specifically over the Berlin crisis, one by Robert Slusser, the other 
by Hannes Adomeit. Both studies come to quite different conclusions 
about the nature of the Soviet leadership at this time.
In Slusser's The Berlin Crisis Of 1961., published in 1971, he argues 
that the Soviet leadership were fundamentally split over policy. He 
asserts that Khrushchev favoured a moderate foreign policy, and that 
it was only when under pressure from his Presidium colleagues that he 
took a more hard-line policy. Slusser claims to substantiate this by 
doing a survey of Khrushchev's speeches which he analyses to be 
consistently more conservative (ie less aggressive) than those of his 
Kremlin colleagues. In order to explain why the Presidium line was 
often more aggressive, Slusser identifies a conservative - military 
opposition, lead by Kozlov and Suslov, who pursued a more right-wing 
policy whenever they had the opportunity. Thus Slusser portrays 
Khrushchev as continually struggling against hard-liners - Gromyko at 
the Foreign Ministry, Kozlov at the Presidium and the senior army 
commanders. These pressures are seen to correlate with Khrushchev's 
increasing use of giving press interviews to Western journalists as a 
way of bypassing official channels.
"It was not merely, however, the officials of the Soviet foreign 
Ministry whom Khrushchev's unorthodox maneuvres were designed to 
circumvent, but his own colleagues in the Presidium. "3 
Slusser also backs his argument by referring to contemporary reports 
from Italy concerning the existence of a hard-line faction in the
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Kremlin, and from Yugoslavian sources reporting the existence of a 
military clique in the Soviet government. Slusser*s final conclusion 
is that:
"an opposition faction could play Russian roulette with the peace 
of the world by taking actions which deliberately risked nuclear 
war, and which a struggle for internal political power was 
successfully masked from the outside world"4 
Hence this is the reasoning that Slusser gives to explain the 
contradictions of Soviet policy in 1961.
The case-study conducted by Adomeit on the Berlin crisis of 1948 and 
*61 comes to a very different conclusion. It asserts that:
"There is no evidence for the existence of a hard-line faction, 
alone or in conjunction with the military, pushing, forcing or 
egging on the political leadership to take reckless action."5 
Adomeit goes to great lengths to show that it is quite in accordance 
with Khrushchev's interpretation of Marxist-Leninism ideology for him 
to pursue an ambitious foreign policy. Adomeit proceeds from this line 
of reasoning to argue that it was Khrushchev himself who demanded a 
vigorous and ambitious foreign policy, and that in fact it was the 
other members of the Presidium that were trying to stop him. Hence He 
argues:
"individual military leaders and members of the Party Presidium 
were concerned that Khrushchev might be going too far in his 
challenge of the West on Berlin, or that he might act too 
impulsively. "6
Thus Adomeit's conclusion is almost diametrically opposed to that of 
Slusser.
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These different historians' views have been considered at this point 
to illustrate the controversy over events in the Soviet leadership at 
this time. This helps us to focus on some of the difficult questions 
concerning Berlin and to understand why attention should be 
given to this area. A case study should provide some insight into how 
the various factors that have been mentioned, relate-the strategic 
importance of Europe, pressure from the communist movement abroad, the 
influence of Ulbricht, and how the Soviet leadership reacted to all 
these.
The background: linguistic ambiguities in an international setting.
"Will there be a Third world war?
-No, but there will be such a terrible struggle for peace, 
there'll be no stone left standing. "10
Soviet joke.
This "joke" has a very great significance for any historian trying to 
comprehend the workings of international politics as it clearly 
demonstrates the way in which the meanings of words can become 
distorted and warped.
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"...........Words strain,
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place,
Will not stay still............... "7
This detachment of word from meaning often allows apparent theoretical 
agreement between countries. When the practical ramifications become 
evident however, the agreement disintegrates as the reality of the 
positions of the countries involved break through. In contrast 
sometimes an agreement can seem linguistically impossible although the 
necessary framework for this to happen is well established. The 
difficulties and frustrations inherent in communication are 
acknowledged by the United States and the Soviet Union. Kennedy 
remarked at a press conference:
"it was important that we try to get at the real meaning of 
words, dealing with access and rights and freedom and the rest."8 
while Khrushchev struggles to determine:" the borderline
that separates "cold war" from war in the fullest sense of the
word. " 9
Misunderstandings between countries, whether genuine mistakes or 
political contrivances, can create an atmosphere of mistrust or 
cynicism on all sides. This can be demonstrated by looking at the 
remarks of Dean Rusk, the American Secretary of State, in a speech made 
on the 11th of July 1961. He comments of the Soviet quest for power: 
"In this process, the very language of international intercourse 
becomes distorted and contrived. "Peace" has become a word to 
describe whatever condition would promote their world
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revolution. "Aggression" is whatever stands in its way. "People’s 
democracy is a term applied to regimes no one of which has been 
chosen by free elections. Self-determination is loudly espoused, 
but only in areas not under communist control.
The normally attractive word "negotiation" is used as a weapon 
for the only subjects to be negotiated are further concessions 
to communist appetite. Agreements are offered, but against the 
background of a long and sobering list of broken promises; and 
agreement is apparently a rest-camp, where one pauses and refits 
for a further advance. New assurances are offered in the very 
act of withdrawing those earlier given. Law, as one of their 
spokesmen put it: is like the tongue of a wagon - it goes in the
direction in which it is pointed." And the gains of lawlessness 
are cited as the "new conditions" which justify new invasions of 
the rights of others."9 
This type of public statement would not it must be supposed be 
conducive to a furthering of any dialogue, but does provide insight 
into the frustrations of communication which must have been felt by 
negotiators on both sides. One of the difficulties for the historian 
is to,as Kennedy puts it "get beyond the rhetoric to the reality. "10. 
Yet this difficulty needs to be addressed before any significant 
headway can be made.
The negotiating process over the fate of Germany as early as during 
the latter stages of the second world war wets full of complexities 
and ambiguities. The initial agreement on the status of Berlin and 
Germany was drawn up by the European Advisory Commission, and in a
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joint Protocol of 12th September 1944 it confirmed that:
'"Greater Berlin'................. will be jointly occupied by
armed forces of the USA, UK and the USSR assigned by the respective 
Commanders-in-Chief. "11.
In the Yalta Protocol basic principles were agreed upon concerning the 
treatment of Germany as "a single economic unit"12 to be disarmed and 
demilitarised. It is important to notice here that at Potsdam it was 
envisaged that the four occupying powers, ie the USA, USSR, UK and 
France would co-operate during this period of occupation until a 
satisfactory German political settlement be achieved. However even at 
this early stage ambiguous phrasing concealed fundamental differences. 
Phrases such as "democratic" were interpreted by the United States as 
implying a Western style electoral system, while the Soviet government 
saw it being socialist-orientated. The Potsdam Declaration's reference 
that:
"supreme authority in Germany is exercised on instructions from
their respective governments by the Commander-in-Chief each
in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters 
affecting Germany as a whole in their capacity as members of the 
Control Council."13 
was ambiguous in its declaration that Commanders-in-Chief were to work 
both jointly and independently. In practice this meant that when they 
didn't agree, they all followed their own individual policies. Thus 
joint control broke down in Berlin, and in Germany by 1949 two 
separate and sovereign states were set up - East and West Germany.
From the start Soviet policy in East Germany was contradictory, on the 
one hand ruthlessly seeking economic benefits and reparations, on the
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other seeking to win approval from the German people themselves for 
the new communist regime. These two concurrently pursued aims 
succeeded only in alienating any support for communist rule that might
have existed. The geographic and strategic position of Germany as a
whole was a prize that neither super-power was prepared to relinquish, 
so the two sides remained in stalemate from 1949 and it was clear that 
the question of Berlin would continue to be a contentious issue.
The years 1949-58 were relatively quiet in terms of the Berlin 
question. In the early 1950's attention was drawn away from Europe to
the Far East when the Korean War broke out on the 25th of June 1950.
The effects of the Korean war had profound ramifications in Europe, 
bringing the increasing militarisation of NATO and bringing West 
Germany into the organisation. With the death of Stalin on the 4th of 
March 1953 and the ensuing struggle for power, the Soviet Union was 
too internally preoccupied to be on the offensive over Berlin. By the 
end of 1958 however, with Khrushchev's success at the 20th Party 
Congress, consolidated by the defeat of the anti-party group in 1957, 
with increased agricultural success and the launching of the Soviet 
Sputnik, stability seemed to have returned within the Soviet Union and 
the leadership appeared more confident.
In the spring of 1958, Khrushchev began to talk of "normalisation" of 
Berlin, and by the 27th of November 1958 he declared: "The Potsdam 
Agreement has been grossly violated by the Western powers. "14 and 
hence that a German peace treaty was long overdue:
"It is well known that the conventional way to put an end to the 
occupation is for the parties that were at war to conclude a 
peace-treaty offering the defeated country the conditions
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necessary for the re-establishment of normal life."15 
On first reading this sounds very reasonable until you come to 
passages like the following:
"Of course the most direct and natural way to solve the problem 
would be for the Western part of Berlin now actually attached to 
the GDR, to be reunited with its Eastern part, and for Berlin to 
become a unified city within that state in whose territory it is 
situated."16
Thus the Soviet goal becomes more apparent. Khrushchev was claiming 
that as West Berlin is surrounded by East German territory, the 
logical conclusion to this is that West Berlin should become 
officially part of East Germany. The underlying threat here is not 
further developed, but the implication seems to be that by not 
pursuing the matter further the Soviet leadership is making some form 
of concession. Khrushchev announced at this time that West Berlin 
should be a free city, and that the Western powers would be allowed 
six months to decide on their line of action. This began a new phase 
of concern over the German question. While the Soviet ultimatum was 
withdrawn in 1959, for the next three years the Berlin question 
continued to simmer away. Negotiations by the major powers over the ' 
German question continued sporadically at various foreign ministers 
conferences, at Camp David in 1959, and was to be raised again at the 
Big Four summit conference In May 1960. This meeting failed to take 
place however, after the Soviet shooting down of the U2 plane. By the 
beginning of 1961, the atmosphere was much calmer, so much so that 
Lord Home, the British Foreign Minister declared: "As far as we are 
concerned there is no German quest ion"17. Yet at the Vienna summit of
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3rd and 4th of June, the Soviet delegation lead by Khrushchev raised 
the subject of Berlin as an urgent and vital matter. If it could be 
discovered why the matter was raised so strongly at this time, perhaps 
some of the processes of Soviet decision-making would be clarified.
It would be helpful at this point to spend some time piecing together 
a picture of official Soviet policy, and the Khrushchevian Marxist- 
Leninist ideological framework that permeated all levels of Soviet 
education and training, and therefore Soviet officials. This could 
help provide a framework for analysing Soviet attitudes and 
statements made in relation to foreign policy.
The traditional difficulty of knowing how to distinguish between an 
offensive or a defensive foreign policy is as true of Khrushchev as 
for any other Soviet leader. Khrushchev's rhetoric about the end of 
capitalist encirclement and the beginning of "peaceful co-existence" 
initially seemed to mark a substantial change from the "two camp" 
doctrine of Stalin. It seemed a great advance towards a new era of 
international co-operation and reconciliation. Yet when the substance 
of this ideology is more carefully scrutinised, the difference becomes 
less tangible. In a speech given on the 25th of January 1961, 
Khrushchev defines peaceful co-existence as: "a form of intensive 
economic, political and ideological struggle of the proletariat against 
the aggressive face of imperialism in the international arena" 18, and 
says that the Socialist countries: "can maintain co-existence, if they 
fight against imperialism" 19. This seems to indicate a de­
militarisation of Stalinism, a return to a broader interpretation of 
Marxist-Leninist theory as a result of technical developments in the
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international arena eg the possession of nuclear weapons by both 
sides. It was obviously a complex issue, as the argument was that if 
both superpowers had nuclear weapons, then war brings the danger of 
annihilation, and therefore war itself is no longer an option for 
either side.
Khrushchev addresses this problem in this same speech of the 25th 
when he identifies three types of war; world war, local war and wars 
of national liberation. The first two types of war are seen as 
undesirable because of the danger of escalation - this is borne out by 
an article in F'ravda later in the year which states: "any armed 
conflict, however minor at first, would inevitably develop into a 
general nuclear missile war should nuclear powers be drawn into 
it."20. However the third type of war mentioned by Khrushchev, that 
of "national liberation" as in Angola or Vietnam, is seen as not only 
desirable but as inevitable. Wars of national liberation are seen as 
internal class struggles, the fight of socialist forces against the 
agents of imperialism. Despite claims that:
"Every people has a right to free and independent national 
existence and no-one should interfere in the internal affairs of 
other countries. "21 
Khrushchev's ideological stance denies that the:" national liberation 
movement is developing independently of the struggle of the working 
class for socialism"22. Thus all internal dissension in a country is 
seen as a manifestation of the class struggle for socialism, which 
allows for wars of liberation to take place in every country. Hence 
when Khrushchev states;" The Soviet Union does not export its system, 
but it cannot prohibit other people from following its example, "23 The
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use of Soviet military equipment and advisers to help this process is 
not prohibited, so in actuality "peaceful co-existence" means only 
that direct confrontation between the two superpowers is recognised as 
undesirable. Khrushchev's ideological framework gives him the 
opportunity to allow Soviet intervention at any time into any country. 
This is the background to be remembered when studying the dynamics of 
Soviet policy.
The stated Soviet belief in non-interference in the domestic affairs 
of other countries and the theoretical acceptance of self- 
determination are not obviously manifested in Soviet-East German 
relations. Here issues of Soviet security take precedence over 
ideological niceties. Similarly when the Soviet leadership wished to 
assert pressure, it seemed to have no qualms about making aggressive 
statements: "not only to deal a shattering blow to the territory of 
the United States, but also to render the aggressor's allies harmless, 
and to crush the American military. "24 Thus by examining just a few of 
the statements concerning foreign policy in the Soviet press, the 
confusion and illogicality of Soviet ideology when put into practice 
becomes apparent. This lack of coherence is important, as it indicates 
that the role of ideology in the processes of foreign policy might at times 
well have been diminished, subordinated to more immediate and pressing 
practical concerns.
In the Soviet press any action which is seen as either anti-Communist 
or anti-Russian is seen as being inspired by the American 
imperialists, so much time and effort is devoted to vilifying the 
American government and society. Thus they are accused of a lack of 
"democracy" in taking decisions over Hiroshima and the U2 incident,
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and it is said that the imperialists: "play the role of throttlers of 
the freedom of the people."25 In order to portray Communism as a 
strong and ever developing creed, American imperialist policy is 
depicted as failing because of its own shortcomings. There are 
enormous variations and discrepancies in the Soviet view of the 
outside world, depending on the political priorities of the moment. An 
example of this can be seen in the Soviet press's treatment of J. F. 
Kennedy. In Izvestia on the 11th of May, he is seen as the "young 
American President", while in Kommunist of the same month, the 
American government is described as being "headed by a millionaire. "26 
These type of references were made in the period just before the 
Vienna summit, and seem to indicate that the Soviets wanted to have 
some-one to blame if everything went wrong at the summit itself. After 
the summit however, on the 15th of June Khrushchev commented: "I 
formed the impression that President Kennedy appreciates the great 
responsibility that rests with the government of two such mighty 
states. "27. On the 9th of August, Pravda talks of Kennedy displaying 
"sober realism"28. Thus when political progress is being made Kennedy 
is seen in terms of his trustworthiness, when things are difficult a 
more standard economic interpretation is taken. Again this example • 
would seem to indicate the triumph of expediency over ideological 
inte grity.
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As we have seen, one of the main motivating factors in the Soviet cry 
for a German peace treaty to be signed appeared to be to get West 
Berlin incorporated into East Germany. In Pravda on the 11th of June a 
similar plea is made, for a peace treaty to be signed, the borders of 
Germany to be legalised and the situation in West Berlin to be 
normalised. This can all sound quite admirable until some of the finer 
detail is revealed. Thus the article states;
"In the interest of achieving agreement on a peace-treaty, the 
Soviet Union does not insist on the immediate withdrawal of the 
FGR from NATO. Even after the conclusion of a peace-treaty, both 
German states could for a certain period remain in the military 
alignment of which they are now members. "29.
Thus it was a specific objective for the Soviet Union that West 
Germany should leave NATO, which may well be related to the decision 
just taken that nuclear weapons should be stationed in West Germnay as 
part of NATO's military deployment there.
Other significant points are made in this article. It points out 
t hat:
"Occupation rights will naturally terminate with the conclusion 
of a German peace-treaty, whether it be signed with both German 
states or only with the GDR within whose territory West Berlin is 
situated. "30
Thus it is stated that if the Soviet Union and East Germany alone sign 
a "peace-treaty", then automatically American, British and French 
troops would have no legal right to stay in West Berlin. This is spelt 
out:
"This will at the same time mean doing away with the occupation
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regime in West Berlin, with all the consequences ensuing 
therefrom. In particular, questions concerning the use of land, 
water and air communications across the territory of the GDR 
will have to be decided solely on the basis of appropriate 
agreement with the GDR. "31 
This is justified by:
"This is natural, since the exercise of control of such 
communication is the inalienable right of every sovereign 
state. "32
Thus the USSR is not just speaking of a Western evacuation of West 
Berlin, but that even its status as "free city" would be in grave 
doubt as East Germany would have full control over all communications 
and transport between West Berlin and the outside world. Thus while 
the rhetoric of 1961 may initially seem milder than that of 1958, the 
underlying objective has changed very little - ie to absorb West 
Berlin into East Germany.
This is just one example of how words are manipulated to give 
misleading impressions. The Soviet call for a German peace treaty 
sounds very credible, as it implies that the overriding objective is 
to achieve a peaceful and just settlement, however neither of these 
concepts stand up under scrutiny. What the Soviet leadership were 
really seeking was the imposition of an agreement, signed without the 
participation of West Germany or the Allied powers, to enable West 
Berlin to come under East German jurisdiction and to ensure that West 
Germany came out of NATO.
Although all these undercurrents are present in Soviet propaganda of 
the time, Soviet rhetoric followed a logic of its own. By refusing to
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sign a German peace treaty on Soviet terms, the imperialist Western 
powers were accused of showing their true expansionist colours. Hence 
on the 15t'n of July it was said:
"History has confronted the peoples of Western Europe with a 
choice. Either move towards a dangerous exacerbation of relations 
between countries and move towards military conflict; or fight 
with all your energies for the conclusion of a German peace- 
t reat y. "33
This type of "either...or" scenario presents a flagrant distortion of 
the truth bearing in mind the nature of the German peace-treaty 
proposed. If the West protests or doesn't accept Soviet proposals, 
then the West is seen as guilty of aggression. On the 15th of June 
Khrushchev took this a stage further:
"Some people in the West are threatening us, declaring that if we 
sign a peace-treaty it will not be recognised and that armed 
force will even be employed to prevent its implement at ion. "34 
Thus the Western powers are seen as the aggressors, when in fact they 
are talking of responding to the implementation of an essentially 
aggressive act of the Soviet Union. Thus although Khrushchev's policy 
of "peaceful co-existence" sounds very different from Stalin's "two 
camp theory", in practice it was very similar.
As a result of the intricate and often ambiguous nature of the 
Marxist ideological framework, an ideologically motivated foreign 
policy does not seem very credible unless in the most general of 
terms. The ideological framework is still significant because every 
Soviet citizen was educated within a Marxist-Leninist cocoon, and 
therefore,for example,it affects the attitudes of those determining
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foreign policy. However from Soviet speeches of 1961, it is difficult 
to discern any ideological change which could account for the more 
assertive Soviet demands from Vienna onwards. If this is the case, why 
was the issue of Berlin raised again with such vehemence at this time?
Vienna and the summer of 1961.
Domestically by 1961, the weaknesses and defects of the Soviet 
economy were beginning to become apparent. The virgin land scheme, the 
flagship of Khrushchev's agricultural revolution was no longer 
fruitful, both literally and metaphorically. The fall in agricultural 
production combined with an increase in inflation meant a 
deterioration in the strength of the economy. Increased spending on 
new technology, especially in the military sphere, meant that troop 
reductions had had to be made in January 1960 of 1,200,000 men.
Economic constraints thus indicated that a provocative foreign policy 
involving some type of military commitment was not sought after. If 
this was the case, it might help to explain why Khrushchev wanted to 
negotiate concerning a German peace-treaty at Vienna. It seemed to 
provide a way of achieving major foreign policy success without vast 
financial expenditure. In his speeches, Khrushchev repeatedly 
stressed his belief in the power of negotiation.
In terms of foreign policy, the timing of the Vienna conference was 
highly favourable to the Soviets. It is to be noted that the meeting 
was a result of Soviet initiative:
"on May the 12th, Kennedy had received an unexpected reply from N.
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S. Khrushchev to his letter of February the 22nd, reopening the 
question presumed dead after the Bay of Pigs, of a meeting in 
Vienna in early June."35 
Thus it was Khrushchev who took the initiative in establishing 
contact. As we have seen there were domestic reasons favouring 
negotiations. There were also international ones. The Soviet Union's 
position in world affairs had been steadily increasing in the late 
1950's with the successful launching of a Sputnik in 1958, with 
Khrushchev's visit to America in 1959, and with the shooting down of 
the U-2 in May 1960 which cast the American government in a very poor 
light. These were not the only setbacks for the Americans. The 
communist advances made in Laos and the communist gains in Korea 
helped to increase Soviet confidence. Thus the prestige of the United 
States was at a very low ebb. If Khrushchev wanted to put pressure on 
the United States government to make concessions in central Europe, 
this must have seemed the ideal time to do so.
It was not just a time of American weakness, it was also a time when 
Khrushchev must have been keen to demonstrate Soviet strength and 
superiority. Especially after the 81 International Communist Party 
Conference of November 1960, the growing antagonism between the Soviet 
Union and China was becoming increasingly apparent. China's preference 
for a hard-line foreign policy, openly antagonistic to the West and 
granting no concessions, meant that they were highly critical of 
Khrushchev's preferences for negotiation, seeing it as a sign of 
weakness. Thus Khrushchev was constantly under pressure from the East. 
One of the reasons that this was so potentially damaging was because 
of the effect on non-aligned and embryo communist parties within the
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world communist movement. Khrushchev had spent much time and trouble 
in the early 1950's trying to encourage Soviet communist sympathies in 
countries such as Eygpt, India and North Vietnam by means of loans of 
foreign aid, material and military assistance, and he didn’t want China 
to reap the benefit of these policies. If China’s claim to be the true 
successor of Marxist-Leninism was seen to be at all credible, then 
this could result in communist groups abroad changing their allegiance 
from the USSR to China, especially in East Asian countries where 
Chinese influence was already strong anyway.
There is also considerable evidence to suggest that Chinese 
relationships with Eastern European countries could undermine Soviet 
influence and security in Eastern Europe itself. The country of which 
this is most obviously true is Albania, but it is significant that 
East German - Chinese links were very strong in the late 1950's. This 
alliance deteriorated in the I960's however, and Zagoria comments:
"One may suppose that Khrushchev tightened the screws on Ulbricht
and offered some inducement ....... some sort of promise to renew
the Berlin crisis." 36 
Certainly, as will be shown later, Ulbricht took a much more hard-line 
attitude than Khrushchev, and this reversal in Sino-German relations 
indicates that a renewed commitment by Khrushchev to finding a 
solution to the German question might have been the price that 
Khrushchev had to pay. Hence Chinese pressure seems to have played a 
large role in persuading Khrushchev of the need to re-open the German 
question. This combination of different pressures would go a long way 
to explaining why Khrushchev could one moment seem to be quite 
conciliatory, and the next very demanding. It also helps explain
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Khrushchev's methods, ie of seeking to achieve ambitious and 
grandiose schemes through vigorous negotiations and exchanges. The 
Vienna summit is a good example of this, as Khrushchev was pursuing a 
vigorous foreign policy to satisfy his left-wing critics, while trying 
to do so in a relatively conciliatory manner. If he had been 
successful, he would have pacified his internal and external critics, 
and would have gained a greater fiexibilty in policy formation. It is 
interesting to note that the Soviet press were more optimistic about 
the Vienna meeting than Kennedy and his advisers were, as it 
corroborates that there was a feeling in the Soviet Union that there 
would be a successful outcome. Thus Khrushchev went to Vienna under 
pressure, yet hopeful that he would be able to gain concessions from 
the West.
The items discussed at Vienna centred on three main areas -Laos, 
disarmament and the German situation. Laos was the subject over which 
there was the most progress, with Khrushchev reasserting his 
commitment to giving the implementation of the ceasefire there a high 
priority. Despite this area of agreement, there was little progress on 
the other two issues. As was revealed in Pravda on the 11th of June, 
Khrushchev's position on the testing of hydrogen weapons at the 
conference had not changed since the Genevan talks two and a half 
years previously. On the German question, Khrushchev was 
uncompromising, stating that a German peace-treaty was central to the 
security needs of the USSR. In the Soviet press, West Germany was 
accused of cultivating: "sabre-rattling militarism,and advocates 
reconsideration of the German borders."37 and: "stockpiling armaments 
and building an army plainly in excess of defence requirements" 38,
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West Germany is constantly portrayed in the Soviet press as an outpost 
of German revanchism.
There seems to be some confusion over when Khrushchev introduced a 
time-limit for the German peace-treaty, as both Adomeit and Wolfe 
claim that it was first done during Khrushchev's television appearance 
on the 15th June. However if the Pravda publication of the 11th of 
June is correct, then Khrushchev gave Kennedy a time-limit before 
then, ie at the Vienna conference itself:
"To keep the matter of a peace-sett1ement from dragging out, a 
time-limit must be set during which the Germans must seek the 
possibility of agreements on questions within their internal 
competence. " The Soviet government considers a period of no more 
than six months adequate for such negotiations. "39 
Thus it was at Vienna that Khrushchev resurrected his ultimatum of 
1958, that if an agreement was not reached by East and West Germany by 
this time, the Soviet Union would have the right to sign one 
unilaterally with East Germany alone. The consequences of this were 
laid out as the peace-treaty:
"will at the same time mean doing away with the occupation regime 
in West Berlin. ..In particular, questions concerning the use of 
land, water and air communications across the territory of the 
GDR will have to be decided solely on the basis of appropriate 
agreements with the GDR. "40 
Despite the threatening rhetoric, there are signs that Khrushchev was 
in fact seeking the neutralisation of Berlin, and in terms of the 
peace-treaty that he wanted a "de-facto" recognition of the East German 
state, rather than a "de jure" one. It is quite possible that this
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concession, made in the statement:
"The Soviet proposal does not link the conclusion of a peace- 
treaty with recognition of the GDR or the FRG by all the parties 
of the treaty. It is up to each government w'ne ther or not it
will recognise one or the other state."41 
and the concept of the UN guaranteeing that Berlin would remain a free 
city, combined with the US acknowledgement of USSR conventional 
superiority in Europe and the strong prestige of the USSR would be 
enough to sway Kennedy into considering attending a peace-conference.
In traditional Soviet fashion, Khrushchev seems to have used carrot
and stick techniques simultaneously. Thus he negotiated, but made 
thinly veiled threats at the same time, ie hinting at the consequences 
of a unilaterally signed German peace-treaty to pressurise the 
American government into action. This was counterproductive, as by 
drawing the Americanos attention to the consequences of such a treaty, 
it highlighted the pitfalls that could be involved in negotiations - 
especially when the Soviet side had been so uncompromising and 
obstructive in the past, eg at the Geneva disarmament talks.
The Americans were well aware of the nature of the issues. Kennedy 
remarked: " All Europe is at stake in West Berlin."42. There were 
differences in American perception of Soviet intentions in Berlin. 
Acheson felt that Soviet objectives in Berlin were unlimited - this 
would tie in with the assertion in the Penkovsky Papers that 
Khrushchev was a proponent of hardline and adventurous policies in 
Berlin. However L.Thompson, American ambassador in Moscow, and A, 
Harriman both believed that Khrushchev's objectives were limited and 
were more realistically based. If opinion at the time was divided, so
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too is the attitude of historians. From this study so far, it is 
indicated that the role of the Chinese and East German pressure, 
whether it was coincidental or co-ordinated, has been underestimated.
As for Khrushchev himself, he seems to have been responding to 
pressures put on him from abroad, and attempting to take advantage of 
perceived American weakness. Hence his desire to return to the 
question of Berlin. The extent to which he was successful can be seen 
as we look at the events of the ensuing months.
In the aftermath of the Vienna meeting, both Kennedy and Khrushchev 
had time in which to reflect on and reconsider their positions. After 
his brief visit to Britain, Kennedy made a television broadcast 
speaking of Vienna as: "sombre as it was, to be immensely useful."43, 
and that: "our views contrasted sharply but at least we knew better at 
the end where we both stood."44. In Khrushchev Remembers, he speaks of 
"being impressed"45 by Kennedy, and says that some form of rapport 
between the two leaders had been established. This is more than borne 
out by their later exchange of letters at critical times. In Izvestia 
on the 8th of June, Vienna was described as: "no decisions were 
adopted in the course of it. Nevertheless it is being talked about 
everywhere in the globe." and serves as "a point of departure for new 
contacts" 45. On the very same day at a local level the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry published notes protesting against the German Republic's 
desire to hold a Bundesrat session in West Berlin on the 16th June.
The timing of this note raises some interesting questions about the 
nature of Soviet policy formation and co-ordination. (The Western 
decision to accede to this request, despite its lack of substance must
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be criticised, as it seems to indicate to the Soviet government that 
the Western governments were prepared to make concessions over 
Germany, thus encouraging them to apply further pressure to this end.)
On the 15th of June, Khrushchev made a television and radio broadcast 
to the people of the Soviet Union. His language was tough and 
uncompromising in tone, trying to justify a unilaterally signed peace- 
treaty between the USSR and East Germany by an analogy with the 
American unilateral signing of a peace-treaty with Japan in 1951: 
"relying on their edge in atomic weapons"46. Yet again there is at the 
same time an emphasis on diplomacy, Khrushchev saying of Vienna:
"We consider such meetings indispensible, because under present 
day conditions, problems that defy solution by normal diplomatic 
means make head of government meetings imperative. "47 
and that:" the holding of such a meeting was worthwhile"48. While 
Khrushchev reaffirmed the six month deadline taken at Vienna, he sought 
to achieve this by political and diplomatic pressure.
That Khrushchev was seen by many of the communist bloc as pursuing 
too moderate a policy can be seen by a comparison with the stridency 
of Ulbricht at a press conference on the same day, the 15th of June. 
That Khrushchev was actually in his eyes pursuing one of the less 
radical options available could explain a "prophetic" remark of 
Ulbricht: "We have no intention to build a wall"49. Adomeit interprets 
this remark as Ulbricht trying to force Khrushchev's hand into taking 
stronger action. For Ulbricht to start talking of a "wall" would 
increase tension in East Germany, to increase the number of fleeing 
refugees, and thus to force some kind of quick and decisive action. 
There is indicated a growing East German frustration at what they saw
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as Soviet intransigence and slowness to act.
Even more important, this reference to a "wall" means that it's 
probable that the possibility of sealing the East/West German border 
had already been discussed as a possible plan at some time in the 
past. There could be perhaps a series of contingency plans agreed in 
case the peace-treaty was not signed within the agreed time-limit. 
These plans might also become possible courses of action if there was 
a further deterioration in the East German economic situation, or 
further political unrest there. If so, it was in Ulbricht's interest 
to heighten tension, that the number of fleeing refugees would 
increase, and thus to force Khrushchev's hand.
There were a variety of reactions to Khrushchev's speech of the 15th. 
In a Times, article of the 16th, it commented that Kennedy had failed 
to convince Khrushchev of the Allied commitment to West Berlin. The 
Soviets seemed unhappy about the reception of the Western press to 
Khrushchev, accusing the American press especially of portraying 
Khrushchev too harshly, and arguing that the press was in the power 
of the capitalist monopolies, and hence portrayed a distorted picture 
of events. Khrushchev was thus in a position where he could do no 
right, Ulbricht accusing him of being weak and procrastinating, yet at 
the same time the American government seeing him as harsh and 
uncompromising. The Vienna conference and its aftermath was a direct 
result of Khrushchev trying to reconcile these various pressures. 
Khrushchev attempted to attack the Western powers Achilles' heel, in 
order to increase his personal prestige, and to silence his critics at 
home and abroad.
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16th of June - 25th of July.
There is evidence of internal debates within the Presidium at this 
time which must have resulted in pressure on Khrushchev. On the 16th 
of June, an Uzbek newspaper talks of this being a time of "Presidium 
decision-making", and it was shortly after this on the 19th of June 
that the Party Statutes were unanimously ratified by the Central 
Committee. The Party Statutes were controversial in nature, and it must 
have been a time of tension, when quite possibly Khrushchev had to 
make concessions. It would therefore be worth investigating whether 
there was a marked change of policy in the ensuing weeks.
In the week beginning on Monday the 19th of June, there was a renewed 
outbreak of anti-German sentiment, eg in Pravda on the 20th of June 
there was a torrent of invective directed against a West German
i*
revanchist rally" where it was claimed that groups of men who had 
invaded Russia twenty years previously met:
"we recognise them by their stupid and arrogant faces, by the 
bitterness and hatred flashing in their eyes"50 
and that:
"hopes are placed not only on the revival of the Wehrmacht, now 
called the Bundeswehr, but also on the atom bombs piled up in 
American warehouses in West Germany, and which those exercising 
power in Bonn are striving violently to possess."51 
This type of crude and vigorous rhetoric preceded Khrushchev's speech 
of the 21st of June, marking the 20th anniversary of Hitler's attack 
on the USSR. In this speech Khrushchev took a very aggressive foreign 
policy stance, and threatened to resume nuclear testing. Concurrently
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there were also a number of articles and speeches made by military 
generals at this time,praising Khrushchev and strongly attacking the 
Western position over Berlin. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact 
reason for the increasingly aggressive line over Berlin: it could
simply relate to increased militarism as a result of the 20th 
anniversary of Hitler's invasion of the USSR, or it could indicate a 
stronger role for the military as a result of negotiation concerning 
the Party Statutes.
Soviet pressure on the Berlin situation continued in the last week in 
June, with Khrushchev in his Alma-Ata speech on the 24th of June 
continuing to stress the inevitability of Soviet economic supremacy 
and the need for a German peace-treaty. The comment in The Times on 
this speech is especially interesting:
"There is really no doubt in the minds of many Western 
representatives that he means what he says, and that he will 
announce a separate peace-treaty with East Germany probably 
before or during the Communist Party Congress in Moscow in 
October, if no East - West negotiations have been arranged 
meanwhile. "52
and that hence the West should enter into negotiations. This comment 
indicates the seriousness with which the West regarded the situation, 
and that much attention was being given to the consequences of the 
proposed Soviet action. The Soviet intention of forcing the West to 
the negotiating table must have seemed to have had a chance of 
success.
Khrushchev's speech of the 28th of June depicts the West as being 
committed to policies that were now obsolete:
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"The Western powers are now unable to get out of the quicksands 
of brinkmanship where Dulles and Eisenhower led them. "53 
and that:
"On the way to a relaxation of tension we apparently will be 
obliged to pass through a stage of "chilling" so to speak, of the 
climate in Europe. "54 
Typically Khrushchev makes out that the West is the one that is making 
the difficulties, and that they will come to see the error of their 
ways. Meanwhile he reiterates:
"we are prepared to enter into negotiations, to try honestly and 
sincerely for an agreement and the signing of a peace-treaty."55 
Pressure was thus being built up to a crescendo, and was beginning to 
have an effect. On the 29th of June, Lord Home made a speech warning 
of the extreme dangers of the German situation, while the following 
day De Gaulle stated: "we are on the brink of a major international 
crisis. "56 By this stage Khrushchev's war of verbal attrition seemed 
to be making Western leaders reconsider the idea of negotiations with 
the Soviet Union over Germany.
At the beginning of July, Khrushchev's behaviour was a little 
erratic: on the 2nd of July he was threatening Britain and France with 
nuclear extinction, on the 4th was joking happily with ambassadors at 
an Embassy reception. Meanwhile,differences between the USSR and China 
were becoming increasingly evident, as noticed by Isaac Deutscher in 
The New York Times. On the 5th of July the Soviets revealed that the 
Chinese owed them a large debt, and the next day a Soviet-North Korean 
military Pact was signed. The latter action was seen to be a Soviet 
attempt to consolidate their position in Asia, and to increase its
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influence there at Chinese expense. At this time also Ulbricht was 
making statements about the need to destroy West German militarism, 
and Albania officially complained to the USSR that undue pressure was 
being put upon her. All these various pieces of information help to 
show the enormous strain that the Soviet Union was under trying to 
uphold her position within the communist bloc. It helps account for 
Khrushchev's speech of the 8th of July announcing increased military 
expenditure of S3. 5 billion more than the USA. Such expenditure was 
very much out of line with the Soviet economic situation, and it seems 
likely that this situation was precipitated by the pressure from other 
communist countries. Whether this was done with support from hard­
liners in the Presidium and the military can't be proved, but would 
seem likely as the army had a high profile at this time.
Contradictory signs were apparent at the beginning of July. There
were Soviet displays of rocket power which happened to coincide with
Khrushchev's announcement of troop reductions in the Soviet army. On 
the 5th of July, Kornienko from the Soviet Embassy in Washington 
visited Schlesinger expressing puzzlement at American hostility to the 
idea of negotiations. Schlesinger's view of Kornienko's remarks were 
as follows:
"While nothing Kornienko said indicated that discussions would 
lead to agreement, it did look as if the Russians might want to
get off a collision course."57 
ie perhaps Khrushchev wanted to make an aggressive show for the 
communist world, but to communicate to the Americans that the Soviet 
Union would be prepared to be reasonable. Three days later, Khrushchev 
attempted another way of opening negotiations, ie by re-introducing
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the Polish plan for a "nuclear-free zone". This was greeted with 
interest by Brandt in West Germany, but not by Adenauer. Amazingly 
enough all the signs of tension within the communist world were 
noticed but dismissed by many within the American establishment, by 
both journalists and politicians alike. On the 10th of July the 
editorial column of The New York Times, conceded th3t there might be 
Chinese pressure on Khrushchev to take a tough line, but that to 
envisage friction between the two would be wishful thinking. Similarly 
and even more extraordinarily, a speech made by D. Rusk made on the 
10th of July said that:
"there was solid evidence of tension between the Soviet Union and 
China, but that this tension did not provide a "sound basis" for 
Western policy making. "58 
The contrast between the official Soviet view and underlying tensions 
continued. Gomulka gave Khrushchev a clear sign of his support when he 
made a speech in Outer Mongolia on communist unity, while in the 
background China was signing a pact with North Korea, and the Soviet 
Union drastically censored a Chinese radio broadcast which met with 
its disapproval.
In East Germany meantime it seemed as if Ulbricht wanted to bring 
matters to a head. On the 11th of July he introduced legis lation 
prohibiting Grenzeganger being used to buy major consumer goods in 
East Berlin, and the number of refugees fleeing rose accordingly. 
Adenauer's visit to West Berlin was seen as being provocative. Pravda 
made its contribution regarding the situation:
"History has confronted the peoples of Western Europe with a 
choice: either move towards a dangerous exacerbation of relations
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between countries and towards a military conflict or fight with 
all your energies for the conclusion of a German peace-treaty."59 
As Soviet threats and East German actions escalated, Western leaders 
became increasingly anxious. Western fears were exploited by the East 
German magazine Neue Justiz which provocatively published plans for 
the administration of West Berlin after a peace-treaty was signed. 
While the American government considered a partial mobilisation of its 
troops, in the Soviet Union there was less concern. As Osgood 
Carruthers puts it: "the people had heard it all before."60.
There was a brief respite in mid-July as Khrushchev spent some time 
at Sochi, and public pronouncements from both sides on the subject 
briefly abated somewhat. In West Germany Adenauer continued to seek 
support from the EEC, and the situation in East Berlin continued to 
worsen.
As the tension continued, both Kennedy and Khrushchev saw the need to 
act sensibly and cautiously, attempting to calm the war hysteria. On 
the 25th of July, Kennedy made a television broadcast to the American 
people on the current state of affairs in Berlin. This was an 
emotional speech talking of West Berlin as:
"a showcase of liberty, a symbol, an island of freedom in a 
communist sea. It is even more than a link with the free world, a 
beacon of hope behind the iron curtain, an escape hatch for
refugees....... it has become the great testing place of Western
courage."61
In this speech, Kennedy also announced a new commitment of the 
American military, especially to Europe, involving an increase of
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military expenditure of $3,247,000,000 and an increase in manpower and 
conventional weapons which was to be submitted before Congress. After 
these announcements Kennedy emphasised:
"the choice is not merely between resistance and retreat, between 
atomic holocaust and surrender. Our peace-time military posture 
is traditionally defensive, but our diplomatic posture need not 
be. "62 
He continued that:
"As signers of the U.N. Charter we will always be prepared to
discuss international problems we shall also be ready to
search for peace - in quiet exploratory talks - in formal or 
informal meetings. "63 
It is worth looking at this speech in some detail, as there were many 
different interpretations of it. In his memoirs Schlesinger recounts 
that Kennedy's intention was not to: "drive the crisis beyond the 
point of no return" and that he "rejected the programme of national 
mobilisation and sought the beginning of careful negotiation."64 
Schlesinger feels that both the American press and Khrushchev 
misinterpreted this speech and felt that it was more hard-line than it 
was intended to appear. When Khrushchev at Sochi heard the translation 
of the speech, McCoy the American negotiator visiting him at the time 
bore the full brunt of Khrushchev's anger when: "he told McCoy 
emotionally that the United States had declared preliminary war on the 
Soviet Union. "65 The speech which apparently was intended to be firm 
but deflamatory, in practise had the opposite effect. A few days later 
Secretary of State Rusk said in a speech that he believed that the 
Berlin dispute could be settled peacefully, and that there was a need
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to have a multi-nation disarmament conference. At the same time he 
recommended that the number of NATO divisions in Germany grow from 22 
t o 30,
Thus speeches were made calling for peace, yet announcing the need 
for greater arms. These ambiguous speeches were interpreted in the 
worst light by both sides, tension mounted and events seemed to be 
spiralling out of control. It is possible that both leaders were aware 
of this process, and it is here that more informal means of 
communication came into their own. McCoy for example, returned to 
Kennedy with a message concerning the possibility of new negotiations. 
This type of confidential correspondence allowed more direct 
communication without the need for rhetorical show, and had an 
important role to play in international relations at this time.
By the 31st of July Khrushchev was back in the Kremlin, and the Draft 
Party Programme had just been published. The Party Programme was 
ambitious in its economic objectives, but the comments of one American 
analyst at the time, felt that the Party programme departed 
seriously from the Khrushchevian pro-consumer line quite 
significantly. To back this perception, he refers to an Embassy 
reception on the 20th of May where Khrushchev had remarked:
"Now we consider our heavy industry as built. So we are not going 
to give it priority. Light industry and heavy industry will 
develop at the same pace."66 
This remark for some strange reason was not published in the Soviet 
press. Now unless Khrushchev had radically changed his mind between 
the middle of May and the middle of June when the draft party 
Programme was adopted by the Central Committee, then pressure
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must have been exerted upon him from some source to make 
him change his mind. Thus here is more evidence which strongly 
suggests that Khrushchev's authority was under some strain at this 
period, and that the inconsistencies of Soviet foreign policy might in 
part reflect tension amongst the political leadership.
By the beginning of August the East German government was again 
putting pressure on West Berlin, on the 1st suggesting the suspension 
of all East/West German traffic because of a polio epidemic, on the 
2nd increasing border guards at crossing points sixfold. In many ways 
the first week of August seems crucial to the outcome of the Berlin 
crisis. Siusser speculates that just after Khrushchev's return to the 
Kremlin there was a Presidium meeting, and this would seem highly
likely considering the amount of time that Khrushchev was away and the
considerable tension over the Irerman question. It would also help to 
explain why there was a Warsaw Pact meeting on the 3rd to the 5th of 
August in Moscow. This meeting was not announced in advance which 
could indicate that the decision to hold it was made in a hurry. The 
duration of the meeting, three days in length, would also indicate 
that something of importance was being discussed or decided.
In order to attempt to understand what happened at this meeting, it 
is helpful to guage what possibilities lay before the participants of
this meeting. Although it was nominally a Warsaw Pact meeting, it is
clear that the Soviet Union had the greatest influence. Ulbricht too, 
with his country's direct involvement in the Berlin crisis must have 
had a strong voice. Ulbricht's renewed campaign over the previous few 
days also indicates that the meeting might well have been convened at 
his insistence. The decisions reached at this meeting were not
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revealed in the official communique, but Windsor talks of a plan being 
worked out there: "which prevented most East Germans reaching Berlin
at ail."67, with large numbers of police on duty all over East Germany 
to prevent East Germans reaching East Berlin and having the 
opportunity to escape to West Berlin. If this was so, it would seem 
that Khrushchev had managed to stave off Ulbricht's more radical 
plans. Ulbricht must have been under enormous pressure to curb the 
number of refugees fleeing from his country, at this point leaving at 
a rate of 1,000 a day. In January 1961, women already comprised 45% of 
the East German labour force, and this proportion was increasing. The 
large number of agricultural and professional workers fleeing left 
large gaps in the economic structure of the country, leaving it on the 
verge of collapse. Hence Ulbricht's demand for a speedy and effective 
resolution to the situation. Khrushchev had a world perspective on 
events, and did not wish to take such potentially inflammatory action 
unless it was absolutely necessary. As we have seen on the 15th of 
June Ulbricht's reference to the building of a wall was considered by 
the West as a possible action taken in conjunction with the unilateral 
imposition of a German peace-treaty. Yet it would seem that this 
scheme was not immediately adopted, but instead the interim measure of 
a police clampdown of the movements of East Germans was implemented.
Meanwhile back at the conference table, the talks over Laos were 
deadlocked. There was increased Allied anxiety regarding East German 
measures at border crossings. Rusk was making optimistic statements 
that there was:
"a growing feeling at the State Department that Washington's firm
stance, without closing the door on negotiations, was having the
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desired effect." 67a 
Similarly at the meeting of Western Foreign Ministers in Paris, it was 
noted that there had been a milder tone in Soviet notes recently. At 
the State Department the idea of curtailing US-USSR trade in protest 
over Berlin was rejected. On the 6th-7th of August, the flight of 
Vostok-2 took place, and on the 7th Khrushchev made a major television 
address to the Soviet people. In this speech many of the concerns and 
themes previously dispersed throughout Soviet propaganda were brought 
together. The economic superiority of the Soviet Union meant there 
was:" no need to impose that system on other people by force or 
arms"68. The danger of Berlin was seen as very real, but damage was 
seen as preventable:" West Berlin must not be permitted to turn into a 
kind of Sarajevo."69 
The whole tone and content of the speech however is aggressive, full 
of warnings against American procrastination:" If the Western powers 
persist in their refusal to sign a German peace-treaty, we shall be 
obliged to solve the problem without them. "70 and that if the peace- 
treaty was postponed it:
"would give NATO and the Bonn government even greater 
encouragement to form more and more new divisions in West 
Germany, equip them with atomic and thermonuclear weapons and 
turn West Germany into the main force for unleasing a new world 
war. " 7 1
Accusations are repeated against current Western aggressors who:" are 
using West Berlin as a jumping off point for subversive activities 
against the GDR."81. In many ways, this speech seems a last ditch 
attempt by Khrushchev to get the Americans to come to negotiate over
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Germany. In the Western press also, pressure for American action grew. 
That Khrushchev must have been hoping for a rapid and favourable 
response can surely be ascertained from the fact that he must have 
known that his speech would increase the number of refugees fleeing. 
Soviet pressure mounted further with the announcement of a new Soviet 
megatonne weapon, the increase of military manoeuvres taking place in 
Eastern Europe, and by the appointment of Marshal Konev to take 
command of Soviet troops in East Germany.
By this time, it was clear to everyone that something dramatic must 
happen soon. In East Germany the Foreign Minister, Dr Lothar Bolz 
again spoke of the need for West Berlin to be a de-mi 1itarised free 
city, and for a peace-treaty to be signed. On the same day, Friday the 
11th of August, Ulbricht paid a rapid visit to Moscow. It would seem 
to be at this meeting between Khrushchev and Ulbricht that Ulbricht 
was at last allowed to implement his border sealing operation between 
East and West Berlin. On the 12th, while Khrushchev made another 
speech about the need for a German peace-treaty, a Warsaw treaty 
declaration announced measures to be taken at the border to stop 
"diversionist activities" which would be removed when a peace-treaty 
was signed. The significance of this statement soon became apparent, 
when on the early hours of Sunday morning, East German guards started 
to secure the border crossing between East and West Berlin.
In his book, City on Leave. P. Windsor talks of "twin crises", and 
this idea can be developed further. The reason for the rapid 
escalation of tension over Berlin and Germany in 1961 was the 
interaction between two concurrent events, one at international level, 
one specific to the economic and political situation in Germany
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itself. As in all international disputes, there is a great danger in 
seeing all the actions of your opponent's ally as being directed by 
your opponent. In this case,yes Khrushchev was seeking to increase 
Soviet prestige and influence in Eastern Europe, and his methods of 
achieving this objective were at times provocative and risky, but the 
real threat to world peace came from the way that Ulbricht single- 
mindedly pursued nationalist goals with little regard for 
international consequences. Khrushchev could be impetuous in his 
foreign policy, but he was aware of the potential danger of going too 
far. The added economic and social decline of East Germany distorted 
the balance of the situation however. The two different policies 
clashed - Khrushchev's desire to get the West to negotiate and make 
Concessions over Germany, and Ulbricht's intention to stop the 
economic drain on his country and to reintroduce stability. These two 
different emphasis confused American policy-makers who saw them all as 
coming from the same source. They failed to recognise the significance 
of hard-line influences of China or East Germany, and thus were not 
inclined to be sympathetic to Soviet pleas for negotiations.
Insight into the reasons behind the border-sealing operation can be 
gained by a study of the changing nature of the official Soviet 
explanations of these events. Before the 13th of August, West Berlin 
was portrayed as: "a jumping off point for the subversive activities 
against the GDR. "72 and:
"a place where Bonn revanchist circles constantly maintain a 
state of extreme tension and organise all sorts of provocations 
that are highly dangerous to the cause of peace. "73 
By the 14th of August, three accusations were being levelled against
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the Western powers, that they had tried to:
"recruit spies and to incite hostile elements to organise
sabotage and disturbances in the GDR....... undermine the
economy of the German Democratic Republic....... encourage a
certain unstable part 
of the GDR population to leave for West Germany. "74 
Thus for the first time, it was officially acknowledged that there was 
an economic element in the problems in East Germany. That it was a 
sensitive issue however can be seen in the article in Izvestia. on the
18th of August, where there is an abrupt refutation of criticism of
the East German economy: "every word in this reasoning is a lie."75 It 
has only been with the passage of time that the economic and 
demographic crisis of August 1961 has been given more weight. Thus the 
Russian historian Vysotskii talks of:
"the recruitment of qualified labour and the luring away of the 
technical intelligentsia inflicted even greater harm to the GDR
than the machinations in the exchange rates and different forms
of speculation. "76 
Therefore the significance of the effect of the drain of professional 
arid skilled workers is acknowledged to have made a vital difference to 
the East German economic situation. This factor more than any other 
appears to have been decisive in the decision to seal the East/West 
Berlin border.
It is very tempting for the historian in retrospect to comment on 
this period and to identify the events of the 13th of August as the 
"apex" of the Berlin crisis, and that after this things returned to a 
more normal routine. This type of interpretation is very far from the
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truth. This can be ascertained by a survey of American and Western 
reaction to the events of the 13th of August. The headline of the New 
York Times, was:
" Berlin Border Curb seen as first of Soviet moves." 
ie that this was just the initial phase of an operation to put 
pressure on the West, and signified: "that Premier Khrushchev had
decided irrevocably to conclude a separate peace-treaty with East 
Germany." 77 It would seem fair to say that whatever the reasoning 
behind the border sealing, the result was a mastei— stroke for the 
Soviet Union, as it evoked very contradictory and a confused response 
from Western politicians. While they were highly indignant and 
outraged at the Soviet action, no-one seemed quite sure of what 
counter-measures to take.
It wasn't until the 15th of August that Kennedy made a strong and 
vigorous protest against the Soviet action. The perhaps unforeseen 
ingenuity of the border sealing operation by the Soviets was that 
Western Berlin could not be said to be under threat by the action 
taken. Dean Rusk puts it like this:
"available information indicates that measures taken thus far are 
aimed at residents of East Berlin and East Germany, and not at 
the Western position or access thereto. "78 
Thus Western powers found themselves in an awkward position for two 
reasons. The first was that they were not ready to take any immediate 
action on a local level. Schlesinger comments: "Despite the 
Presidential and other anticipations, the action caught the State 
Department and the CIA by surprise."79. Also because the action did 
not affect American, British, French or West German movement directly,
-129-
only the East Germans, this made the authorities in the West cautious 
about taking action. While the border-sealing operation had horrendous 
consequences for many in terms of dividing families etc, this did not 
provide a clear cut mandate for action. The border-sealing was 
successful because it split the Allies, the Americans not having the 
motivation to act, the European powers reluctant to get involved by 
themselves. The Soviet action did contravene the 1948 Foreign 
Minister's agreement guaranteeing freedom of movement, but this was 
not major enough for the Americans to act. Hence Kennedy's remark:" I 
can get the Alliance to move if he tries to do do anything about West 
Berlin, but not if he just does something about East Berlin."80 Thus 
the Americans responded with what Schlesinger descibes as "Apparent 
American passivity"81, but Adenauer and Brandt were not as desperate 
for action as might be suspected either. The only people who seemed 
truly worried were the West Berliners themselves, who not 
surprisingly feared that the Soviet action was just a prelude to a 
direct attack on their freedom.
Another reason that the Soviet government had to congratulate itself 
about was their method of acting. Contrary to popular mythology,
Soviet troops did not build the Berlin wall overnight. In fact East 
German troops occupied most of the crossing points and barbed wire 
fences were put up. The building of the wall itself did not start till 
the 17th of August. The gradual nature of the Soviet backed actions 
helped to sow dissension amongst the Western powers when they were 
trying to decide on a suitable reposte to the East german moves. It is 
an interesting theory that the cautious nature of the border sealing 
might perhaps have indicated that the Soviet-East Geramn leadership
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might have backed down if they had been challenged more vigorously by 
the West.
When considering the Soviet - East German action of the 13th of 
August, what in fact were Khrushchev's motives? It is quite common to 
suppose that Khrushchev's rhetoric about a peace plan was a 
subterfuge, to divert the West from perceiving his true purpose, ie to 
seal the East/West Berlin border. This argument seems seriously 
flawed on a number of accounts however. Firstly, it would be grossly 
out of proportion to spend so much time and effort on such a 
propaganda campaign for such a small objective. Secondly, what however 
if the border sealing operation was only a minimum objective for the 
Soviet Union to achieve? This perhaps sounds more likely. Khrushchev 
also has a reputation as an opportunist - did he capitalise on the 
disarray of the Western powers after the 13th? While the Soviets may 
have begun with a weak hand in Berlin - as it describes in The Times 
on the 14th of August:
"The East German government has now made an open confession of
failure......... it has admitted that its country is such a
thoroughly unpleasant and inefficient place in which to live that 
its unhappy citizens must be kept there by force."82 
yet the overriding impression left from this is that of Soviet 
aggression and Western weakness. After the 13th of August the Soviets 
had everything left to play for.
Thus it seems quite probable that Khrushchev was pursuing the concept 
of a peace-treaty, albeit on Soviet terms, and that the events of the 
13th of August were just a response to an urgent local situation 
rather than the climax to an international campaign. There were
-131-
indications at the meeting of Foreign Ministers at the beginning of 
August that the West was just about to agree to a four power 
conference to negotiate over the German situation. It would seem 
probable that this was Khrushchev's objective, and that the decision 
to intervene in Berlin was due largely to Ulbricht's pressure. Perhaps 
Khrushchev agreed in the hope that the border-sealing would persuade 
the West into acknowledging the need for talks. While all this remains 
speculation, it would provide a rational explanation for some of the 
apparent contradictions in Soviet policy, ie on the one hand the 
longstanding pursuit of a peace-treaty, and on the other taking 
military action in Berlin.
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It is now time to move on and to consider the events in the rest of 
August and in September, in order to see if they help provide more 
clues as to Soviet policy intentions concerning the German question. 
During the week after the border-sealing, various notes of protest and 
counter-protest flew backwards and forwards. About the 20th of August, 
Khrushchev seems to have left Moscow, and the next set of moves seem 
to have been made in his absence, though whether with his approval or 
not is another matter. On Wednesday the 23rd two significant events 
took place. For the first time in this period measures were taken to 
restrict the movement of West Berliners, as a new regulation was 
introduced stating that if they wanted to go to East Berlin they would 
need a permit. This move was of major significance and should not be 
disregarded as it seems to follow a pattern of an escalating campaign 
to isolate West Berliners from the rest of West Germany. On the same 
day, the Soviet government sent a note to the American government that 
the Western powers were illegally using their air-corridors to West 
Berlin, conniving:
"at interference by the German Federal Republic in the affairs of 
West Berlin and the use of the city's territory for 
international provocations. "S3 
The timing of these actions could be co-incidental, but it looks very 
much like the beginning of a renewed campaign by the Soviet leadership 
and the East Germans to either bring the West to the negotiating 
table, or at least to deter them from taking any major retaliatory 
action in the immediate future. This time the American response was 
swift, the next day saying that this:
-133-
"is clearly but one more step in a deliberate campaign of
deception and attempted intimidation................. any
interference by the Soviet government or its East German regime 
with free access to West Berlin would be an aggressive act, the 
consequences of which the Soviet government would bear full 
responsibility. "84 
Although Khrushchev was outwith Moscow, he kept a high profile during 
this period, on the 24th emphasising the willingness of the USSR to 
negotiate with the West over Berlin, on the 25th declaring that he 
would talk with the Italians about a peace-treaty. He also arranged 
through an intermediary Y. G.Zhulov to meet an American journalist Drew 
Pearson. While Khrushchev was making these conciliatory noises,
Ulbricht made another speech on the 25th of August claiming that while 
the West Berliners themselves were innocent of sabotage, the Western 
powers were not. He continued to pressurise the West Berliners, and to 
isolate them by driving a wedge between them and their Western Allies.
On the 28th of August, Khrushchev continued his campaign for a German 
peace-treaty, stating:
"When the peace-treaty is signed it is quite natural that rights 
of the conquering powers which stem from the surrender of the 
conquered country come to an end."96 
thus effectively he was saying that Western access to West Berlin 
would be at an end. Of equal importance to this threat is the emphatic 
use of "when the peace-treaty is signed." Reinforcing this, the 
editorial in Pravda the same day said that the treaty would be signed 
by the end of the year.The next day Pravda carried an article 
speaking of the aggressive and provocational acts of the West
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Berliners. Thus after the slight abatement in the rhetorical storm, a 
renewed campaign to put pressure on West Berlin seemed about to start.
On the 30th of August, despite some favourable signs such as American 
concessions in the Geneva test-ban negotiations and talk of a foreign 
ministers meeting, tension was still high. At a press conference, 
Kennedy appointed Lucius Clay to be his personal representative in 
Berlin, as a morale booster for the West Berliners. That there was 
still concern over the situation is demonstrated by the statement of a 
journalist that:
"if one takes the public statements of the two sides at face 
value, it would seem that the US and the USSR are on something of 
a collision course here."85 
Ironically, while the Americans were taking an optimistic line with 
Kennedy saying that "negotiations can be successful" 86, the Soviet 
government announced that it had decided to resume nuclear testing. 
This announcement came as a surprise to the Americans. In the Soviet
statement it talked of Western obduracy over negotiations and
complained bitterly over the continued conduct of nuclear tesing by 
France. It also implicitly linked the resumption of nuclear testing 
with the German situation:
"The more appreciable the danger of West Germany's unleashing of 
a military conflict, the more imperative and urgent becomes the
conclusion of a German peace-treaty............The policy of the
leading NATO powers - the US, Britain and the FGR - and of the
aggressive bloc as a whole leaves the Soviet Union no
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alt ernat1ve."87
On the same day Pravda reported the Central Committee's decision to 
extend military service, this time directly related to the need for a 
German peace-treaty:
"The interests of the Soviet Union's security demand that the 
best-trained Soviet servicemen remain in the armed forces of the 
Soviet Union until a peace-treaty is signed with Germany."88 
The reason behind this Soviet decision is hard to gauge. If it was to 
put additional pressure on the American government they scored an own 
goal as it just strengthened the Americans in their resolve not to 
make more concessions. It is possible that the Soviet decision was the 
result of pressure from the military or from the Chinese. Yet even 
then that leaves questions unanswered, as the Americans themselves 
were on the verge of resuming nuclear testing and if the Soviets had 
waited a little longer they could have scored an enormous propaganda 
victory.
One historian, Mackintosh argues that the Soviet decision for the 
resumption of nuclear testing was made as early as March 1961, and 
that the time-lag until the 30th of August was the time needed to 
prepare testing sites in Asia and the Arctic. There is little evidence 
to support this proposition however, and greater insight into the 
matter is given by Khrushchev's remarks to two visiting Labour MPs Sir 
Leslie Plummer and Konni Zilllacus that his action was:" to shock the 
Western powers to negotiate on Germany and disarmament. "89 The Western 
press drew similar conclusions:
"the Soviet Union hoped to demoralise and frighten the Western 
allies, perhaps reducing their will to stand firm in West
- 136-
Berlin" 90
and:
"to risk alienating the rest of the world so completely at this 
time, Khrushchev must be overwhelmingly, even dangerously 
conf ident. "91
From whatever angle you look at, it must be said that Khrushchev's 
foreign policy did not look very coherent af this time, as he 
consistently uses carrot and stick policies simultaneously. While 
there was a pervasive awareness of the Soviet resumption of nuclear 
testing, Khrushchev repeatedly stressed his awareness to negotiate 
over Berlin.
On the 2nd of September, the Soviet Ambassador in Rome, Kozyrev 
delivered to Fanfani a message about how Khrushchev was anxious to 
negotiate with the West. On the 5th of September in his interview with 
the American journalist Sulzberger, Khrushchev said he would be 
prepared to meet Kennedy at any time. Thus Khrushchev used informal 
channels of communication to express his interest in negotiations, 
while official Soviet rhetoric was more strident. A series of Soviet 
announcements and moves built up the tension. In the Soviet note of 
the 2nd of September, it stated that agreements over the rights of 
air-corridors across GDR territory:
"were concluded before the establishment of sovereign German 
states which have already won broad international recognition. "92 
and that the USA bears full responsibility for the use of the air- 
corridors by "West Berlin revanchists, militarists, spies and 
saboteurs. "93 The West responded to this on the 8th of September 
warning the Soviets against: "aggressive action against established
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rights by the Soviet government and the East German regime. "94 In 
Pravda there were charges made against Western hypocrisy and demanding 
change in the German situation. On the 10th of September, large scale 
Warsaw Pact military manoeuvres in East Germany, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia were announced. The military kept a high profile, with 
General R.Y, Maiinkovsky, Defence Minister, repeatedly calling for the 
strengthening of Soviet armed forces.
A possible incident of great importance was Kozlov's speech of the 
12th of September in Pyonyang, in which he stated that there was no 
longer a time-limit on the German peace-treaty. Whether this indicates 
a crucial change of policy or an indication of an internal policy 
difference is difficult to ascertain. Such a remark certainly seems at 
Odds With the buzzing of American commercial planes over East Germany 
by two MIG fighters the following day. Yet certainly it was about this 
time that the Soviet government began to take a slightly less 
aggressive line.
The sudden death of Dag Hammarskjold, the UN Secretary General, proved 
to be a diversion, focusing attention on the controversial question 
of whether there should be a change in the fundamental structure of 
the UN. With the absence of any more confrontations in Berlin itself, 
by the 23rd of September M,Kharlamov was able to remark to Pierre 
Salinger: "The storm is now over"94, and to deliver a 26 page letter 
from Khrushchev to the President. Negotiations were in progress at 
different levels, and Gromyko went to Washington where he had several 
lengthy if largely unproductive sessions of discussions with Kennedy. 
Ulbricht continued to make inflammatory speeches, but in practice he 
could do little.
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Another reason why the German question was receiving less attention 
in the Soviet Union was that the dominating concern was becoming the 
preparations for the 22nd Party Congress opening in October. On the 
world scene, the public dispute between the Soviet Union and China was 
becoming more pressing. In East Germany itself, the measures perhaps 
initially seen as "interim", ie to close the East/West German border 
had of itself achieved many of the objectives that the concept of a 
peace-treaty was meant to fulfil. Economic and social stability had 
been brought to East Germany, and hence greater security for Soviet 
interests also. The Soviets had also won a prestigious victory in 
relations with the US. The last major confrontation in Berlin in 1961 
was that of the Checkpoint Charlie incident of the 22nd of October. 
This attempt by East German troops to restrict and hence have control 
over the movement of Allied personnel into East Berlin should not be 
dismissed as an unimportant incident as argued by historians such as 
Adomeit. It is important as if the allies had taken no action it would 
have set an important precedent, acknowledging that the East German 
government had complete authority over all traffic passing through the 
West/East German border, a right not previously claimed. One aspect of 
particular note is that the harsh and aggressive note of the speeches 
of Ulbricht found no echoes in the Soviet press. The East German 
action seems a direct response to Khrushchev's speech of the 17th of 
October in which he lifted the deadline for the signature of a German 
peace-treaty, while asserting that it was still a matter of urgency. 
Khrushchev was still interested in concessions from the West over 
Berlin, but was no longer willing to take major risks in order to win
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West Berlin. The situation in East Germany was stabilised, and the 
matter was no longer urgent.
Conclusion.
After such a detailed examination of the events of the summer of
1961, it is now time to stand back a little, and to discern the
overall trends and information gained about Khrushchev's leadership.
Are we any closer in classifying Khrushchev as following an aggressive
or cautious foreign policy? As we have seen, R,Slusser argues that
Khrushchev wanted a moderate foreign policy, while Adomeit sees
Khrushchev as pursuing an ambitious and aggressive policy, held in
check only by his more conservative colleagues. Adomeit's conclusions
seem in line with Penkovsky's, the Soviet army colonel with Military 
*
Intelligence. He argues that many in the Soviet leadership, including 
Mikoyan and the Soviet Generals were against such aggressive policies 
saying: "What in hell do we need Berlin for?. We have endured it for 
16 years: we can put up with it for a little longer."95 
Many distinguished historians advise caution when referring to The 
Penkovsky Papers. Thus E.Crankshaw comments:
"Penkovsky, as I have said, was shocked by the size and magnitude 
and malevolence of the secret service of which he formed a part. 
He was also shocked by the behaviour of Khrushchev and others. 
Here I think, he can be very misleading"96.
He also comments that Penkovsky "detested Khrushchev and the Soviet 
leadership" and was unable to "distinguish between government
intentions and government precautions. "97 These observations, made
* Penkovsky
after a close examination of Penkovsky*s notes, cast doubts on 
Penkovsky's reliability as a source.
There is a greater objection to Penkovsky's argument however, and 
that is that they fail to have any verification from the evidence 
examined, Khrushchev was put under pressure from Ulbricht re the 
signing of a German peace-treaty, yet in the end he decided against 
this. In their speeches, time and again the military took a harder 
policy line than Khrushchev, yet these were not implemented.
Khrushchev can also be seen to be diffusing tension as when talking 
directly to the press he often took a much less severe line than that 
of official Soviet policy, eg the Sulzberger interview. On numerous 
occasions Khrushchev took action which if not moderate, was certainly 
not as radical or extreme as the options open to him. Even the 
decision to seal the East/West Berlin border, was taken after some 
hesitation, and was tentative in that they didn't immediately build a 
wall, but were prepared to retreat if directly challenged. The one 
exception to this pattern could be the decision to resume nuclear 
testing on the 30th August. Repeatedly Khrushchev has shown an 
awareness of the serious consequences of escalating actions by either 
side, and while he takes risks he seerned to do only if he felt that 
the circumstances were favourable. Thus he raised the question of a 
German peace-treaty at the Vienna Conference as he felt that the 
Western and especially the American position was weak, and that he 
could take advantage of this.
Khrushchev was willing to take opportunities to exploit Western 
weakness for Soviet advantage, but usually withdrew if he judged the 
risks to be too great. In the Berlin crisis because the Soviet Union
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was economically vulnerable, the Soviet government acted quickly and 
productively to secure the stability of one of its Warsaw pact allies. 
By the border sealing operation for East Germans leaving East Berlin 
for West Berlin, the Soviet government achieved its aim at minimum
cost.
The Berlin crisis has been seen in a number of ways. The Soviet 
historian Vyotskii asserts:
"it can be said for certain that the socialist countries won the 
battle, and that the erection of a defensive wall against 
militarism and revanchism on the border with West Berlin was a 
major achievement by the ethnic socialist community and an event 
of truly historic significance. "98 
In his Memoirs, Khrushchev sees it as:
"a great victory for us, and it was won without firing a single 
shot. By refusing to back down in the face of intimidation by the 
West, we guarantee the GDR's right to control its own territory 
and borders. "99
By contrast, many Western historians see the Berlin crisis as a time 
when: "Western strength and moderation had triumphed over Khrushchev’s 
bluster." 100, while A,M.Schlesinger talks of Kennedy as a man who: 
"applied power and diplomacy in combination and sequence which 
enabled him to guard the vital interests of the West and hold off 
the holocaust."101 
On the whole, after sifting the evidence, it does look like, whether 
by chance or design, the Soviet government wrong-footed the Americans 
over Berlin, gaining a number of advantages at little cost.
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Chapter 5. Cuba 1962 - a case-sturiy.
"If it was a triumph, it was the triumph of the next 
generation, and not of any particular government or 
people"i
R. Kennedy on the Cuban missile crisis.
Outline of the study.
In the next two chapters, in order to try to analyse the mechanics 
of Soviet foreign policy, and to identify its sources, an evaluation 
of the period in 1962, involving the period concerning the Cuban 
missile crisis will be made. The following framework is going to be 
adopt ed;
1. A background analysis of the situation leading to the Cuban 
missile crisis. This will focus particularly on the influence of China 
in various areas of Soviet foreign policy, and then towards Cuba 
especially.
Chapter Six.
2. A case-study based on a specific period of time, in this case the 
months of January to November 1962, in order to identify the main 
patterns and variations in Soviet policy-making, and the nature of 
their implementation.
This will include recent input from a conference in the Soviet Union 
in January 1989 concerning the Cuban missile crisis.
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SECTION 1. A BACKGROUND TO THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, is one of the most commonly 
discussed and debated incidents of post-war international relations. 
Many scholars and historians have spent considerable time and energy 
to search out all the facts and exact times of various incidents and 
meetings between the key American political figures and their Soviet 
counterparts, in an effort to explain the string of decision-making^ 
from the American discovery of the existence of Soviet missiles on 
Cuba to the final conciliatory telegram sent by Khrushchev on Sunday 
the 28th of October. Yet despite the profusion of personal accounts, 
memoirs etc and the intensity of historical analysis, these works 
chiefly depict the American viewpoint. Thus it would seem logical to 
attempt to redress this balance, to assess Soviet and Cuban government 
statements and policy, to seek their attitudes and possible 
motivations for action.
Apart from this need to challenge stereotypes of American 
historiography, there are many other reasons to look at this period 
afresh. As a result of recent developments in the Soviet Union, some 
new and relevant source material has come to light, articles, memoirs 
etc, whose information needs to be assimulated into the broader 
spectrum of previously known facts. 1962 was a year in which it began 
to be discovered that the old fallacies of the "communist monolith" 
were discovered to be false, and something of the political diversity 
possible in nations in both East and West was realised. It was this 
year that laid the foundations for the Test-ban Treaty of 1963
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providing a new and more cooperative basis for Soviet-American 
relations. Events in Cuba should also be seen within this broader 
context of world events, especially with regard to Sino-Soviet 
relations. Therefore time will now be spent giving an analysis of some 
of the main issues in the months leading up to the autumn of 1962, in 
order to gain a more comprehensive perspective on events. This will 
involve the study of three main topics:
(a)Soviet and Chinese attitudes towards Cuba, and under-developed 
count ries.
(b)Soviet and Chinese attitudes towards India.
(c)Soviet-Cuban relations since 1959.
(a)The influence of Chinese-Soviet relations on Soviet attitudes to 
under-developed countries
Initially, the link between Chinese policy and the Cuban missile 
crisis looks at best tenuous, and at worst completely irrelevant, yet 
on closer inspection Chinese policy does seem to influence Moscow 
quite considerably. When the Chinese People's Republic was declared on 
the 1st of 1949, the Soviet government was one of the first in 
recognising the new regime, and by 1950 an Alliance Treaty had already 
been signed between the two countries. In the early 1950's, various 
economic and political agreements were signed, culminating in a secret 
Soviet agreement in 1957, providing help to enable China to build her 
own nuclear weapons. However already there were tensions emerging 
between the two countries. The Chinese government was no longer
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willing to follow the Soviet lead in the international communist 
movement, and realising its own capabilities and capacities tried to 
assume a more influential role amongst communist states. While there 
is some controversy over the role of ideology in this split, it is 
significant that it was after Khrushchev's Secret Speech of 1956 that 
antagonism started to flare up. While the Soviet Union propounded 
"peaceful co-existence" and a "peaceful transition to socialism", 
which for them offered economic advantages - trading advantages and a 
less hefty military budget, this type of policy offered little hope 
for China to increase her influence in the world. The Chinese 
government had fewer influential contacts, and felt that it had more 
to gain from an aggressive policy of forcibly exporting revolution and 
encouraging territorial expansion. While theoretically it may seem 
possible for both countries to pursue these policies independently and 
amicably, in practice it lead to confrontation.
Manifestations of this disagreement can be seen as early as 1958, in 
the case of the Iraqi revolution. While the Soviets were trying to 
support and influence the existing government, the Chinese were 
intriguing against the government and encouraging more radical left- 
wing groups. As Zagoria comments: "The Russians cannot be indifferent 
to Chinese led Communist assaults on the very government that the 
Soviets are trying to woo. "2 Therefore even in 1958, real policy 
divergencies and indeed actively contradictory policies can be 
identified, and characteristics of the later "full split" can be seen 
in embryo form. The vast majority of the West was oblivious to the 
implications of this policy conflict, a noticeable exception being 
Isaac Deutscher. He was aware as early as 1958 the influence that the
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Chinese exerted over Soviet foreign policy:
"The events of this summer have brought to light, with somewhat 
artificial sharpness, the fact that Soviet foreign policy is no 
longer made in Moscow alone, that Peking plays an essential 
part in formulating it, and that Mao Zedong may have a decisive 
say at crucial moments. "3 
That the encroaching Chinese influence was taken seriously in the 
Kremlin, can be seen in the Soviet decision of 1959 when they 
repudiated their agreement to help the Chinese build nuclear weapons. 
Other potential sources of conflict included the nature of the Sino- 
Soviet border and the position of the Mongolian People's Republic.
By 1958-9, the outline of Sino-Soviet conflict had been set, and the 
implications for communist and non-communist countries alike were 
immense. It wasn't just "neutralist" countries who saw here the 
opportunity for self-advancement, but more ominously for the Soviet 
Union, communist ones also. The Albanian Communist Party, with their 
historically based fear of invasion and hatred especially of the 
Yugoslavs, were alarmed when Khrushchev began to re-establish Soviet- 
Yugoslav links, and to rehabilitate Tito in the communist bloc. Hence 
Hoxha, looking for an ally against a resurgence of Yugoslavian power, 
began to see China as the ideal partner. In order to gain a guarantee of 
Albanian security against Yugoslav attempts to interfere in her 
internal affairs (there had been two Yugoslavian attempts to overthrow 
Hoxha already) the Albanian leadership seized the opportunity to 
exploit Sino-Soviet differences for their own advantage. (NB the 
Yugoslav government felt it was to its advantage to increase tension 
to gain stronger Soviet support). The Chinese were only too pleased to
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encourage Albania in its rebellion against Soviet domination, seeing 
it as an opportunity to gain a foothold in the Soviet backyard. The 
extent of the Chinese challenge at this time, eg at the 81 communist 
party conference in July i960, seems to have been consistently 
underestimated by historians.
The Chinese had an obvious advantage in Asian and Far Eastern 
Communist Parties, having influential majorities in the Indonesian, 
Malaysian and North Vietnamese Communist Parties,and considerable 
influence in North Korea. The Chinese had no hesitation in using the 
American aggression in the Bay of Pigs incident of April 1961 to 
justify a more aggressive policy in Laos and South Vietnam. This 
American action was of course to have major repercussions on Soviet 
policy also.
Chinese actions were thus no marginal concern to the Soviet Union.
The Chinese government had no compunctions about challenging Soviet 
activities in countries where the Soviet government felt it had the
sole right to interfere such as in the Congo. Meantime in Algeria,
Khrushchev was taking a strong diplomatic line trying to take 
advantage of the division between Eisenhower and De Gaulle, while the 
Chinese government were encouraging Ababas in order to support his bid 
for power.
As the Chinese began to realise the possibilities of their 
activities, they became more determined and more ambitious, and the
dispute began to escalate to the stage where:
"an international setback for either Russia or China tended 
almost immediately to rebound against the Sino-Soviet relationship, 
prompting mutual recriminations. "4
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This cycle of events was exacerbated by individual countries 
exploiting the situation for their own advantage, as we have seen, and 
in these years the Kremlin's policy-makers faced very real 
difficulties. It could well have been in the context of these 
circumstances that Khrushchev felt forced to make his dramatic and 
unexpected condemnation of Albania at the 22nd Party Congress of 1961. 
It seems that this move was devised as a method of making communist 
parties from different countries to make a definite commitment one way 
or another, for China or the Soviet Union. However many delegates were 
reluctant to make such a display of allegiance, so little was decided 
and everything remained to play for.
Such continuous Chinese pressure on the Soviet Union over so many 
areas of the world, probing every weak spot, offers a fresh 
perspective on Soviet motivation concerning Cuba. By placing nuclear 
weapons in Cuba, the Soviet government was not just trying to close 
the "missile gap" with the United States, but to increase its 
influence in the Latin American countries. It must also be remembered 
that the Chinese too were interested in Cuba, and that by placing the 
missiles there, the Soviet leadership were reasserting their 
predominant role in Cuba and symbolically in the world communist 
movement as a whole. The fear of being out-manoeuvred by the Chinese 
seems a crucial element in explaining Soviet actions in Cuba.
(b)Soviet and Chinese attitudes towards India.
The Indian case is of particular interest because both of its
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ambiguous geographical position (between East and West), and the 
nature of the connection between the Chinese invasion and Soviet 
actions in Cuba, Indeed one aspect of the Cuban crisis that is often 
overlooked is the concurrent events taking place in India, when the 
Chinese invaded at several points along the border. Again the Soviet- 
Chinese divergence is crucial to forming an accurate picture of 
events, and a brief review of events in India to outline Soviet and 
Chinese policy trends is needed.
In 1959, during the Chinese-Indian border clash, it was:
"the first time that any communist nation had ever taken a 
neutral stance in a dispute between another communist nation and 
a non-communist state."5 
To understand how this situation came about, it is necessary to look at 
Soviet policy towards India on two levels:
(1)its policy towards the Indian state and government.
(2)its policy towards the CPI.
As we have seen, the 1956 20th Party Congress of the CPSU, marked a
watershed in Soviet internal and external policy, with the 
denunciation of Stalin and the pursuance of a more rightist course. 
This had major repercussions in India, where there were already 
significant differences and turmoil within the communist party. 
Confidence in the CPSU waned, only to recover with the Kerala election 
results, which seemed to make a parliamentary path to socialism a more 
realistic possibility. Lasting damage was done however, as the centraj 
leadership of the CPI was losing control of an increasing fragmented 
party, there being strong left-wing and Chinese-orientated groups in 
the provinces of West Bengal, Punjab and Andhra. Paradoxically, while
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Khrushchev's policies of wooing neutral countries in a non-military 
manner lost him support amongst the Indian communists, it meant 
Soviet-Indian relations on a state-level were increasingly cordial and 
further enhanced by now mutual suspicion of China.
By 1961, the CPI were uncertain of their position in the Chinese- 
Soviet division. In 1960 at one point, the Central Committee of the 
CPSU had condemned Chinese policies, only to be criticised in turn by 
the West Bengalis for their biased attitude. Matters were brought to a 
head by the 22nd Party Congress of October 1961. In 1961, Khrushchev 
was facing renewed opposition within the Party and the bureaucracy, 
and sought both to consolidate his position and to pave the way for 
further reforms. Khrushchev's vigorous attack on Stalin at the 
Congress, offered him the chance to disperse his opponents, but was 
not without risk. This internal campaign was matched by a vehement 
attack on Albania, which affected the communist movement very deeply. 
In India, it lead to the further process of radicalisation of the CPI 
- the General Secretary Gosh tried to assume an ambiguous non-commital 
position, while the more left-wing of the Party eg in Uttar Pradesh 
publisised an article eulogising Stalin and suggesting that if 
Stalin's body was to leave the Kremlin walls, then they would be happy 
to bury it in their town. Thus as H.Gelman comments:
"by the end of 1961, the internal division of the CPI into 
moderate and leftish factions reflecting the divergent 
attitudes and policy positions of Moscow and Peking had become 
clearly def ined. "6 
Meanwhile in Eastern Europe, Khrushchev's attempt to isolate Albania 
and cause China to backtrack had not been successful. With the
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failure of the 1961 22nd Party Congress to reunite the world communist 
movement around the Soviet leadership, the Soviet government would 
need to embark on another course of action.
(c)Soviet-Cuban relations since 1959.
One of the most interesting and controversial questions of the Cuban 
missile crisis, lies in the nature of its origins. Why did Khrushchev 
decide to take such a drastic and bold decision as to place nuclear 
weapons in Cuba? While this question is very much dependent on the 
timing of this decision to place missiles into Cuba, the history of 
Soviet-Cuban relations also has a part to play. By attempting to 
isolate some of the motivating factors of the Soviet government with 
regard to Cuba, it should be possible to gain a deeper understanding 
of the Soviet government's perceptions of the international scene.
Castro's revolution in Cuba against the Batista regime was victorious 
in 1959. While some communists were involved, that the nature of this 
revolution was in any way communist was far from certain, eg only in 
1962, under much pressure would Castro even go as far as to say: "the 
basis for a single united revolutionary party was being created and 
that its members were very seriously studying Marxist-Leninism. "7 This 
in no way can be seen as an enthusiastic espousal of Marxist-Leninism, 
and it was hard for the Soviet government to accommodate even in the 
flexible "national liberation" theory. It was quite possible, in the 
early months of 1959 that Cuban-American relations could have been 
quite strong, were it not for Castro's ill-fated attempt to invade the
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Dominican Republic in June of that year. From then on, Castro was 
forced to seek an ally elsewhere, though again it was by no means 
certain as to whom he should turn. In 1960 Mikoyan visited Cuba in 
January, and by February a Soviet-Cuban trade agreement 'was signed. 
Shortly afterwards in April, Cuba was constituted a socialist state.
Yet even then in Cuba rival factions were keen on having different 
allies. Escalante on the leftist side of politics wanted a greater 
radicalism of the Cuban revolution, and looked to the Chinese model as 
an example. In 1960-1, Cuba signed trade-agreements with both the 
Soviet Union and with China, and the issue could have gone either way.
Why at this stage, was the USSR so interested in Cuba? There are many 
reasons. As a result of Cuba's geographical position, so close to the 
United States, Cuba would make a useful strategic ally for the USSR, 
to increase her prestige. With the Soviet Union's policy of 
encouraging and aiding under-developed countries still strongly held, 
Cuba seemed the ideal prize. Another strong motivating purpose must 
have been the Chinese influence. Irrespective of the intrinsic merit 
of Cuba itself, the very fact that China herself was interested in an 
alliance with Cuba, increased Soviet interest. As Lowenthal comments: 
"both Moscow and Peking turned decisively and skilfully to a 
policy of respect for the independence of the emerging states 
and offered them economic aid and support in all conflict with 
the imperialists. "8 
As a result of Chinese interest, Cuba's value was enhanced, despite 
the ideological difficulties of incorporating her into the Marxist- 
Leninist mode. Thus in the initial years at least, Soviet interest was 
primarily for reasons of prestige, for a victory over China, and to
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gain a potential foothold into Latin America.
1961, from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union, must have seemed to be 
one of triumph for Khrushchev. In April he saw the new President lose 
much respect and credibility by his sanctioning of the invasion of 
Cuba in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The importance of this failed invasion 
should not be underemphasised in giving Khrushchev motivation to be 
more involved in Castro's situation. It's interesting to look at new 
material published in the form of previously hidden tapes made by 
Khrushchev himself. These tapes were published in Khrushchev 
Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes. In extracts from Time magazine, he 
claims that the Cuban missiles were put in Cuba for defensive reasons: 
"I was haunted by the knowledge that the Americans could not 
stomach having Castro's Cuba right next door to them. Sooner or 
later the US would do something. It had the strength and it had 
the means. As they say, might makes right. How were we supposed 
to strengthen and reinforce Cuba? With diplomatic notes and 
TASS statements?
The idea arose of placing our missile units in Cuba."9 
This remark emphasises the effect of the Bay of Pigs incident in 
Soviet thinking, and that Cuban pressure on Khrushchev must have had 
some degree of influence on Khrushchev as a result. This helps to 
partly explain Khrushchev's desire to place Soviet missiles in Cuba, 
as shall be explored in greater depth later.
After a time of uncertainty about Eastern Europe and how to stabilise 
East Germany's deteriorating economic condition, the creation of the 
Berlin Wall had taken some of the pressure off, even if only 
temporarily. At the end of September 1961, the Soviet Union resumed
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nuclear testing, while in October Khrushchev launched a new de- 
Stalinisation drive and a new assault on Chinese influence in the 
communist movement. In Cuba things were also looking more hopeful, as 
by the 2nd of December, Castro had openly espoused Marxist-Leninism. 
There must have been a considerable degree of confidence amongst the 
Soviet leadership at this time.
A theory concerning the decision of the Presidium of the Central 
Committee to put Soviet missiles into Cuba is advanced by Andrez 
Suarez, who estimates that the decision must have been taken a year in 
advance, sometime just after the Bay of Pigs invasion attempt. He 
argues that it was Castro's insecurity after the American action that 
made him seek Soviet protection in earnest, because he could receive 
from them a nuclear guarantee. Thus he states: "It would take Castro 
more than a year to break Moscow's resistance."10 This theory lacks 
substance however. It would be unlikely that the Soviet Union would be 
willing to place nuclear weapons in Cuba, epecially when bearing in 
mind that no other communist country even in Eastern Europe had Soviet 
nuclear weapons on their soil, just because it would make Castro more 
secure. As Tatu argues:
"had Castro's defence been the main object, it would have been 
far simpler to extend the Warsaw Pact guarantees to cover the 
island, or else for the USSR to commit itself only to declare 
war in case of aggression against its ally"11 
When the decision to put nuclear weapons in Cuba was made, the defence 
of Cuba itself can only have been part of a much greater plan.
From the evidence of Castro himself, much of a contradictory nature 
still emerges as to who initiated the idea of putting nuclear weapons
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in that country. In a six month time span, at least three different 
theories were produced. Castro:
"told a Cuban audience in January 1963 that sending the 
missiles was a Soviet idea; he repeated this idea to Claude 
Julien of Le Monde in March 1963; in May he described it to 
Lisa Howard of the American Broadcasting Company as 
"simultaneous action on the behalf of both governments"; then 
in October he told Herbert Matthews of the New York Times that 
it was a Cuban idea, only to tell Jean Daniel of L1Express in
November that it was a Soviet idea "12
One interesting remark he did make, was that he claimed that the 
decision to place the missiles in Cuba was in fact made "at the 
beginning of 1962"13. This assertion needs to be investigated, to see 
if it provides a clue as to whether there was a more tangible reason 
for the Soviet Union to decide to take such a decision then, and if 
there was any evidence of a change of political line in 
January/Febroary 1962.
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Chapter 6.
SOVIET POLICY WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO CUBA: A CASE STUDY JANUARY TO
NOVEMBER 1962.
As we have seen, Fidel Castro has claimed that Khrushchev took the 
decision to put missiles into Cuba at the beginning of 1962, and that 
this was the critical period for policy making. In the early months of 
1962, Chinese-Soviet relations were poor, with a number of polemical 
outbursts on both sides. There was also a number of reports of 
dissension within the communist bloc. One report of particular 
interest, was in the New York Times on the 13th of January:
"One experienced American reported that the Soviet Union was 
being urged by the Polish and Czechoslovakian governments, as 
well as by the East Germans, to move rapidly towards a final 
settlement of the East German problem, of which Berlin was a 
part." 1
If this was so, it would suggest that the Soviet focus was on Europe 
rather than Cuba. It is also possible, although less likely that it 
could have been as a response to this pressure that a scheme involving 
missiles in Cuba could have been conceived. A salient factor that 
would appear to back Castro's assertion is that at this time Soviet- 
Cuban relations were close - eg thus on the 11th of January the Cuban- 
Soviet trade agreement was renewed.
Despite these happenings, there is evidence which suggests that it is 
unlikely that such a decision was made at this time. There were some 
Soviet initiatives concerning Germany at this time, but they were of a 
diplomatic character rather than being aggressive. On the 8th of
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January, the Soviet government seemed to he manoeuvering to isolate 
West Germany politically from the rest of the alliance, and to profit 
from the disarray and dissension prevalent amongst West German 
politicians at this time. Various attempts to encourage negotiations 
were made by the Soviet Union, but little was achieved in practice. 
Thus at this time it would seem that the Soviets favoured a quieter, 
more subtle approach. With Ulbricht's visit to Moscow in Febuary of 
that year, the Soviet government resumed a slightly more antagonistic 
line, putting pressure on the Allied air corridors etc. This seemed 
more a change in emphasis rather than a drastic change of policy 
however.
From a domestic viewpoint also it seems unlikely that such a major 
decision was made at this time. Khrushchev was absent from public life 
for the first two weeks of January, and there seems to have been a 
considerable amount of confusion in policy making. This is manifested 
in the various contradictory Soviet statements about Molotov's return 
to his post in Vienna. The announcement of this move was interpreted 
by some observers as: "an indication that Mr Molotov still had 
powerful friends in the Party."2 On the 10th, the original Soviet 
statement was retracted, and by the 18th there was an attack on 
Molotov in an article by N,Inozemtsev in Pravda. and again on the 
19th. At this time attention seems to have been concentrated on the 
implementation of the internal de-Stalinisation drive,and on ways of 
replying to Chinese anti-Soviet propaganda, rather than on planning a 
new initiative. One Western correspondent commentated at the end of 
J anuary:
"Soviet diplomacy has been strangely quiescent of late. Premier
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Khrushchev has not had anything to say on foreign affairs for
some time...... On East/West relations, Moscow has seemed
content to mark time. "3 
While it could be argued that there was little going on precisely 
because the Soviet government was planning new activity in Cuba, there 
is little to support this idea. There were few signs of consultations 
being held with other leaders, either internally or externally at this 
time. It appears to have been largely a reactive and self-absorbed 
period for the Soviet leadership, rather than one of taking new 
initiatives. There were too many pressing domestic concerns for a 
decision of the magnitude of placing nuclear missiles in Cuba to have 
been taken.
The next time which seems a possible time of decision is towards the 
end of April, During this period, there were a number of significant 
policy changes, both internally and in a number of foreign policy 
areas, which would indicate some major policy readjustment originating 
within the Kremlin. Therefore this period will be considered in some 
detail.
Soviet motivation for the placing of missiles in Cuba, is a neglected 
area when it comes to a consideration of the Cuban missile crisis, 
although it is crucial to an understanding of Soviet thinking. A 
survey of some of the major pressures on the Soviet Union at this time 
could help provide insight into their reasoning. Berlin surely must 
have played a major part in Soviet calculations as it was the focal 
point of much discontent and protest in Eastern Europe, as well as 
Western pressure. By the placing of missiles in Cuba, this would 
redirect pressure onto the American government, and might allow a more
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flexible American stance on Berlin. While at the moment it is not 
necessary to assess the relative importance of Berlin in Soviet 
calculations, it can clearly be seen that it had a definite role to 
play.
If we accept this premise, then when a decision was made regarding 
Cuba, you would expect a corresponding change in Soviet rhetoric about 
West Berlin. This is mirrored in policy statements by Soviet leaders 
at this time. In Khrushchev's speech on the 21st of April in Sofia, he 
made some of his most aggressive speeches on Berlin. On 24th of April, 
Gromyko made a speech, expressing his desire for a German Peace Treaty 
as opposed to merely a settlement over Berlin.
"the best thing to do would be to sign a single peace treaty 
with both the German [democratic Republic and the Federal 
German Republic or, if it would suit the Western powers better, 
to sign separate treaties with each of the German states."4 
Another significant remark was made by Khrushchev on the 25th when he 
told the American publisher George Cowles that plans to have a US-USSR
summit should be postponed. He argued that there should be preparatory
negotiations first, to avoid Mbig disappointment for people who want 
to see urgent problems find their positive resolution"4a and referred 
pointedly to the U2 incident on the eve of the Eisenhower-Khrushchev 
meeting in May 1960. Interestingly, Khrushchev talks about the 
possibility of the international situation deteriorating and that in 
this event:
"there may then be a need for urgent efforts on the part of the
leaders of the great powers to prevent the spark that could
cause a military conflagration; this is another case where I do
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not rule out a summit meeting, one that would be aimed at 
averting such an outcome. "5 
This would seem to correspond to the later Soviet concept of 
negotiating from a position of strength, after the missiles were
established and operational on Cuban soil. By the end of April
therefore, the Soviet government was giving less emphasis to diplomacy 
and negotiations, and was pursuing a hardline and antagonistic 
attitude over the German question. For Khrushchev to do this after 
spending much time trying to achieve a negotiated settlement, and 
considering the urgency of the question, it seems highly probable that 
some alternative plan was being considered or had been adopted.
This was a time of internal tension also. In the political arena, 
Voroshilov was unexpectedly retained in the Supreme Soviet, perhaps 
indicating something more than a tremor in Khrushchev's political 
control. Plans for a prestigious Soviet World Trade Fair on the 50th 
anniversary of the Revolution had to be dropped because of lack of 
capital, indicating that the Soviet Union was still in considerable 
financial difficulty- Signs of economic difficulty were mentioned in
the Editorial column of the New York Times, which commented that the 
USSR was:
"under considerable strain in trying to meet all its many 
commitments, an impression shared by many observers."6 
If the Soviet government was feeling itself to be under economic 
pressure, this would have made the relatively "cheap" option of 
putting missiles in Cuba an attractive way of increasing its world 
standing. Michel Tatu, the French correspondent of Le Monde, argues 
that there were important changes in army personnel in April, and
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makes a convincing case to connect this with a decision over Cuba. He 
points out that in the spring of 1962, three Marshals lost their 
influence, and that the demotion of two in particular, K, S. Moskalenko 
and F I. Golikov was kept secret till the summer, and that both were 
reinstated after the missile crisis. Thus Tatu argues that it was 
Khrushchev's desire to place nuclear weapons in Cuba which caused 
these disruptions amongst the military. This theory is also consistent 
with : "what the Chinese later called "an excessive reliance on atomic
weapons "7. Thus there are indications, from a military viewpoint, as 
well as an economic one, that a major policy decision was made at this 
time, and that the concept of putting nuclear missiles in Cuba looked 
to be an attractive option to Khrushchev.
Another interesting and related development of this time, took place 
in the sphere of Sino-Soviet relations. During three weeks in April, 
the Chinese Party Congress took place, at which a number of 
ideological concessions were made which seemed to be aimed at 
reconciliation with the USSR. Just after the end of this, on the 21st 
of April, a Sino-Soviet trade agreement was signed. Much of this new 
conciliatory attitude can be explained in terms of China's poor 
economic situation - the bad harvest of the last three years, the 
droughts, mass malnutrition etc, but it could also be that relations 
were improved because the Soviet government had hinted at the 
possibility of a new military initiative, which the Chinese considered 
to be a vindication of their more aggressive foreign policy line. The 
installation of the missiles must also have seemed a method of 
exerting more substantial control within Cuba, and of providing a new 
momentum in Soviet power and influence in underdeveloped countries and
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the world as a whole.
A last but crucial factor in all this is the Soviet-Cuban exchanges 
that took place at this time. On the 28th of April, Khrushchev met 
Ceinfuegos, the Cuban Minister for Public Works. A few days later on 
the 1st of May, Castro declared Cuba to be a socialist state, which 
could indicate some form of deal having been made between the two 
countries. Although this evidence is only circumstantial, when all the 
different pieces are brought together - the change in Soviet policy 
towards Berlin, better relations with China, internal economic, 
political and military pressures and close Soviet-Cuban contacts at 
this time - it does amount to a formidable collection of evidence that 
the Soviet government made the decision to place nuclear missiles in 
Cuba at the end of April.
Reference has been made previously to a conference that took place 
relatively recently in the Soviet Union concerning the Cuban missile 
crisis, and it seems an appropriate time to consider some of the 
remarks and insights that can be gained from that. This conference 
took place in Moscow in January 1989, and the following people 
attended: Gromyko, Dobrynin, MacNamara, Bundy, Sorensen, Mikoyan and 
Khrushchev's son Sergei. The conference was covered by the Soviet 
press in articles in Izvest ia on the 6th of Febroary and the 17th of 
April ligand also in The Guardian on the 25th of March. In some ways 
the results of this conference were disappointing, as not much 
progress was made about some of the most controversial issues of the 
crisis. The major point everyone seemed to agree on was how much 
difference new technology made to international relations today, 
especially the "hot-line" between the Kremlin and the White House. Yet
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some interesting information did emerge. In the article of the 28th 
of f ebruonj i t states:
"The idea of placing the missiles in Cuba was a Soviet one, by 
N.S.Khrushchev in person. It was confirmed in Moscow in the 
summer of 1962 after the visit of the Soviet delegation to 
Havana. "8
This is slightly ambiguous, as "confirmed" could mean the decision to 
go ahead with the final stage of an action already begun, or a 
decision to instigate a completely new line of action. As previously 
intimated, the former seems the more accurate, as much of the evidence 
would indicate it was a longer term plan, and that the decision to 
procee4 at least in part, must have been made in the spring.
By the summer of 1962, the pressures on Khrushchev were increasing 
from all sides. At home Khrushchev was still under considerable 
political attack after the 22nd Party Congress, and his control over 
the Secretariat had been weakened. It was in June that due to enonomic
difficulties prices rose - meat by 30%, butter by 25%, and also in
June when there was much political discontent and riots in Rostov. An
indication of the seriousness of this little reported event is given 
by the fact that as senior a figure as Kozlov was sent to calm the . 
situation and reimpose central government authority.
The arms race situation between America and the Soviet Union was at a 
critical stage by the summer. By July 1962, the American government 
was fully aware of the fallacy of the "missile gap" myth propounded by 
the Soviets. Thus Khrushchev felt that he was losing out in his 
relations with the West. To make matters worse, due to the strictness 
of the budgetary restraints, there was very little he could do about
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it. The Soviet economic crisis had another important consequence, as 
it limited:
"Soviet capacity to relieve economic distress in Communist China 
and to provide meaningful aid to the underdeveloped countries of 
Asia and Africa, no matter how high a priority in propaganda 
value it might attach to such activities. "9 
Khrushchev's foreign policy aims were very much limited by the 
shortage of economic resources in the USSR. The situation in the 
satellite countries also gave cause for concern, especially in East 
Germany where chronic food shortages provided the focus of 
discontent, and a renewed surge in the number of people attempting to 
flee. By mid-June the Berlin crisis was centre-stage, accompanied by 
more Soviet calls for a German peace-treaty. Thus by the end of June, a 
New York Times correspondent reported:
"Observers here believe that pressure is mounting on Premier 
Khrushchev to obtain a Berlin settlement both for political 
reasons and for considerations of personal prestige. Some 
Western officials here fear that a new East-West crisis will
develop before the end of the year if the Soviet/United States
talks fail to produce any results."10 
This comment was perceptive, but the author didn't realise quite the 
form such a conflict would have.
Some historians , such as R.Slusser attribute the decision re Cuba to 
have been made during this period. They argue that the prime reason 
for this move was to readdress the strategic balance lost after the
"missile gap" discovery. Yet surely there must have been more to the
decision than that. Certainly Raul Castro, Castro's brother and
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Minister of the Armed Forces in Cuba visited Moscow for two weeks in 
early July 1962, and it does seem likely that some of the details of 
the actual deployment were made then. However the heavy missile 
shipments to Cuba started by mid-July and peaked 22nd-31st of July, 
which would indicate that the actual decision to deploy the missiles 
must have been taken quite some time previously, in order for the 
logistics to have been worked out, the parts made ready etc. Thus even 
though Khrushchev records in his Memoirs that the final decision 
wasn't made until the 1st of August, this could only be so if this was 
the final decision in a long train of decisions that the actual 
construction of the missile sites in Cuba might procceed. This is 
further supported by remarks made by the Chinese Ambassador to Moscow 
Liu Siao who:
"indicated on several occasions to Ambassadors from neutral 
countries that the Chinese were glad that the Soviets at last 
had found the right way to solve the Berlin crisis"11 
As to the question of who actually initiated the idea of bringing 
Soviet missiles to Cuba, there is much controversy. Khrushchev 
declared: "The Cubans asked the Soviet government for extra help"12. 
while Castro at various times, as we have seen , made completely 
contradictory statements. It does seem most likely judging from the 
available evidence that Khrushchev must have been the main instigator 
- the scheme has all the hallmarks of his character-intelligence, 
boldness, unexpectedness and a significant element of risk. While it 
may have been Castro who asked the Soviet Union for extra help, the 
nature of that help must have been determined by Khrushchev. It is 
unlikely that Castro himself, without prompting, would have been
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ambitious enough to ask for Soviet nuclear weapons to be established 
on Cuban soil, when they had not even been placed in Eastern Europe. 
Thus the essence of the idea must have been from Khrushchev.
This brings us back to Khrushchev's motivation to take such decisive 
action. It would be unlikely that such plans went forward unopposed.
As has been seen, there was opposition from conservatives in the Army. 
It is not enough to say that the missiles were placed in Cuba for 
security reasons. As has been noted previously, it would have been far 
simpler for Khrushchev to extend some form of military pact regarding 
the defence of Cuba, than for him to place nuclear weapons there. From 
this Tatu concludes that hence: "Cuba was only part of a bigger game 
"13, and this would seem to be borne out by the circumstances 
involved. Although the Bay of Pigs incident provided some motivation 
for retaliation of some description, and as we have seen it did 
influence Khrushchev, the main motivation for the Soviet Union's 
actions lay outwith Cuba itself, and the most urgent and difficult 
problem on the international scene at this time was Berlin. It is very 
noticeable in the period leading up to the autumn of 1962, that the 
Soviet Union hinted repeatedly that a summit meeting
might be possible in November, or that Khrushchev might visit the UN 
then. It seems that Khrushchev wanted then to present the Americans 
with a fait accompli, ie with missiles already established and 
operational in Cuba, and then to bargain on that basis. Mikoyan's 
retrospective comment that Moscow had wanted to inform Washington 
about the missiles, but: "not till after the American elections,to 
prevent it from becoming a campaign issue."14, seems like another way
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of saying that the Soviet government didn't want to draw attention to 
what was going on until it was ready and the results would be most 
beneficial to itself. Thus at this stage in August, it seems, as M. 
Tatu asserts, that the majority of the Soviet government favoured 
putting the missiles secretly into Cuba, then they planned a dramatic 
announcement to the world, possibly at the UN, to see what concessions 
and advantages they could gain from their action, especially in 
relation to Berlin.
August began quite promisingly, with the successful conclusion of an 
agreement over Laos and concessions made by Kennedy concerning the 
international control of nuclear testing. In Cuba however things were 
running less smoothly, discontent being reported. On the 4th of August 
a Soviet-Cuban protocol was signed, the Soviet Union providing Cuba 
with technological aid in the development of commercial fishing. It 
seems quite likely that the purpose of this agreement was to distract 
American attention from other activities. Meanwhile this was a time of 
tension in Germany as the first anniversary of the building of the 
Berlin Wall approached. On the 1st of August Ulbricht visited Moscow, 
and because of the deteriorating economic situation pressed with 
increasing fervour for a German peace-treaty. This situation was not 
helped by the Soviet Union's own economic difficulties - in 1952 
Soviet trade with both China and Eastern Europe fell sharply, and the 
Soviet government was less able to give economic aid to East Germany 
than previously. Accusations and threats flew back and forward on both 
sides, and sometime about the 10th a meeting between W.Stoph, Grotwohl 
and Khrushchev at the Black Sea was said to have taken place, the 
substance of which would surely make interesting reading.
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By mid-August, once more there was deadlock at the test-ban 
negotiations at Geneva, with both sides accusing the other of blocking 
progress. Within the Soviet Union there were food riots eg in Rostov, 
and in the continuing Sino-Indian conflict at this time centred on the 
territory of Ladakh, the Soviet government was finding it increasingly 
difficult to placate both sides. The decision of the Soviet government 
to make an aviation agreement to sell MIG-21 jet fighters to India 
didn't help relations with China. Another indiction of the state of 
Sino-Soviet relations is the Hungarian purge, in which 25 Communist 
Party members were expelled including Emoe Geroe and Matyas Rakosi.
The purge was said to be a response to Chinese communist pressure to 
try to gain influence in Hungary at the Soviet's expense, with the 
help of the Hungarian Minister of the Interior Antai Bartos. If this 
is correct, this would provide an additional factor to explain the 
Soviet government's desire for swift and decisive action to 
demonstrate its power both within and outwith the Communist movement.
The attitude of the Soviet Union to the UN at this time is of 
particular interest. It was widely believed in West German political 
circles in mid-August that any plans that the Soviet Union had had to 
take the Berlin Question to the UN for a settlement had now been 
abandoned. The Soviet's policy of trying to gain the support of 
neutral countries in the UN General Assembly had not been effective. 
Yet despite this the Soviet Leadership seemed to maintain their 
confidence in a possible UN solution. On the same day, 20th of August, 
at a flamboyant Soviet ceremony in Red Square to welcome the 
cosmonauts back, Khrushchev made a strong call for Western forces to 
be withdrawn from West Berlin and to be replaced by UN troops. At the
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end of August there was an announcement in Pravda by the USSR Ministry 
of Defence, ordering the abolition of the office of Commandant of the 
Soviet garrison in Berlin. While this move had few practical 
implications, it was a way of antagonising the West who had been 
demanding a conference of the 4 Commandants, and of undermining the 
existing order. This new Soviet activity provoked speculation in the 
West that: "The simmering Berlin crisis seems to be rushing towards a 
new climax"15, and that a Treaty could soon be imposed. This 
impression was fortified by renewed Soviet threats against American 
air-space and a continual stream of border incidents. At the end of 
August, the UN Secretary General U Thant met with Ulbricht and 
Khrushchev at the Crimea to discuss the German question, and U Thant 
said that Khrushchev would be willing to talk with Kennedy. It was 
widely expected that Khrushchev would come to give a speech at the UN 
in the autumn. Although there was concern over the resources and 
ability of the UN to play a major role in international politics, 
especially in the American Congress, the Soviet leadership seemed to 
be calling upon it to play an ever increasing role. As we have seen 
there was no logical reasoafor this change in Soviet policy, countries 
were no more likely to vote for the Soviet Union than before. The 
Soviet leadership must therefore have been relying on some unexpected 
factor capable of dramatically ameliorating their position at the UN, 
and that mysterious "factor" must have been the effect of there being 
Soviet missiles in Cuba.
By September the missile shipments to Cuba were well underway, and 
this should be remembered as the background to the events of this 
month. Partly in order to explain the increased volume of Soviet and
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Soviet chartered ships heading towards Cuba, on the 2nd of September 
the Soviet Union announced that it was sending arms and more technical 
specialists to Cuba. In reaction to this, both the Secretary of State 
and President Kennedy made statements saying that any installation of 
ground-to-ground missiles in Cuba would be unacceptable. At this time 
the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin arranged to meet R. Kennedy to reassure 
him as to Soviet intentions. R.Kennedy related that Dobrynin:
"told me I should not be concerned, for he was instructed by 
Soviet Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev to assure President Kennedy 
that there would be no ground-to-ground missiles or offensive 
weapons placed in Cuba. Further he said, I could assure the 
President that this military build-up was not of any 
significance and that Khrushchev would do nothing to disrupt the 
relationship of our two countries during the period prior to the 
elect ions. " (ie, the American Congressional elections in 
November)16
Reverting back to the old stratagem that attack is the best form of 
defence, a campaign was launched critical of Western policies in other 
areas of the world, eg that under the auspices of the UN the Western 
powers were"competing to seize the riches of the Congo"17 by 
supporting Tshombe and his separatist demands for Katanga. There were 
also reports of American U2's flying over Soviet airspace, and 
complaints against the activities of the CIA. Thus at the beginning of 
September, the policy of the Soviet government seemed to be to assure 
the Americans that nothing of importance was happening in Cuba, and to 
draw attention to other issues instead.
This was a time of great political activity within the Soviet Union,
- 174-
and as we shall see, this had a great relevance to foreign policy 
objectives also. On the 9th of September there appeared in Pravda an 
article by Professor Y. G. Liberman advocating possible ideas to improve 
the Soviet economic system. This was to involve less centralised 
control, more autonomy for local managers and a profit orientated 
incentive system. This article has been seen as expressing the policy 
preferences of Khrushchev himself, as it corresponds to remarks made 
by him, and these ideas were to be discussed at a plenum in mid- 
November. At this plenum these radical plans to reform the Soviet 
managerial system were to be introduced, as were Khrushchev's 
proposals to separate the Party into industrial and agricultural 
sections. These new plans obviously aroused much opposition and 
created political instability, and the key decision time was to be 
this plenum in mid-November. It can't be mere coincidence that this 
internal political activity, happens to coincide with Khrushchev's 
statements hinting at a UN appearance also at this time. It seems that 
Khrushchev saw mid-November as the zenith of his achievements: in
foreign policy - the existence of functional nuclear weapons in Cuba, 
perhaps announced dramatically by Khrushchev himself in a speech at 
the UN, resulting in a deal over Berlin bringing stability to Eastern 
Europe: in domestic policy his foreign policy success augmenting his 
personal authority, lessening the effectiveness of the opposition and 
allowing him to introduce and implement his radical plans to reorganise 
the economic framework of the country. Thus there seems to be a 
recognisable framework to events, a congruent pattern in domestic and 
foreign policy, culminating in the mid-November finale.
A TASS statement made on the 11th of September gives considerable
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attention to the Cuban situation, and it is worth looking at this 
major foreign policy statement in some detail. The United States is 
seen as bellicose and aggressive, after having called up 150,000 
reservists. Thus Soviet military aid, requested by the Cuban 
government, is seen as a natural response, and that:
"the means of defence which Cuba is acquiring will not be used, 
for the need to use them would arise only in the extent of 
aggression against Cuba."
The statement continues:
"The government of the Soviet Union has authorised TASS to state 
also that there is no need for the Soviet Union to set up in 
any other country - Cuba- for example, the means it possesses
for the repulsion of agression, for a retaliatory blow. The
explosive power of our nuclear weapons is so great and the 
Soviet Union has such powerful missiles for delivering these 
nuclear war-heads that there is no need to seek sites for them 
somewhere beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union"18 
This statement is intentionally misleading - implying that nuclear 
weapons would not be placed in Cuba because there is no "need" for 
them. The emphasis on TASS having "government authorisation" is 
designed to make it seem reliable and reassuring, when in fact that was 
exactly what it was not. Another statement which gives us insight into 
Soviet thinking is:
"The whole world knows that the United States of America has
surrounded the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with
its military bases.............set out along the frontiers of the
Soviet Union - in Turkey, Iran, Greece, Italy, Britain, the
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Netherlands, Pakistan and other countries. "19 
Then there is a demand for "Equal rights and equal opportunities must 
be recognised for all countries of the world". This plea for equal 
rights, linked to the emphasis on US military bases abroad, seems to 
provide a theoretical justification for the Soviet Union to turn Cuba 
into just such a base. J. F. Kennedy seems to have been at least partly 
aware of these implications, and on the 13th of September he warns 
t hat :
"If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger 
or to interfere with our security in any way. ...or if Cuba
should ever  become an offensive military base of
significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country 
will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and 
that of its allies."20 
In retrospect many hints concerning the true situation in Cuba at this 
time can be distinguished, but they were presented in such an 
ingenious manner that they were almost inconspicuous in the deluge of 
Soviet rhetoric.
The latter part of September was considerably quieter, partly perhaps 
in anticipation of what was to come. There were some happenings of 
interest— on the 18th an article in Pravda defended the Soviet 
decision to abolish the office of commandant of the Soviet garrison in 
Berlin, while on the same day, a new session of the UN General 
Assembly opened. Even Gromyko's speech there was moderate in tone. One 
of the reasons for this inaction again lay in the internal situation. 
There was an enlarged Presidium meeting which took place from the 17th 
to 22nd of September. From the 24th onwards, Brezhnev's visit to
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Yugoslavia also concentrated Soviet attention slightly nearer to home.
Further signs of an internal power battle was manifested with the
publishing of a "new" Leninist document found and published in Pravda
on the 28th, departing significantly from some of Lenin's earlier
works, and bearing a coincidental resemblance to Khrushchev's own
line of thought, with emphasis on the "production principle" for
example. That there was some form of vigorous struggle at this time
can be seen in the literary world, where there is criticism of 
*
"Silence"in Oktvbr and Zvezda while at the same time it is vigorously 
defended in Izvest i a. During this period both the Soviet Union and 
America seem to be absorbed in their own domestic problems, the United 
States little guessing that this was just the lull before the storm.
^  'Vu B o n d a r e v  . £ Uvecba. 2% th October.^
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By the beginning of October, Soviet pressure and activity were again 
becoming more perceptible in different areas of the world. Press 
speculation continued to thrive on reports of a possible meeting 
between Kennedy and Khrushchev. On 1st of October, Stewart L. Udall the 
American Secretary of the Interior, reported that Khrushchev wanted to 
invite President Kennedy and his wife to visit the USSR. By the 3rd of 
October however it became known that Khrushchev had since rejected 
this idea, saying that the U2 incident was too fresh in the rninds of 
the Soviet people for such a visit to be practicable. This mention of 
the U2 seems a mere pretext, as surely it was applicable too, when the 
original suggestion was made two days earlier. It seems more likely 
that Khrushchev floated the idea in order to guage the reaction to it, 
not from the Americans but from his more conservative-minded 
colleagues. If so, their response must have been overwhelmingly 
negative for him to change his mind so quickly. It could also be 
argued that Khrushchev came to think the better of his offer, because 
of the uncertain nature of events over the next few months. This 
incident gives another indication of there being contradictory forces 
at work amongst the Soviet leadership, and the pressure on 
Khrushchev's leadership.
The talks between Gromyko and Rusk over Berlin continued, but seemed 
to get nowhere. In East Germany Ulbricht repeated his desire for 
urgent action over Berlin, while on the border itself East German 
border guards refused to let ambulance men aid an injured man. Once 
more the situation regarding Berlin should be seen in terms of Eastern 
Europe as a whole, and in relation to the Sino-Soviet rivalry. It is 
significant at this time when Brezhnev was visiting Yugoslavia,
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Soviet-Yugoslav relations had taken a turn for the better. This was 
seen by the Chinese as antagonistic, especially as the Chinese already 
resented what they considered to be a lack of economic aid, and 
deviant Soviet economic and political policies. The fact that the 
Chinese were so eager to increase their influence in Eastern Europe 
made it all the more vital for the Soviets to consolidate their own 
power there, and to settle the most destabilising and damaging problem 
there, ie Berlin.
In Eastern Europe the diversity within the communist "monolith" was 
being manifested more clearly as a political polarisation over the 
German issue emerged. Gomulka,the Polish Communist Party Chairman was 
to visit Ulbricht the next week. Unlike the previous year the Polish 
harvest was not so good, and there was less food to send to East 
Germany to alleviate the effect of critical food shortages. Gomulka 
was expected to advise Ulbricht to be less impatient over a German 
settlement. Tito was also showing signs of having fundamental 
differences with Ulbricht, as he wasn't in favour of the signing of a 
separate German peace-treaty. The Soviet leadership must have been 
aware for a long time of the dangers of a major split developing in 
Eastern Europe, and decided to take action accordingly. It was no 
coincidence that Warsaw Pact military manoeuvres were just being 
concluded at this time, and indeed there were rumours that this was a 
preliminary step before an outright Soviet military assault on West 
Berl in.
While Berlin was still the chief focus of attention for the United 
States, the build-up of Soviet forces in Cuba was also attracting 
attention, and by the 3rd of October the American government had
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decided to take unilateral action against American, Allied or neutral 
ships transporting arms to Cuba, by closing American ports to such 
ships. By the 9th of October, Kennedy had authorised U2 surveillance 
of Cuban territory. While the Americans had a keen interest in what 
was going on, their policies were moderated at this time by the fact 
that 1,000 Cuban exiles,being held prisoner since the Bay of Pigs 
invasion,were on the verge of being released.
During the second week in October, all kinds of unusual statements 
and odd happenings increased fears that some major move by the 
communist bloc was imminent. A major Soviet press campaign co^cerm'ng 
Berlin began, with Krasnaya Zvezda being particularly vehement,
Seymour Topping, a journalist for The New York Times commented:
"some Western diplomats here believe this campaign will 
culminate in November with the appearance of Premier Khrushchev 
before the General Assembly of the United Nations. Ke would 
apparently seek support for a Berlin solution on Communist 
terms. "2 1
Thus observers at this time felt that the situation was 
deteriorating, and that Khrushchev was going to use the opportunity of 
a UN platform to make new demands over Berlin, and to gain support by 
wooing nonaligned nations. In other parts of the world while foreign 
troops had left Laos as part of the recent agreement, in the Congo 
discussions were still continuing, and Chinese proposals for talks 
with India had been rejected.
American attention was again directed towards Cuba, in particular to 
the remarks of Fidel Castro. On the 7th of October, the Cuban 
President said that Cuba had weapons to defend herself with, but
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preferred not to use them, while on the 10th he claimed that he had 
"special support" from the USSR. In Pravda on the 11th, these remarks 
were censored. Tension escalated when a Cuban exile group based on the 
Florida coast, Alpha 65 said that it had raided Cuba on Monday the 
10th, killing 20 Cubans, On the 12th, Senator Keating made the 
dramatic assertion that he had received information that six missile 
launching sites had been built in Cuba. In the already tense 
atmosphere, this statement was explosive, even if there seemed to be 
no available evidence to confirm these allegations. It wasn't long 
before the President was confronted with absolute proof, as on the 
Monday evening of the 15th of October, photographs from Sunday's 
reconnaissance flight over Cuba revealed the presence of Soviet SS-4 
and SS-5 missiles. When J. F Kennedy was informed he gathered together 
a group of senior politicians and officials, later known as the 
Excomm, to decide upon the most appropriate form of response. This 
secret committee met for a week, before Kennedy made the discovery of 
the weapons public on Monday the 22nd of October. During this week, it 
would be worthwhile to examine the nature of Soviet foreign policy.
On the 15th of October, a report by Thomas J Hamilton in the New York 
Times , said that a Soviet UN official, with Khrushchev's 
authorisation, had said that if America would ease its stand on 
Berlin, then the Soviet Union would change its policy towards Cuba.
The next day, in an interview with the new American Ambassador F D. 
Kohler, Khrushchev is reported to have made a sharp reference to the 
American military bases in Turkey and Italy. Tension remained around 
Berlin itself, and Adenauer brought forward his visit to Kennedy in 
Washington to the 7th of January, so as to be ready for any Soviet
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action after then. Khrushchev continued to make a determined attempt 
to settle the Berlin question, and a direct meeting was set up between 
Gromyko and Kennedy for Thursday the 18th.
The events described above are worth dwelling on. At the UN there was 
talk of a Cuba-Berlin deal, while Khrushchev himself seemed concerned 
with Turkish and Italian basis. In an article on the 18th of October 
in Izvest ia, N. Polianov wrote a strong piece criticising the idea of a 
Berlin/Cuba deal, and saying that this rumour was created by the 
United States to increase Cuban influence in the Soviet Union. It 
seems strange for Izvest i a to be so critical of an idea that 
Khrushchev was said to favour only two days before. On the same day 
Khrushchev said he might put the Berlin question before the UN, while 
in his talks with Kennedy, his foreign minister Gromyko took a tough 
uncompromising line. How can all these conflicting policy statements 
be explained?
One theory is that there were two different factions at work within 
the Soviet government, one being more ambitious than the other. In this 
case it appearing that one group favoured a deal involving Cuba, 
another being more concerned with Italian and Turkish bases and with 
Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry staff being the most consen/at i ve of' 
all of them, unwilling to pursue adventurous policies with possibly 
unpredictable results. One way of explaining Gromyko's impassive 
facade at his meeting with Kennedy on the 18th, incredible as it 
seems, is that perhaps he wasn't aware that the missiles were actually 
being placed in Cuba. It is well-known that Khrushchev was quite happy 
to bypass the Foreign Ministry when it suited him. Certainly as we 
shall see, other senior figures in the diplomatic service were
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oblivious to the presence of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba. This 
possibility will be dealt with in greater detail at a later stage. 
Another theory relates more to Khrushchev's methodology. It is quite 
likely that Khrushchev intended to present the question of Berlin to 
the UN only when he was in an advantageous position to do so. As 
Ambassador Dobrynin told Sorensen earlier:
"Nothing will be undertaken before the American Congressional 
elections that could complicate the international situation or 
aggravate the tension in the relations between our two 
countries. .. This includes a German peace settlement and West 
Berlin. ..If the necessity arises for (the Chairman to address 
the United Nations), this would be possible only in the second 
half of November. The Chairman does not wish to become involved 
in your Internal political affairs."22 
ie the Soviet Union sought to tell the American government about the 
missiles in Cuba, but only when it was convenient for it, ie when the 
missiles were safely installed and operational. It might have been 
planned that the information would be made known only to the American 
government, and that a secret deal would be made. If the Americans 
were to unexpectedly make important concessions at the UN in response 
to a speech by Khrushchev, this would have the effect of greatly 
enhancing the personal prestige of Khrushchev himself, as well as the 
Soviet Union. Hence the concept of a deal of this type would be very 
much an unofficial one as yet, and perhaps the Soviet UN official 
involved acted prematurely.
For a major breakthrough to take place for the Soviet Union in the 
UN, the Soviet Union would also have wanted the support of many of the
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non-aligned nations, and this might help explain the line taken in 
Polianov's article. This article didn’t just criticise the concept of 
a Berlin/Cuba trade,but gave as a reason that this had been made up by 
the Americans to give Castro greater influence amongst the Soviet 
leadership. Thus the author was in fact trying to put pressure on 
Castro, to remind him of his true position and to warn him against 
excessive ambition. What was Castro doing to merit such a warning? 
Castro at this time was seeking allies amongst under-developed nations 
such as with Ben Bella of Algeria. If Castro was successful in his 
manoeuvring, he could have attempted to lead a revolt against the 
Soviet Union at the UN. When the agreement between the Soviet and 
Cuban government was made to put missiles into Cuba, it is unlikely 
that Khrushchev explained to Castro some of the possible strategic and 
diplomatic purposes they might serve. While this is mere speculation, 
if Castro had come to realise the Soviet government's true intentions, 
this would explain his desire to stir things up, and to threaten the 
plans of the Soviet Union. Afterall it wasn't in Castro's interest 
that the missiles be taken out of Cuba as quickly as they went in.
Then the world would see that the Soviet government had been 
exploiting Cuba for her own political ends. Castro's ill-considered * 
remarks about a new type of weapons in Cuba must have prompted the 
Soviet Union to take action, to warn him against further exploits. The 
Polianov article could have been Khrushchev's way of calling Castro to 
heel and reassuring him that a Berlin/Cuban deal was not an option for 
the Soviet government. The Soviet leadership must have been treading a 
fine line between placating the Germans with the idea of an agreement 
over Berlin soon, satisfying Cuban demands for aid, keeping Chinese
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influence at bay and dropping hints to the American government of a 
possible deal over Cuba without making its nature public.
Here we come to another set of intriguing questions. One of the 
reasons that the American government was taken by surprise by the 
Soviet missiles in Cuba, was not just that there was no precedent for 
such an action, but that on a more practical level the installation of 
SAM ground to air missiles was not yet complete. It would seem logical 
that before taking such a dangerous step of installing nuclear weapons 
the Soviet government would wait until the ground-to-air missile 
system was installed and fully operational, providing protective air- 
cover over Cuba and allowing the construction of the missile sites to 
proceed undetected. Why did the Soviet government not pursue this 
seemingly sensible policy? There are many reasons for this - firstly 
even if military construction had been co-ordinated in such a 
sequence, the appearance of ground-to-air missile sites in themselves 
would have attracted American suspicions. If the Americans had 
persisted in sending U-2 reconnaissance flights over Cuba, the Soviet 
leadership would still have been reluctant to take action against it 
by shooting it down. Other factors also seemed to be at work in favour 
of the Soviet government. In the article in Time "Khrushchev's Secret 
Tapes", Khrushchev says:
"Our security organs assured us this was possible even though 
American planes overflew Cuban territory all the time.
Supposedly, the palm trees would keep our missiles from being 
seen from the air. "23 
Whether he actually believed this or not is another matter - it 
doesn't sound very credible. It is true however that in the Carribean
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in the autumn, hurricanes were a prevalent characteristic, which at 
the very least would have brought continual delays and disruptions in 
American aerial surveillance. These interupt ions would have limited 
the comprehensive nature of reconnaissance, and this combined with the 
unexpectedly fast installation time of the missile systems, must have 
provided the Soviet government with reason for hope. A .Schlesinger 
comments about Khrushchev in the following way:
"He had an advantage unknown to us: Soviet engineering had 
enormously reduced the time required for the erection of nuclear 
missile sites. "24 
The Soviets also seemed to believe that even if the American 
government detected the missile sites, that it would not make the 
information public till after the Congressional elections, so as not 
to risk damaging its public image and losing votes. This line of 
Soviet reasoning would seem to indicate a complete lack of 
comprehension of the workings of the American political system, and 
needs further investigation. It is interesting to speculate on whether 
this interpretation of American policies was a subconscious reflection 
of Soviet governmental priorities in decision making, ie that domestic 
policies were prevalent over foreign policy considerations.
In order to probe more deeply into the professed unity of mind in the 
Soviet government's attitudes and policies, an investigation will be 
carried out into the pattern of policy developments in the Soviet 
Union during the week of the Cuban missile crisis.
On the weekend of the 20th-21st of October, there were already many 
significant events taking place, such as the Chinese launching of a 
massive "defensive" action on the Ladakh and North-East border of
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India. The sheer scale of the attack would indicate that it must have 
been planned by the Chinese government for a considerable period in 
advance. While an article in People1s Daily, November 2nd 1963, stated 
that the Chinese had informed the Soviet government of their 
intentions a week before the invasion, this was not borne out by the 
subsequent reactions of the Soviet government. The Soviet leadership 
and press seemed bewildered as to how to respond. They were embarassed 
by the aggressive Chinese action, especially because the Soviets had 
spent so much effort in establishing good economic relations with the 
Indian government, and were reluctant to cause increased dissension 
within the Indian Communist Party. Hence the Soviet government was in 
a very delicate situation - the Chinese expected their backing, being 
a fraternal Communist power, while the Indian government were looking 
to them to put pressure on the Chinese to retreat. Over the weekend, 
the military situation being unclear, the Soviets tried to adopt an 
ambiguous position, but it must have been obvious that a decision 
would have to be forthcoming at some stage. This must have been a time 
of sharp debate within the Kremlin.
On the Sunday, Pravda published Yevtushenko's Stalin* s Heirs pointing 
out that:
"He left many heirs on the face of the globe" 
and asking:
"....How to root Stalin
out of Stalin’s heirs?"25 
and Komsomolskaya Pravda published Yevtushenko's Fears. The 
publication of both these pieces would seem to show that a less hard­
line faction was predominant. Talks continued between the Soviet
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Union and the United States over Berlin, and there were more rumours 
of a Khrushchev-Kennedy summit. It is interesting to note that it was 
on Monday the 22nd of October that Penkovsky was arrested. On the same 
day, TASS was referring speculatively to secret American meetings 
taking place at the White House, and by six o'clock that day Soviet 
Ambassador Dobrynin was summoned to meet Secretary of State Rusk. Rusk 
showed Dobrynin photographs taken by American U2's, saying that the 
installation of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba was intolerable and 
that a quarantine would be placed around the island until they were 
removed. At 7pm that same day, Kennedy made a television broadcast 
making the discovery of these weapons known to the world. (NB the term 
"quarantine" was chosen in preference to "blockade" because it was 
seen as a milder measure, blockade under international law, 
constituting an act of war.)
The reaction to Kennedy's speech in the USSR was mixed, revealing a 
whole spectrum of differing opinion. Soviet
"diplomats across the world were displaying all the symptoms of 
improvisation; as if they had been told nothing of the placement 
of the missiles and had received no instructions what to say 
about them. Ambassador Dobrynin himself gave every indication of 
ignorance and confusion. As late as Wednesday a message to 
Robert Kennedy from Mikoyan repeated that Cuba was receiving no 
weapons capable of reaching the United States. Georgi Bolshakov, 
who transmitted the message and who had seemed to us all an 
honest fellow, assured the Attorney-General that he believed 
this himself"26
Conformation of this perception by Schlesinger was given in a recent
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article in Soviet Weekly by G.Bolshakov himself. He says that evidence 
of the missile sites in Cuba "came like a bolt from the blue"and that; 
"We Soviet diplomats in Washington found ourselves in a very 
awkward position. Information was withheld not only from "them" 
but from "us""27
This lack of basic knowledge by key members of the Soviet diplomatic 
personnel, seems to be reflected throughout the Soviet press also. On 
Tuesday the 23rd of October, w'nile the American action was seen as 
piracy, no threat of Soviet counter-action or attack was made. A 
Moscow radio broadcast said that the photographs were fake, and 
completely dismissed the American charges. The Defence Minister 
Malinkovsky put Soviet military forces on alert, and hinted at doing 
some type of Cuban/Turkey missile deal, which surely by implication 
acknowledged that there were Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuba, although 
this was not admitted officially. At the UN in a debate, A.Stevenson 
lodged a demand for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, and 
the Soviet representative V. A, Zorin failed to respond except to 
denounce the blockade. Therefore while the Soviet press and the UN 
Ambassador denied the existence of the weapons, the Defence Minister* 
was more adventurous, seeking a missile trade with the West. Thus 
there was a lack of coherence or co-ordination in the Soviet Union's 
initial responses, which would indicate that the Soviet leadership 
were completely wrong-footed by the sudden American public statement, 
while at lower levels Soviet officials were totally ignorant of what 
was going on. The week of deliberation by the Excomm seemed to have 
borne fruit, as the idea of imposing a quarantine was a carefully
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thought out compromise measure which left the Soviet government with 
no obvious course of action to adopt in response.
On the Tuesday of that same week, the Soviet Foreign Minister A. 
Gromyko was scheduled to make a speech at Humbolt University in East 
Berlin. Ng w as we have seen, one of the Soviet government's chief 
motivations in placing weapons in Cuba was to gain some form of 
advantage in the Berlin dispute. Thus a militant and defiant speech 
would be expected by the conservative hardliner Gromyko. This however 
was not the case. In his speech Gromyko didn't use the Cuban situation 
to put pressure on the West, in fact amazingly enough he didn't 
mention Cuba at all. Why did he fail to exploit this opportunity? To a 
certain extent this was because the Soviet government were caught off­
guard by Kennedy's speech and was reluctant to take precipitate 
action. Although Gromyko had a reputation for toughness in 
negotiation, he was not one to take rash or hasty action, and at this 
time the Soviet government must have found it very difficult to decide 
upon a course of action which would not result in an escalation of the 
situation. Even Khtashchev himself didn't make an official response 
until 5pm on Tuesday. In this speech Khrushchev didn't acknowledge the 
existence of the weapons, and said that the Soviet Union wouldn't 
accept the American blockade and that there could be catastrophic 
consequences for America if she attempted to enforce it. This picture 
of confusion and indecisiveness was reinforced by an encounter between 
R,Kennedy and Dobrynin at 9. 30pm on Tuesday evening. Dobrynin was 
described as: "very shaken, out of the picture and unaware of any 
instructions"28 When questioned:
"Dobrynin's only answer was that he told me there were no
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missiles in Cuba; that this was what Khrushchev had said, and, 
as far as he knew, there were still no missiles in Cuba."29 
This, and the shaky non-commital answers from other Soviet delegations 
across the world, further corroborate that no clear instructions were 
issued from the Soviet government concerning the line to be taken on 
Cuba. This perhaps provides verification of Khrushchev's remark "Only 
a narrow circle of people knew about the pian"30. Both Gromyko and 
his Foreign Ministry seemed unable to give any clear policy 
indication. This is in sharp contrast to Malinkovsky's rapid 
reactions, to place Soviet forces on alert and his remarks on Turkey. 
This would indicate that during this time of confusion the Foreign 
Ministry under Gromyko's instruction were prepared to wait or perhaps 
more likely were unaware of the true situation, while the army grabbed 
the opportunity to play as dominant a role as they dared.
By Wednesday morning, the military situation around Cuba had reached 
a critical point. 20 Soviet ships, 6 of vhich. were tankers, were
fast approaching the American imposed quarantine line shadowed by a 
Soviet submarine, and a US interception was expected between 10.30- 
11.00 am. The Soviet ships stopped dead in the water, but only at 
10.32am, so that American nerves were tested to the utmost. Eventually 
14 of the 20 Soviet ships turned back, although the tankers proceeded. 
At the last moment the Soviet leadership backed down, but only when 
actual military conflict seemed otherwise unavoidable.
Very often the Soviet Union is portrayed as being militant and 
unyielding in the Cuban affair. However there is another relevant 
perspective to their behaviour, as the Soviet government, like the 
American government, were very much aware of the dangers of
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confrontation. This can be clearly seen, as on this day, Wednesday, 
there were five different approaches made by various Soviet 
representatives to seek peaceful negotiations. U Thant, the General 
Secretary of the United Nations, suggested that the USSR should 
suspend shipments to Cuba if the United States suspended its 
quarantine, and Khrushchev eagerly accepted this, welcoming the 
"proposal which meets the interest of peace"31. Kennedy rejected this 
plan because it would allow the continued construction of the existing 
missiles on the island to reach operational capacity. Bertrand 
Russell's telegram to Khrushchev received a similar reply, ie that the 
Soviet Union wanted to prevent war, and saying that:
"The question of war and peace is so vital that we should 
consider useful a top-level meeting in order to discuss all the 
problems which have arisen"32 
This Soviet desire for peace was also indirectly reflected in Pravda, 
in which it was said that Cuba desired negotiations over the 
situation. Yet the internal situation must have been very uneasy at 
this time, as even the existence of the missiles had not been admitted 
in the Soviet Union. That there was considerable time for peaceful 
negotiations and also much opposition ,can be gauged from the types of 
channels used to indicate that the Soviet Union wanted peace. The 
American Ambassador Harriman phoned Schlesinger, saying that he felt 
that the Soviets and Khrushchev in particular wanted peace. Harriman 
felt that Khrushchev was under pressure to take a tough stance, and 
that the American government:
"must give him an out.........(to) downgrade the tough group in
the Soviet Union which persuaded him to do this."33
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Another piece of information which shows-a strong desire for a 
negotiated peace, is that Ivanov of the USSR Embassy in Britain asked 
Stephen Ward to use his influence to get the British government to 
invite Kennedy and Khrushchev to a summit meeting. This contact
resulted in a column by Lord Arran in the Evening News. Some people
have questioned whether these peaceful initiatives came from 
Khrushchev himself, but this seems to have been verified by other 
sources, eg the meeting between Khrushchev and William Knox, an 
American businessman on the Wednesday evening. While Khrushchev said 
that the Soviet subs would sink American ships if provoked, he also 
reassured the Americans that the Soviet missiles were under Soviet 
(and not Cuban) control, and that a summit meeting between the two 
powers was possible. Khrushchev was taking quite a considerable risk 
in saying this, even unofficially, as he hadn't admitted that there 
were Soviet missiles in Cuba previously. (In fact this didn't appear 
in the Soviet press till Saturday).
Despite these various proposals for negotiations, there remained 
considerable concern over other areas,especially Berlin. The Chinese 
invasion of India was seen by many German peoples as if it might be
intended to coincide with a Soviet campaign of action against Berlin:
The American government shared these European worries about the 
situation in Germany:
"We might expect that they will close down Berlin - make the 
final preparations for that."34 
It may seem at this point that there is a noticeable discrepancy 
between Soviet initiatives and Western perceptions of their actions. 
However while the Soviets seemed genuinely eager to hold negotiations,
the exact nature of these is open to speculation. It is quite possible 
that these were favoured by the Soviet leadership, just because a 
summit meeting was closer to the original plan envisaged and would 
seem surer ground. It did not mean that the Soviet leadership was 
willing to make any more concessions. This still seems to have been a 
time of disarray in the political sphere, with Pravda making a strong 
supportive case backing the Chinese in preference to the Indians. At 
the same time in Izvest ia children outside the UN were described with 
the caption "let them live", and in Literaturnia Gazeta an article by 
SS Smirnov again emphasised the need for a peaceful settlement. These 
differences in the official line could be the result of differences 
with Castro also. It must have been quite likely that the Cuban 
government didn't want its newly acquired weapons to be bargained away, 
and hence didn't want negotiations. The Soviet campaign at this time 
lacked co-ordination and therefore credibility, as when at the UN 
Zorin stubbornly denied the presence of missiles in Cuba, even when 
the photographic truth was placed before him. That Khrushchev wasn't 
fully in control can be seen as when on the 25th the town of 
Khrushchev in Kirovgrad was renamed. As it appears that Khrushchev 
himself was the originator of many of the moves towards peace, the 
opposition must have been seeking more radical solutions - involving a 
deal over Cuba, possibly with regard to American bases in Turkey or 
Italy, or in relation to Berlin itself. It seems that when Kennedy 
made his dramatic speech on Monday the 22nd, Khrushchev realised his 
plans for producing his ace hand at a summit was no longer a 
possibility, and decided to cut his losses rather than risk 
escalation. Any hope of a swift, sudden military operation in East
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Berlin was also curtailed. Other factions must have disagreed with 
this analysis and wanted to salvage as much as possible. Hence the 
disunity of the previous few days continued to manifest itself in 
Soviet policy making.
On Friday, despite an attack by Izvestia on progressives in India, 
the majority of the media were still anxious for peace. In the Pravda 
editorial, the need for a summit and a possible agreement of U Thant's 
proposals on Thursday regarding a voluntary suspension was 
acknowledged. Yet once again a harder line was seen in the military 
Krasnaya Zvezda, containing a very selective selection of Khrushchev's 
speech, and with the addition of the possibility of a Cuba/Turkey 
deal, as mentioned by Malinkovsky on Tuesday. At this point V. A.Zorin 
was saying at the UN:
"his government would not fall into the American "trap" of 
retaliatory action in Berlin."35 
but asserting that the Soviet Union would negotiate over Cuba, if a UN 
inspection of Florida and Cuba could take place. Thus Zorin's 
conditions for negotiations seem to be slightly different from the 
rest of the Soviet politicians, taking a more demanding stance.
At 1.30pm on Friday, a Soviet Embassy official, Fomin phoned and 
arranged to meet with John Scali, an ABC News-correspondent, 
emphasising; the need for a peaceful end to the dispute, and saying 
that the USSR would withdraw its missiles from Cuba if the United 
States lifted its quarantine and guaranteed no invasion of Cuba. This 
episode was the start of twenty four hours of the most confused and 
controversial period of the missile crisis.
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alarmed" and his attitude that: "war seems about to break out. 
Something must be done to save the situation."34 Fomin's bid for peace 
does seem to be a genuine attempt to avoid conflict, and to bring 
about a peaceful resolution to the Cuban dispute. The problem in 
interpreting this episode however, is trying to determine who Fomin 
was representing. To use such a lowly Soviet official for such a 
crucial communication does seem rather strange. R,Kennedy commented: 
"why they selected this means of communication was not clear, 
but an unorthodox procedure of this kind was not unusual for the 
Soviet Union. "37
It is quite possible that Fomin was used in order to bypass official 
channels of communication, from which there could be such opposition. 
The approach must therefore have undermined the official Foreign 
Ministry line, which as we have seen tended to be primarily 
conservative in attitude and hard-line in policy. The exact source of 
the authorisation for the Fomin approach still needs further 
clarif icat ion.
Traditionally the Fomin-Scali meeting is associated with a letter 
from Khrushchev which reached the White House later that day at 6pm.' 
"Fomin presented a clearer version of this proposal"3S. Khrushchev's 
letter: This four part cable, was according to those who saw it, long 
and emotional, and contained;
(a)a promise to remove Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba under UN 
inspection and not to reintroduce them.
(b)this being conditional on an American promise to lift the 
quarantine and not to invade Cuba.
These proposals, very similar in nature to Fomin's, in essence were to 
form the terms of the final Soviet-Americari agreement. When this 
letter was received by the American government, they felt that a
peaceful resolution of the dispute was in view.
The first sign of trouble came when Scali met again with Fomin at 
7. 30pm that same Friday evening. When Scali entered, hoping that a 
mutually acceptable solution had now been found, Fomin had changed his 
tune and was now making new demands - that not only should there be UN 
inspections of Soviet missiles in Cuba, but there should also be 
inspections made of US bases on the Florida coast. At this point,
Scali reacted angrily, saying that the Soviets couldn't expect to play 
around any longer, and repeating Rusk's message on the urgency of the 
situation. It is interesting to note that V. A.Zorin at the UN made a 
similar proposal to U Thant, ie to negotiate over Cuba if UN
inspections of both Cuba and Florida could take place. This would
indicate that Fomin's approach was not just a one-off, but was part of 
a carefully co-ordinated scheme.
Yet between 1.30 and 7.30 pm Fomin’s instructions had changed 
dramatically. How can this be explained?
There are various different possibilities. One is that it was 
Khrushchev who, realising how dangerously the situation was 
developing, used Fomin as a way of contacting the US government, and 
assuring them of his commitment to a peaceful negotiated solution. 
Michel Tatu,correspondent of Le Monde, argues that Khrushchev had to 
use this indirect form of communication because although he personally 
favoured reconciliation, he was outnumbered by his colleagues in the 
Presidium. This would explain the change in Fomin's attitude, as it
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could have been when the unofficial "offer" was put before the 
Presidium that a sterner amendment was made. However why did 
Khrushchev not wait until the second meeting, to learn if the deal was 
acceptable to the Americans, before putting his offer in the form of an 
official telegram?
Another recent theory, that of J. L.Scherer, is worthy of 
consideration. He controversially asserts that Khrushchev was the most 
aggressive amongst the Soviet leaders over Cuba. He argues that the 
letter of Friday the 26th was ambiguous, and that while Khrushchev 
said he would withdraw the missiles in return for a non-invasion 
pledge, he didn't say that the USSR would withdraw its weapons first 
or even simultaneously. Thus Scherer argues that it was Khrushchev who 
was the hardliner. The Fomin approach to Scali is seen by Scherer not 
as an attempt by Khrushchev to gain peace, but as an effort by a 
beleaguered opposition, worried about the what later would be 
described as: "wild schemes, half-baked conclusions and hasty
decisions and actions"66 of Khrushchev, to save the situation. This 
would then explain why Fomin was used, rather than Bolshakov or 
Dobrynin.
This argument which challenges the traditional interpretation of 
events, has some attractive qualities, as it helps explain some of the 
events, especially why Fomin was used in an ambassadorial role.
However it doesn't seem in harmony with Khrushchev's other statements, 
eg to William Knox on the Wednesday, when he assured him that the 
missiles were under Soviet control, nor with the fact that the 
military in particular, as we have seen, consistently took a harsher 
line towards the American government than Khrushchev, which would seem
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to indicate that if Khrushchev was under any pressure it was to he 
more hold. The fact that by late Friday evening the missiles in Cuba 
were almost operational must also have strengthened the position of 
the military in the Presidium. This could explain the change in 
Fomin's attitude between 1.30 and 7.30 pm. Another reason for 
increased Soviet expectations would be the article by Walter Ltppmanain 
the Washington Post on Thursday the 25th, talking of the possibility 
of trading US weapons in Turkey for Soviet weapons in Cuba. Thus there 
are reasons to explain why Khrushchev, if it was he who sent Fomin, 
would have adopted a harsher line late on Friday. This would therefore 
seem the most probable explanation. A way of investigating this 
further in the future would be to establish the role of the KGB in 
this dispute, as whoever had most influence over them, might have 
favoured the use of Fomin. It is here where recently published 
materials show their worth, as Sergei Khrushchev quite clearly 
implicates Semichastny, head of the KGB, in the plot against his 
father. However this still does not provide conclusive evidence. While 
the happenings of Friday the 26th are puzzling enough, the series of 
events that followed on Saturday the 27th of October are even more 
intricate and confused. One of the first events that the American 
Excomm was faced with was that one of their U2's had been shot down 
over Cuba and the pilot Major R.Anderson Jr was killed. This obviously 
raised the political tension considerably, and could perhaps be 
indicative of an impatience on Castro's part, hoping that the Soviet 
Union would not soften, but would get the best deal possible for Cuba. 
While this is supposition, it serves to remind us that there must have 
been enormous pressure on the Soviet leadership from Castro at this
-200-
time. The next development to take place, was the publication of an 
article in the normally peaceable Izvestia, by a correspondent called 
Matveev, who called for the withdrawal of all American and Allied 
troops from foreign bases, and saying that a Cuban-Turkey deal 
was"cynical bargaining". For such a radical article to be published at 
such a crucial moment, it must have had quite a high authorisation, 
yet who? On that same day, in Kraznaya Zvezda, hi. Leontyev launched 
another attack on American aggression, the army again demonstrating 
its militancy.
The next surprise for the Americans, before they had had a chance to 
respond to the first Soviet telegram was another Soviet letter, this 
time adopting a stiffer position - that the Soviets would withdraw 
their missiles from Cuba only if the Americans withdrew their Jupiter 
missiles from Turkey. This new demand, from what seemed a weaker 
Soviet position, surprised and shocked the Americans, who felt that 
the Soviets had now upped the stakes. Why did the Soviet leadership if 
they were so concerned about a peaceful settlement, at the last moment 
antagonise the situation and jeopardise prospects for agreement?
Firstly as mentioned before, the article by W Lippmanncould have 
swayed the situation, as the Soviet government are inclined to view ' 
such press articles as having governmental backing. (This concept has 
interesting ramifications, as it means that the Soviet government 
could well use its own press to make its attitude known indirectly to 
foreign governments.) Another possible influence that the Trachtenberg 
theory suggests is that when the Soviet government became aware of 
secret American activity at the UN re the possibility of trading 
missiles, they decided to respond to this, thinking that such a deal
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was on offer. Another idea is that it was Cuban, Chinese and Eastern 
European pressure on the Soviet government which had made them seek a 
more "honourable settlement".
The nature of the letter itself needs to be taken into consideration, 
as this could provide clues to its authorship. The letter, which has 
not been published, has been described by R. Kennedy as: "very
formal...... it was obviously no longer Mr Khrushchev himself who was
writing,but the Foreign Of fice of the Kremlin. "40 It would seem at 
face value that Khrushchev had hardened his position, perhaps under 
pressure from the military or from hard-liners in the Presidium - 
Kozlov, Mikoyan etc. In this case, Khrushchev was perhaps compromising 
between those content to get the missiles out of Cuba and restore 
peace, and those who wanted American troops to leave all overseas 
bases.
Pachter explains the two official Soviet letters, by argu ing that 
the second letter was in fact written first, ie on the Thursday, but 
that it was not released till Saturday, but it seems very unlikely and 
rather contrived. Scherer suggests that the second letter was in fact 
written by a committee and not Khrushchev himself, and that it 
contained the Presidium's way of appeasing Khrushchev's adventurous * 
intentions, and reconciling them with the idea of a reasonable 
compromise. There seems little tangible proof to support this, it 
seeming unlikely that the Presidium would have acted in such an 
independent manner. This interpretation of Khrushchev's position also 
fails to correspond to the statements made personally by him during 
the crisis, and thus doesn't seem credible.
On the afternoon of Saturday the 27th, Fomin met Scali once more. At
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this meeting, Fomin is desribed as "puzzled and unhappy", and explained 
the stiffening in attitude of the Soviet leadership as being because: 
"the Saturday morning cable had been drafted before his report on the 
favourable American reaction had arrived."41 Yet if the Soviet 
authorities had been concerned about the American response, surely 
they would have waited. In fact the concept of the Soviet leadership 
collectively deciding on the "compromise" solution of a Turkey/Cuban 
swap is actually more likely than it initially seems. Firstly it was a
way of placating the military, of gaining a reduction of hostile
overseas military bases and providing some compensation for the loss 
of the missile bases in Cuba. Secondly it was designed to appeal to 
the moderates also, as there had been many unofficial American 
indications that such a deal was a real possibility. Thus Khrushchev 
would have had many good reasons to suppose that such a proposal would
have had a strong chance of success, and of obtaining a favourable
response. This, as demonstrated by later events was quite a reasonable 
assumption. In the 7.45 meeting between Dobrynin and R.Kennedy, even 
though R.Kennedy was insisting that dismantling of the missiles must 
start the next day, Dobrynin still mentioned Turkey. In fact an 
unofficial agreement was made between the two, Robert Kennedy 
confirming that American military bases in Turkey and Italy would be 
removed at some time in the near future, although it would never be 
officially acknowledged as being decided at this time. Thus the Soviet 
leadership must have felt that they had gained something out of this 
crisis, being unaware that the Americans were about to remove them 
soon anyway. By nine o'clock the next morning, Washington received
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confirmation that the Soviet leadership had accepted the American
proposals
Even after Khrushchev's official acceptance of the American 
proposals, ie that the Soviet Union would remove the weapons from 
Cuba, if the government of the United States would abandon its 
quarantine and give assurances that it would not invade Cuba, things 
were not clear cut. Chinese disapproval of Soviet capitulation was 
soon manifested. Despite many articles in Pravda and Izvestia 
approving Khrushchev's actions, there were signs that Khrushchev was 
under severe pressure. American newspaper reports of 30th and 31st of 
October respectively said:
"Premier Khrushchev was represented as labouring to defend his 
"peaceful co-existence" policy towards the West against a 
radical or a "Chinese" wing within his government."42
and:
"The probability is that Mr Khrushchev's personal future now
depends on the attitude of the Soviet army....... The Soviet '
Premier is under serious attack from the communist right, a 
mixture of activites, extremists, Stalinists and Sinophils."43 
A strong attack on Khrushchev published in Unen, the Mongolian 
Communist Party paper, was republished in Pravda on the 1st of 
November, obviously with the approval of someone in a position of 
power. It wasn't till the 8th of November that Malinkovsky spoke in 
favour of Khrushchev's policy over Cuba, and it was at this time also
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when Kosygin lost some of his power. This would indicate that 
Khrushchev was beginning to strengthen his position 
This was a troubled time in Soviet-Cuban relations, with Castro 
obstructing UN supervision of the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles 
from Cuba. Even when Mikoyan was sent there at the beginning of 
November, he couldn't persuade him to allow the UN their agreed role 
re insection procedure. In the months to come, Castro, under Peking's 
umbrella was increasingly critical of Soviet policy, and their foreign 
policy, eg by saying that they were not giving sufficient assistance 
to Vietnam. Thus in the aftermath of the actual Cuban crisis itself, 
many previous trends are confirmed, problems in relations between 
Khrushchev, the military and hard-line factions, who perhaps had 
Chinese sympathies or connections, and difficulties in Soviet-Cuban 
relat ions.
SECTION 3. ANALYSIS.
From the information examined, quite a few conclusions can be offered 
concerning Soviet foreign policy. Firstly, the effect of the Sino- 
Soviet split on the Cuban missile crisis is much greater than is 
conventionally thought. Brzezinski puts it well:
"It is difficult to exaggerate the historical significance of 
the Sino-Soviet conflict. It has influenced every facet of 
international life, not to speak of the Soviet bloc itself. No 
analysis of the relationship between Washington and Moscow, of 
the pattern of nuclear proliferation, of the orientation of 
Indian nationalism, of the thrust of revolutionary movements in 
the Third World would be complete without taking into account
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the impact of the increasingly bitter dispute between the two 
seemingly close allies. "44 
It was in the years 1961-2 that the Soviet Union experienced "perhaps 
the very high point in Soviet global optimism"45, and the 
deterioration in Soviet expectations after October 1962, was not so 
much because of damaged prestige after the withdrawal of the missiles, 
but because of the growing recognition of polycentralism in the world. 
As has been seen, Chinese influence in Eastern Europe, in Albania, but 
also in Hungary, was one of the key motivations for the Soviet Union 
to settle the Berlin question and to demonstrate Soviet power anew, 
and this must have been a strong contributory factor to the decision 
to place the missiles in Cuba. It was largely as a reaction to the 
missile crisis that the nuclear Test-ban Treaty was signed in 1963, 
and this was looked upon with disgust by the Chinese:
"In signing the nuclear Test-ban Treaty in mid 1963, Khrushchev 
completed his betrayal by entering into a new "Holy alliance" 
with Kennedy, Nehru and Tito."46 
In many ways the Cuban crisis was a catalyst for the increased 
worldwide perception of the fragmentation of Communist monolith and 
decline in Soviet influence.
The decision to put Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, was almost 
definitely taken in April 1962 by Khrushchev, who planned to inform 
the Americans of the missiles there in November. At this time, at a 
summit or a UN meeting, Khrushchev hoped to gain concessions over 
Berlin, in order to reunite Eastern Europe, and to spectacularly 
demonstrate his dexterity and skill in foreign diplomacy. In a 
congruent domestic policy position, he would then use his newfound
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prestige and power to gain approval for new economic policies to be 
passed at the November plenum. This theory is corroborated by the 
Soviet leadership's confusion and unpreparedness at the early 
discovery of the missiles, and the initial desire to have a summit 
meeting to resolve the matter.
The other major theme that has kept recurring thoughout this period, 
is the degree of dissension amongst Soviet policy makers. During the 
missile crisis itself, the military, eg Malinkovsky can clearly be 
seen to take a more aggressive stance, but there is disunity even 
amongst the Presidium itself, as is reflected by some of the attacks 
on Khrushchev in the press. There seems to be major differences 
between the Presidium and the Foreign Ministry, with key diplomatic 
personnel, perhaps even Gromyko himself, being unaware of essential 
facets of Soviet foreign policy, eg the existence of missiles in Cuba. 
Certainly as has been previously mentioned in the article 
"Khrushchev's secret tapes" in Time magazine he says:" Only a narrow 
circle of people knew about the plan". 47 This could indicate a major 
breakdown of communication in the governmental structure of the USSR, 
when so many informal contacts and approaches between countries are 
used to decide key issues. This ties in with the other areas already' 
examined, ie to what extent there were differences in the Foreign 
Ministry and Soviet leadership, the role of the Soviet press, which 
seems to reflect different viewpoints, Izvestia and Literaturnaya 
Gazeta being more conciliatory in foreign policy, Pravda and Kraznaya 
Zvezda taking a stronger more aggressive line. This all serves to 
confirm the vulnerability of Khrushchev' s position.
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CONCLUSION.
In this thesis, an examination has been made of various aspects of 
policy and practice of the Soviet government during the period 1961-2. 
The powers and limitations of Khrushchev's leadership have been 
analysed to reveal as much as can be discerned from the existing 
material available. Two major areas have been examined in this work, 
that of domestic and foreign policy, and the conclusions reached from 
these studies will now be outlined.
In the domestic sphere, the use of database techniques on the 
recorded speeches of the delegates of the 22nd Party Congress has 
revealed that the amount of disharmony between delegates has been 
greater than perhaps had been previously suspected. With the 
relaxation of political controls under Khrushchev' s leadership, much 
discontent came to the surface. Frustration amongst farmers and 
administrators about inefficiencies in the agricultural system, and 
criticism from the intelligentsia were common. Khrushchev's desire to 
get away from the more Stalinistic interpretation of Marxist-Leninism 
antagonised many groups who felt their own position to be threatened 
by it - especially amongst the military, the nomenklatura , the 
diplomats etc. Its interesting that at the 22nd Congress, it comes out 
that it's admitted that the campaign against the anti-party group is 
not just about setting the historical records straight, but about 
dealing with a still active group of politicians whose policies clash 
in a basic way with the policies of Khrushchev. This is shown by the 
references to Molotov's letter at the Congress, which seems to spark
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the whole anti-party group campaign off. Khrushchev did achieve some 
notable victories - the new Party Programme did represent a 
Khrushchevian ideological stance, and the influence of Stalinism on 
society was admitted as a more tangible and pervasive phenomena than 
it was ever publically admitted before. The removal of Stalin's body 
from the Mausoleum at the end of the Congress is often seen as 
epitomising Khrushchev's achievement. In many ways this is true, but 
it is also double edged. As we have seen this decision was not reached 
by the Presidium or Central Committee, but by an open vote at the 
Congress. If it had been an official governmental decision it is 
likely that it would not have been passed. Despite the impressive and 
dramatic finale, Khrushchev didn't get his way even in retaining some 
of his closest allies in governmental office, and overall his 
powerbase was being eroded. As we have seen, men such as Kozlov,
Suslov, Brezhnev etc were already putting pressure on Khrushchev and 
were forming the basis of a strong group opposing the irnplememtation 
of Khrushchev's ideas. Thus even at this early point, there were signs 
of strain and weakness in Khrushchev's leadership position.
In terms of foreign policy, this thesis concentrated on two 
particular aspects, that of Soviet policy towards Berlin and Cuba. In 
the case of Berlin, it comes over very strongly that Soviet actions 
were very much out of Khrushchev's hands, being dictated largely by 
circumstances. The need to stem the thousands of refugees who were 
leaving East Germany through the East Berlin/ West Berlin border, and 
to prevent the economic and perhaps political collapse of East 
Germany. In this instance, practicalities won over ideology in a way
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which actually prevented the more militant long-term action which 
Khrushchev threatened in the form of an imposed German Peace-Treaty. 
Khrushchev gained much from this situation, as in sealing the East 
Berlin/ West Berlin border he prevented a serious threat to the East 
German government, as well as posing a threat to the West which they 
found difficult to react to with any substance. As well as Chinese 
pressure on Khrushchev to act, there was a great deal of behind the 
scenes pressure from Ulbricht to try and force Khrushchev's hand. In 
this way Khrushchev 's position was largely reactive, with him trying 
to moderate Ulbricht's demands yet to use the opportunity to enhance 
his own position at home and in the communist world movement.
In the Cuban situation it is much more difficult to assess 
Khrushchev's role. The information available, from sources both old 
and new, regarding the Soviet position often seems confused and 
contradictory. The time leading up to the actual crisis itself has 
therefore been looked at in some detail in order to try and bring a 
new understanding of Khrushchev's role in events.
From the information available, it looks as if Khrushchev initiated 
the placing of missiles in Cuba to bolster his own prestige, his 
intended outcome being a quiet Soviet disclosure of the existence of 
the missiles in the UN summit in November. This would then be used as 
a lever in order to gain a German Peace-Treaty, and perhaps the 
removal of American nuclear bases in Turkey and Italy. Khrushchev 
would also have been very much aware of the importance of the 
underdeveloped countries and of indigenous Communist Parties 
scrutinising how Khrushchev dealt with the requests for aid and
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military help from Castro. Placing missiles in Cuba thus seemed to 
guarantee a number of advantages - concessions in Germany, gaining 
support amongst communist parties abroad, and humiliating the United 
States government. The plans all went wrong when the missiles were 
discovered by reconnaissance surveillance by a US military aircraft. At 
this point it seems that Khrushchev's position became one of trying to 
salvage as much as possible from the affair without jeopardising the 
peace. From the exchanges with the American government it would seem 
that there was some disagreement in the Presidium as to how to 
proceed. Khrushchev seemed to have no faith in the traditional 
official channels of communication, using friends and contacts in 
order to communicate to American officials directly. This would again 
indicate the weakness of Khrushchev's position and also personal 
weakness, as his scheme was very grandiose and involved high risks, 
which were not perhaps the most wise considering the stakes he was 
playing for. The Cuban Missile crisis must have precipitated a 
quickening of the plot which lead to his downfall two years later.
From the survey made of the afore-mentioned areas, the following 
conclusions can be drawn.
One of the main themes that has emerged is the varied role that 
ideological influence has played. In terms of develop ing a more 
accurate understanding of Soviet thinking, the concept of "cold war" 
and the "two camps" theory has proved to be highly misleading. This 
can be more clearly seen after recent events in the USSR which have 
caused many people to re-examine the nature of past events. When
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the events of Khrushchev's time in office are examined from a Soviet 
viewpoint, a picture very different from the traditional one emerges. 
The influence of China, and Chinese rivalry for the allegiance of 
under-develop ed countries is much more powerful than was previously 
t nought.
Very often the role of ideology in the Soviet outlook has been played 
down, with the "superpower rivalry" element at the fore. Yet for 
Khrushchev, both within and outwith the USSR, his distinctive 
ideological stance gave him his identity. It was his concepts of 
"peaceful co-existence" and destalinisation that brought him respect 
in 1956 at home and abroad, and Khrushchev constantly tried to uphold 
these ideals throughout his time as General Secretary. For Khrushchev, 
ideological change was a way of returning to true Marxist-Leninist 
roots, was a political weapon against internal adversaries, and the 
basis for asserting Soviet supremacy in the world communist movement.
When that ideological line was challenged in various circumstances,
Khrushchev was politically astute enough to be flexible, eg to close 
the East/ West German border, to back down over Cuba etc. Khrushchev 
was undoubtably a pragmatist when the situation required, but 
communist ideals continued to be his inspiration, and played an
important role in decision making at every level.
It was Khrushchev's less militant Marxist-Leninist line that so
antagonised the Chinese, and which lead to such intensive rivalry 
between the two powers. The competition between them was seen in their 
conflicting attitude about how to deal with America, with Khrushchev 
often being accused by the Chinese of cowardice. Militant communist 
theorists, such as the Chinese, satellite power leaders like Ulbricht
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and Castro and the internal Soviet group lead by Suslov all acted as 
a constraining force on Khrushchev's leadership, as they constantly 
criticised him if he didn't conform more to their line. The opinion of 
the governments of underdeveloped countries, and of communist parties 
in them also helped persuade Khrushchev of the importance of 
presenting a clear ideological line which would win their support. 
Countries like India, Indonesia, Malaysia, North Korea and a variety 
of African countries were all watching to see how Khrushchev dealt 
with Castro, in terms of backing his words with substantial economic 
and political support.
Ultimately much of our understanding of Khrushchev's leadership comes 
from our understanding of the man himself. While recently published 
information perhaps offers little that is new concerning Berlin, and 
many of the mysteries of the Cuban situation remain undisclosed, the 
writings of prominent Soviet journalists and historians do stimulate a 
new understanding of Khrushchev as an individual, and as a historical 
figure. Elsewhere in this thesis I've described Khrushchev as "the 
orthodox rebel" who rejected the excesses of stalinist thinking in 
order to return to what he saw as "pure Marxist-Leninism". Khrushchev 
does seem to have had a genuine desire to work towards a fair and 
equal socialist society. Personality-wise, Khrushchev was a shrewd and 
ambitious man, who seems to have had flashes of insight, but who 
lacked the vision or opportunity to carry them through. Khrushchev was 
inconsistent in his policy-making, perhaps at times as much from 
political pressure as personal weakness, however he was not very 
politically adept, and made many enemies by his sweeping statements
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and blunt accusations.
In many ways after seeing the experiences of Gorbachev, we can come 
to understand Khrushchev's position better. Gorbachev emerged as 
General Secretary of the CPSU in 1935, with the image of a confident 
and astute politician, and became known as a bold and innovative 
thinker, and a skilled international statesman. Yet within six years, 
despite all his initial impetus and enthusiasm, all the international 
and diplomatic successes etc, the Soviet Union is in chaos, 
economically and politically, and it has now disintegrated completely 
as a functioning political unit. In a similar way, the accusations 
against Khrushchev as a "hare-brained schemer" etc are not entirely 
justified, as the difficulties facing a reformer of any sort, were and 
are overwhelming. There are many parallels between the two men, both 
tried to bring economic and political reform to a country of people 
who had been long used to the preservation of the status quo. The 
frustrations of opponents in both cases lead to coup attempts, one 
successful, the other not. Gorbachev presided over the disintegration 
of the USSR, Khrushchev over the fragmentation ofttaworld communist 
movement as a united body. The parallels are indeed striking, and help 
to put Khrushchev' s limitations in perspective, for while he was not 
successful at much that he tried to achieve, his objectives were from 
the start difficult if not impossible.
Khrushchev's leadership then was characterised by a fight against a 
spectrum of opposition - from political opponents like Molotov, Suslov 
etc, interest groups like the military and the nomenklatura, and 
pressures from abroad - the. Chinese more than the Americans, satellite 
states, and the awareness of the opinions of various underdeveloped
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countries. The leadership period of Khrushchev was beset with 
difficulties, and not by any means all of his own making. As for his 
triumphs, there were a number. Within the Soviet Union, Khrushchev 
exposed the injustices of Stalinism, past and present, with great 
determination, and at a high cost. In terms of foreign policy his 
master stroke was the sealing of the East/West Berlin border, 
ironically the consequences of this were probably largely unforseen by 
him. In the Cuban crisis, Khrushchev also demonstrated the ability to 
know when to back down. In all these areas, Khrushchev's single- 
mindedness and insight, however thwarted in practice, deserve the 
respect of those who came after him.
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APPENDIX : Database information used in 
Chapters 2 and 3.
This database is based on information taken from the 22nd Party 
Congress in the Soviet Union in October 1961. It uses the following 
sources:
Sovetskaia Istoricheskaia Entsiklopediia.
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press.
Additional background information has come from the following:
The New York Times.
Keesings Contemporary Archives.
East European and Soviet Data Handbook.
Radio Liberty: composition of the Leading Organs 
of the CPSU.
This database was constructed using a Nimbus computer and a software 
package called Quest containing facilities for database work.
For each of the 103 delegates who spoke at the Congress, a survey of 
their speeches were made, with the specific intention of identifying 
their position on a range of issues. Basic background information 
concerning each delegate as far as possible was sought, covering such 
information as date of birth, date of Party Membership etc. Twenty two 
different categories for each delegate were in the end decided upon as 
being the criteria to decide upon the attitude and political 
persuasion of each delegate as far as possible.
An explanation of the abreviations for each field:
1. name.
2. dob. date of birth.
3. dop. date of joining the communist party of the Soviet Union.
4. nat. nationality, ie the Republic that the delegate originates
f rom.
5. po61. the position/title held by the delegate in 1961.
6. genocc. the area of occupational specialisation.
7. fullmem, the date/dates that a delegate became and desisted from
being a full member of the Presidium of the CPSU of the Soviet 
Union.
8. candm. the date/dates that a delegate became and desisted from 
being a candidate member of the Presidium of the CPSU of the 
Soviet Union.
9. mob53. These three categories look at the political mobility of
10. mob57. individual delegates in the key years 1953, 1957 and
1961. It is noted whether delegates were promoted or
11. mob 64 demoted at this time.
12. pos. This indicates the order that the speeches were given in,
eg 1.
13. sdom. This represents the candidate's position on the issue of
the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union in his speech. 
The coding is as follows:
very critical 1.
critical 2.
ambiguous 3.
no mention 4.
optimistic 5.
14. scul. position on the cultural position of the government
conservative 1.
innovative 2.
ambiguous 3.
non-mention 4.
15. sapdef. How the delegate defines the anti-party group in his
speech:
This gives a listing of which if any of the 8 members of 
the anti-party group are mentionned.
16. sapdes. How the delegate describes the anti-party group, ie the
the severity of the accusations made by the individual 
delegat e:
condemned 1.
have violated Party Legality 2. 
are guilty of ideological deviance 3.
are guilty of mass repressions
and arbitrariness 4.
should be expelled from the Party 5.
17. sde-stal. Period focus ed on as the reason for de-stalinist
measures:
1930's 1.
1940's -53 2.
1953 - 7 3.
1961 4.
non-mention. 5.
18. sfratc. State of relations with other communist parties-
assessment based on whether a delegate mentions Albania, 
and their attitude towards it,
non-mention 1.
Albania mentionned 2.
Strong criticism of Albania, eg 
mentionning the cult of personality 3.
link between Albania and China made 4.
19. sfp. Attitude of the delegate to Berlin and to foreign policy in 
general.
non-mention 1.
militant 2.
ambiguous 3.
conciliatory 4.
20. sk. Reference of the delegate to Khrushchev's leadership.
enthusiastic 1.
praise 2.
mention ed briefly 3. 
not mention ed 4.
criticism 5.
21. sergei Information from Sergei Khrushchev
22. other. This category has been used to comment on historian's
perceptions of the allegiance of the individual delegate
The initial letter indicates which faction is favoured:
k - Kozlov. X - Khrushchev. S - Suslov.
The second letter refers to the historian's initial who
makes
the connection.
L - Linden. T - Tatu. S - Slusser.
Index to Tables printed out.
1. Names of delegates who demanded the expulsion of the anti-party 
group from the CPSU.
2. Names of delegates who condemned the anti-party group.
3. Names, dob and dop of delegates who mentioned three or more of 
the anti-party group.
4. Names, dob and dop of delegates who mentioned seven or less of
the anti-party group.
5. Names, dob and dop of those delegates who only mildly denounced
the anti-party group.
6. Names, dob and dop of delegates who emphasised arbitrariness and
mass repression.
7. Names, dob and dop of delegates who emphasised the ideological
threat of the anti-party group.
8. Names, dob and dop of delegates who mentioned especially the
1 9 3 0 's in relation to the anti-party group.
9. Names, dob and dop of delegates who emphasised the importance of
1 9 6 1  in relation to the anti-party group, and those who didn't 
mention it
at all.
10. Names, dob and dop of delegates who emphasised the role of 1953-
when referring to the anti-party group.
11. Names, dob and dop of delegates who emphasised the role of the 
1940's when referring to the anti-party group.
12. Names, dob and dop of delegates who were very critical of 
domestic policy.
13. Names, dob and dop of delegates who favoured cultural innovation.
14. Names, dob and dop of delegates who made a link between Albania 
and China,
15. Names, dob and dop of delegates who mention Albania itself.
16. Names, dop, definition and description given of the anti-party 
group for all delegates born before 1911.
17. Names, dop, definition and description given of the anti-party 
group for all delegates born after 1921.
18. Names, dob, definition and description given of the anti-party 
group for all delegates who joined the Party before 1930.
19. Names, dob, definition and description given of the anti-party 
group for all delegates who joined the Party after 1953.
20. Names, dob, definition of the anti-party group of delegates 
demoted in 1953.
21. Names, dob, definition of the anti-party group of delegates 
demoted in 1957.
22. Names, dob, definition of the anti-party group of delegates 
promoted in 1957.
23. Names, dob, definition of the anti-party group of delegates 
demoted in 1964.
24. A comparison of name, dob, dop, anti-party defination and 
description and position concerning de-stalinisation of all 
delegates,
25. A comparison of name, dob, dop, anti-party description and 
attitude towards communist parties abroad.
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DOP S A P O R B
A 9 3 9  0  
1948  2  
1917 
A 9 2 0  A 
0
A 9 3 9  0  
A 9 3 7  A 
1957  0  
1948 0 
0
A 9 3 2  
A 9 43  
1 931  
A 94 3  
A 9 A A 
1.7 A 7 
A 9 3 4  
A 9 4 4  A 
192 7  
198 9  
A 94 4 0  
0
A 9 2 /  2
A 9 3 9  
1904  
.1 9 2 0  
A 9 0 6  
1942 
A 9 2 7  
A 9 4 5
; N o v i kov A T A 7 0 6 A 9 2 6 1
O z e ro v  J J. 9 A 5 193 9
P a v lo v  !3 p 192 9 .1.734
P e l e e  A V a A 8 9 9 1 9 A 8 2
,. P e rv u k h .1.1i N G 1904 17 J 9
P a s h i dov 81, R 17 A 7 A 7 3 9 2
Pa Bul ov I) A 9 1 3 J. 9 3 9 2
■;K R o ih n e v a M I 1
;v; B a b u r  ov M Z 190 0 1720
.■ Semenov N N A B96 A 9 4 7 1
2 . S h e p i  1 ov 0 1 A 9 0 8 1 92 6
v; Bhi hi kov 0 P 19 J 2 A 9 3 9 0
:• S h v e r n i  k M M A 8 8 8 1705
S m irn o v V A .1 9 2 2 1 9 4 8 0
‘Y jS n i  ekU s A J 2
K!; T a b e e v P A 19.20 1981 0
t h o r e z 1 14 0
ijii-'Ti l a v  G 8 A 9 3 5 196  A 0
itif^tvar d ov  i=>ky A T A 9 1 0 194 0 0
m dJi b r  i  ch t
A 9 A 9 
A 8 8  A 
1 9 A A
1 94 1 
1903  
1 9 3 2
#
. ,.V
■ !•.
■.. !•*;<}
.‘■Vv'V ■ ' i ■; Vli ,.',7 Vi
£nol m »l keg bul VO.-
n a m e
“ Tctblfi S>i y- _
D i m  O O P  S A R D E S
CtU^j-bu/ hF« Fttkoc* 4f
ou4 J«wi U < jv'**** K-c*«
D z h a v a k h i  s h v i  I i (•• J) 1 91 .V ’ 1 9 /)0 4
P u r t s o v a  Ye A .1 71 0 1930 4
Gubanov V 1 4
K h ru s h c h e v  II S 1 094 1.9 1 0 4
K o r n e ic h u k  A Ye i 9 or:. .1 9 /l 0 4
koz .1 cdv P P: .1.70S 1926 4
L a z u r k i n a  D A 1 9 0 2 4
M a l i n o v s k y  R Ya I 0 9 8 J. 9 2 6 4
p e t r  ov P M 1 0 9 6 4
P o d q o rn y  M V .1.90 :•> .1930 4
S e r c l iu k  Z I 1 9 0  •> 1 9 ? 5 4
S p i r i d o n o v  f. V 170 1 9 2 0 4
B us! ov li A .190.2 192 1 4
v . • / a  Pic
NAME DUD nup Si
. ——......- ................. ......------------ ............. ....... — ----
Adz h u b e i  A \ I 924 I 9 5 3
B r e z h n e v  t. X 19 oo A 9 3  I
G r i s h i n  V V 1 9 1 *1 1 9 3 0
U i c h e v  L P .1 7 0 6 1.92 *1
Mi k e y a n  A .1 i 095 19 1 5 v>
P o l i a n s k y  D S 19 I 7 1 9 3 9
T o l s t i k o v  V S 1 9 1 / 1 9'10 3
V o r o b i e v  u j. J. V I  I 1 9 3 7
V o ro n o v  G I 19.10 J 931
" ......... . ..--- ... ....----
GijCfplfiC
I cxite
N A M E ,
li £ li a v a k h 1 s I > v  j. .1 .i. (.5 1)
P U r t s e v a  Ye A 
G e d k q ie v  A V 
G b r ia c h e v  P S 
t q h a t o v  M G 
•khP.U&hchev 
1<TH le n k o  
K b r n e i  chuk  
Ktoz 1. ov F: R 
L a z u r k i n a  J.) A 
M a z u ro v  l< T 
Mulch i t  d i  riov 
P e t r  ov Fr M 
P o d q o rn y  M V 
B e r t i iu k  1 T 
B h e l e p i n  A M 
S h v b r n ik  N M 
Bni &lcus A J 
Bpj. r i d o n o v  J. V 
bee h e r  o va  Yu I'l 
V c ir o b ie v  G I 
Yeti b r  y c h e v  N G
DUG DOP SDEQ1
N B 
A p 
A Ye
H A
.19 A :<•! A 9 4 0 A
A 9 A 0 1930 1
A 9 A 3 1943 1
1 905 .1927 1
190 A 1924 A
1094 1910 1
1906 1931 .1
1 905 1940 1
19 OB 1926 A
A 902 1
191 4 J 940 :l.
1917 1942 .1
1096 .1
1903 1930 1
A 903 1925 1
19 1 n 1940 1
1 BOO 1905 J
1905 .1920 1
19t 4 1939 1
1 920 1942 1
LCtpcCo^
€
Jctble N ltx>
•
NAME DGD DOP SDK
X Abram ov G G 19 \ B .1.9 4 5 5
' ; Adz h l ib e l  A J 1.7 24 1953 4 ■
Akhi.tnr.lov V Yu .1 9.1 6 1 9 3 9 5
Basov A V 1 9  I ? 1945 5  n
• Cbor n v 11 n*v V Ye 1 90 8 1928 5
ChOll Ell "J. rtj. rr ,.»
X Derib chov  P I I 1 9.1 8 1 93 9 5
D y m sh ib s  V L ! 9.10 1937 5
Bctqanova V I J 9 3 2 1937 3
G i b a l o v  A V .1.9.15 19453 »:r
Go mu .1 k.:i W 5
G ra c h e v  V V 1 9 0 4 1.932 r:rS.l
> G r i  b a c h c v  M k1 191 0 194 3 5
Grom yko A A .1 9 0 9 1.9 3  J. • 2’ .J
D ubanov V 1 5
J. l i c h e v  L P .1906 1924 4 -
lo g a n s o n  b V ;l 8 9 3 .1943 5
Kai r o v  I A .1.893 i 9 j. / 3
X Kavur. V M .1 9 2 8 1 954 5
K e b in  4 0 .1905 1 9 2  7 5
K e l cJvbI i I'l V 1911 J. 9 5 9 5
Kol ch .1 k A A Cr
K u c h e ro n k o  V A ,‘t
L eo n o v  P A I 9 1 8 194 4
— . I1i ko yan  A .1 .1 8 9 5 1 9 1 5 4 -
Hr: hn tvandadze  V P 190 2 1727 5
Mal j v a i  ko G A 1 9 1 0 1 9 4 3 5
“X Mur .lev 7 M .1.9 J. 5 1939 r.r..1
01 r> b a n s  ky I I A 1.9 0 8 193 2 5
O z e ro v  8 1 91 3 193 9 rr
1~\ P a v lo v  G P 1 92 9 1 934 5
P e i  so A Ya .1.899 19.13 pi
P o sp eo v  P M 1 8 9 8 19.16 4 -
s Rasshidov- Sh R A 9  J. 7 J. 9 3 9 rr
R n zh n o v a  11 .1 Li
Gal; l i t  kov  I--’ A 1.9.1 1 I 7 3 9 r.r
-S . Semenov II N :\ 8 9 6 1947 3
S h ch eL .ln . in  53 M * 1 9 1 0 1932
Bhibac-v  A I 1 9  1.3 .1940 3
— S ‘ S h o lo k h o v  M A J 9 0 5 1932 rr % .1
; ■ S m irn o v  V A 1 9.22 194 8 5
T a b e e v  P A 1.928 .1951 rrI
T h o r  ez M 5
T ib o v  G 53 .1.935 .1961 5
T o ka  B K . 1 9 0 1 1 9 2 9 Li
T v a r d a v s l iy  A 1 1.9 1 0 1 9 4 0 rr *J
U s u h a l i ev  1 191 9 J 94.1 5
V o ro n o v  G .1 1 9 1 . 2 1 9 3 1 rr•J
~ T a b U l~e^ \
N A M E o d d  d o p  son: si
B e s h c h e v  B P 1.903 1924
B o d iu l  I J 1 9 1 0  1.940
B r e z h n e v  L. I 1 9 0 6  .1931
G o l i k o v  F I 1 9 0 0  .1918
G r i s h i n  V V 191 4  1930
K e z a n e t s  1 P 1 9 1 8  1944
K o s y g in  A N 1904 1927
K u n aev  D A .1912 .1939
K u u s i non 0 V J 081  .1904
M a l i n o v s k y  R Ya 1 8 9 0  1 92 6
N o v ik o v  1 1 1906 1926
P o l i a n s k y  D f? 191 7  .1939
P o n o m a re v  B N 1.905 19.19
R a s u lo v  D 1 9 1 3  1939
R o d io n o v  N N .1915 1944
S h k o l n i k o v  A 11 .1.914 1 9 4 0
To 1 st: i k r r /  V S .1.9 17 1.9 4 8
Y e f r e m o v  11 T 1911 193 2
Z a r o b i a n  Ya N 1 9 0 8  1932
T a b i c  Cl cm-,,
MANE
....................... W in OOP SDKS',■
Yefremov i m .r     .. ............. "  19 12 194.1. 2
“Tab*
N A M E
I , '■X'
D O B  D O P  O D O M
A k h u n d o v  V Yu 
B asov  A V 
K i r i l e n k o  A P 
M a z u ro v  K T 
O ls h a n s k y  M A 
P o d q o rn y  M V 
P o l i a n s k y  D S 
S h ib a e v  A 1 
S h i t i k o v  A P 
V o ro n o v  G I 
Y e f r e m o v  M T
191 6 
A V A 2  
t 9 0 6  
1 9 1 4 
1 9 0 0  
1 9 0 3  
1 9 .1 7 
.1 91 5 
.1. 9 .12 
.1 9 1 2  
1 9 J I
1939  I 
1 9 4 5  A 
.1.93.1. I 
.1940 .1 
1932  1 
.1930 .1 
1939  1 
.1940 J 
193 9  1 
.193.1 1
.193.2 1
I <rblj o
NAME DOB DOP SCI .1
9:- lo g a n s o n  D V 
( Sho 1 o k h n v  M A 
; ■* T v a r d o v s k y  A T
1 89 3  .1.943 2 
1 9 0 5  .1932 2  
1 9 1 0  J. 9 4 0  2
: v NAME
I o-blfc. bcxw-i rc n
DOB DOP SFRATC
K h r u s h c h e v  M S 
K u u s in e n  0  V
1094 .1910 4 
1001 1904 4
Hi'' _
DOB DOP SFRATCn a m e
^ ^ 6 ™ "  .....
rj* ChbU E n -1  a i
K o r n e ic h u k  A Ye .........
Mwi^f||Yegbrychev M G 1920 .1942
.1905 1940  2  
2
NAMG,nr,
Deshchev  D P 
D re z h n e v  I.. .1 
Bul.garii n M A 
C h e rn y s h e v  V Ye 
Chou F n - . la i  
Dym shihs V F-' 
P U r ts e v a  Ye A 
G o l ik o v  I" l 
Gomul Itei W 
G o r ia c h e v  F Q 
Gracht?v V V 
Gr.i b a ch e v  M M 
Gromyko A A 
Gubanov,,. V I  
. I g n a t o v  II G 
i  i .1 che.v ., L F 
lo g a n s o n  D V 
K aganovi.ch  L M 
'M a ik o v  I A 
. ; K e b in  , , 'J 0 
; KhrUsshchov N S 
K i r i l e n k o  A P 
K b lc h ik  A A 
K o rn e ic h u k  A Ye 
K o s y g in  A II 
.Kole lo v  F R 
K u c h e ren k o  V A 
K d u s in e n  IJ V 
L a z d r k in a  ID A 
M a le n k o v  0 M 
M a lj  n o vsky  R Ya 
• Mi keyan  A 1 
M o lo to v  V M 
Mi! h a v a n d a d e  V F> 
M a l i v a i k o  G A 
N o V ik o v  1 T 
• '•O ls h a n s k y  M A 
P e ls b  A Ya 
P e h v u k h in  lvl G 
Pel:r  ov P II 
: P o d g o rn y  N V 
Ponom arev B M 
■ Pospeov P N 
.J: RozhneVa M I 
SabU rov  M 7. 
i Semenov M I I
• S e r d iu k  1 I
'■'J-.Sheh r? h i n i n B M 
ShepA l o v  JD T 
S h o lo k h o v  hi A 
B h v e r n ik  M M 
S n ie k u s  A J
• S p i r id o n o v  j V 
.• B u s lo v  hi A
Thrirez  M
Tqka S K
/  A T
Yu M 
v K Y 
; Ya N
;,  j TVar dovsk' 
J ^ U i i b r  ic h h
ibehdva
. M S h*> •» • •
o
IDGI * B A  S A P  D P S  D O B
1 994  1 1 9 0 3
193 1 8 3 1906
1917 .1 8 9 5
19;,: 8 3 .1 1908
O 0
1937 ge 1 191.0
1930  8 4 .19 A 0
19 1.0 3 5 1900
0 0
1927 3 3 1905
193 2  0 1904
1.9-13 0 A 9 10
I 93  1 0 A 9 09
g e '1
1724 8 5 190  A
197! 4 <1 3 19.06-
1943  0 1 8 9 3
191 1 .1893
1 9 1 /  0 1893
19 27 0 A 9 0 5
1 91 0  4 4 A 894
1931 8 3 1906
0  0
iv - lo  -I 1 I 7 0 5
1927 8 2 J 9 04
1926  3 4 1908
.1 A
1904 8 1 A 88  I.
19o.V; ge 4
1920 A 9 0 2
.1 97:!6 7 4 A 8 9 8
.191 C) 3 A 0 9 3
1 90 6 1 8 90
19 7! 7 qe 7! 1907!
19 13 0 19 AO
1926  I 1 1906
.1937; 3 5 1908
1.9 1 5  3 7! 1899
1.9 I 9 1 904
10 9 6  qe 4
1930 4 4 A 9 0 3
' 1.9 19 8 5 1905
1916  1 5 A 8 90
q »:? 1
1 9 2 0 1 9 0 0
1 9 4 /  qc? I I 0 9 6
1925  3 4 1 9 0 3
1937! 3 5 191.0
1 9 2 6 A 9 0 5
1932 qc? 3 A 9(.>5
1905  8 1 BOB
t / .
19741 1 4 1 9 0 5
1 97! 1 5 4 A907J
qe 0  
.1 9 7! 9 3 5 A 901
.1940 0 0 J 9  A 0
1903  1081  
1932  1 C* 1908
loJb^Q
urns.
A d z h u h e i  A J 
G ag a n o v a  V I 
Kay.un V li 
l - 'a v lo v  S P 
6 m ir n o v  V A
V k b e e V  P A 
V i i o y ',G S
I lf I '. ' V •
OOP BA O A P D F B
\ 9 * .- ' 3 I
1.9 3 7  0
\ vr<i o
.1.9!?) 4 0  
I 9 4 8  0  
A 9 3  A 0  
1 96 1 0
O
o
o
o
DOP
J 9.94 
.1939 
1 9 2 8  
A 9 2 9  
A 9 2 2  
A 9 2 8  
A 9 3 3
"Tcl 13a (S"cjl'.lxu.«-\
• MAMG IX) 0 SAI M)EG 8 A DOI •
B esh ch ev  B P 1903 3 1 J 924
B u lg a n in  N A 1 8 9 3 1 91 7
C h e rn y s h e v  V Ye 1 '/Oil 1 t 9 28
Chou E n - l a i u O
G o l ik o v  F I 19 0 0 «.*.• . ■% 1 9.1 8
Gom ulka W 0 (>
G o r ia c h e v  F 8 1 9 0 3 . *1 ..■% 1 92  7
Gubanov V 1 4 nr*
I g n a t o v  M 0 190 1 3 8 1.974
111 c h e v  L l: .1 VO/> s’\ 4 1 924
K a g a n o v ic h  1. N I 0 7 3 17 1. 1
K ai r  ov I A A 0 9 3 0 1 9 1 7
K e b in  ,'J G 1 9 0 3 0 1 927
K h ru s h c h e v  N S 1094 4 4 1 91 B
K o . lc h ik  A A o o
K o s y g in  A N 1 V<> 9 7 8 1 9.77
K o z 1ov F R 1 9 0 8 4 1926
K u c h e re n k o  V A 1 i
K u u s in e n  0 V .1 0 8  1 1 8 1904
L a z u r k i n a  0 A 4 on J 90.7
M a le n k o v  0 M 1 9 0 2 1 7 20
M a l in o v s k y  R Ya 1 0 9 8 4 7 1 92 6
M ik o y a n  A I A 09!. 0 1913
M o lo to v  V M .1 0 9 0 A 9 06
M z h a v an d a d ze  V 1”• J. 9 0 7 qe A 92 7
• N o v ik o v  I  T A 9 0 6 A A 1926
PeJ.se A Ya 1 8 9 9 • »Yl V 9 1 5
■\  • • P e r v u k h in  M G A 904 19 A 9
. F^etrov F M 4 A 8 96
Ponom arev B N 1 9 0 8 r. 8 .1 9 1 9
. . Hos’p eov  P M I 0 7 0 «;•; . t 1 J 9 A 6
Rdshneva  M I 1 rie
- S a b u ro v  N 7. 1700 I 9 2 0
• S e r d i  uk Z T .1 9 0 3 4 .1 9 2 3
Bhepi 1 ov l) I 190  8 1 9 26
• S h y e r n ik  N M A 8 8 8 8 .1 90 3
• S n i e k u s  A 4 ' > .<• 4
S p i'r  i donov I V A 9 og 4 1 1 97 0
B u s lo v  M A 1 9 0 2 4 K* . 1 A 92.1
T h o re z  M 0 no
,Toka S K I 9 0  1 r." . > ._*> 1 9 29
U l b r i c h t
V, : .V e c h e ro v a  Yu M tr-, I
( f e r o s h i  lo v  K Y 1 88  1 1 9 0 3
i . ^  i - ~ . i--------------------- ----- ----------------- ------------ ---- .....-.... ............... .... ... ......  _. .. . .  ..........
NAME
lcvA.*o (Vj^ q '.oc , \
DOB SAP 01:’. 8
G a g a n o v a  V 
Kevun V 11 
K e ld y s h  M ' 
Pa v l o v  S lr’ 
T i tov G S
I 1 7 3 2  0  
.1 9.VO 
1 9 I .1
.1 7 7 7  
I 933 o
■I ] NAME
B re z h n e v  L I 
K o s y g in  A N 
K u u s in e n  0 V 
S liv e r  n i k  N M 
! Sim l o v  M A
000 SAIDEI
1 70*6 0
.1 9<> 1 8 mol 
108 I. 0 mo I 
10BO B mol 
1707 8 mo)
SA DOP
0
0
(.:»
o
o
1737
19 84
1987  
.1 984  
A 9 6  A
kmi mal 
kag mal 
kag mal 
kaq mal
v o r  bn.I per sab shop
v o r  b u l  p e r  sals shop
v o r  bu l p e r  sab shep
v o r  b u lq
MO 11
rj
cl
d
rl
cl
^ fcvb L a  fB :.\ t«j - Or<?
NAME Dim SAPDEF MODS'
K aganovich l M I O v  S
Malenkov 0 M 1 9< >V d
M olotov V M 1 O’M ri
Porvukhi n M (5 .1904 d
Bahurov M 7. t 7 0 ‘ > d
Shepilov D T 1 9 ‘ >8 d
I. . ■■ 
.... . I" "Tlbb. Tiiei'U^  17jo
' $
NAME
R rb z h n e v  I.. 1 
F l i r t  so va  Ye A 
I g n a t o v  N fi 
K i r i l e n k o  A P 
IsOByqin A M 
K o z1 ov F R 
K uusi nen 0 V 
M a iu r o v  K 1 
M zhavandarlz  r? 
P ospeov  P M 
. S h v e r n ik  N M
V \
DI 1)1 SAP Did 1101187
1 9 0 6 R 1*
1 9 i 0 0 mo 1 leaf) ma 1 vor’ bul p e r sa l shep P
! 701 0 mol kag ma! vor b u l per sab !* hep P
I 9 0 6 0 mal mol kaq v o r b u l p e r sab shep P
1 90  4 0 mol kag mal vor bul per sab shep P
1 9 0 0 3 mo) kag ina.I P
1 001 0 mol kaq ma) v o r bul p e r sab shep P
1 7.1 4 3 mo! kaq ma) P
.1 70.7 qen P
1090 I mol P
I 00 0 0 mol kaq ma) v o r bul p e r sab shep P
n a He
I l i c h e v  I. F 
K h ru s h c h e v  M
~[3kU 7^--
DUD SAPDEF
1906  4 mol k.ag mal shep  
J.0 7 4  4 mol kaq rna.I v o r
MOD 6  4
c.l
d
i ir:i. i.»• t.«y> i »r»».«.» »».»t
T a  tAfl 7 rti*. ZTv"«- c
NAME
Abramov B 1B
Adz hubei A I
Akhundov V Yu
Basov A V
Beshczhev B P
Bodiu.1 1 1
Brezhnev I. 1
Bulgani n N A
Chernyshev V Ye
Chou En-lai
Demi chev P N
Dymshi t. s V E
Dzhavakhi shvi J. i
Furtseva Ye A
Gaganova V I
Beorgi ev A V
0 i t. a 1 o v A V
Goli kov F I
Gomulka W
Bori achev F B
Grachev V V
Br i bachev N M
Or- i shi n V V
Bromyko A A
Gubanov V I
I qnatov N B
Ili chev L. F
IoqsnEon .0 V 
' Kaganov! r.h I. M 
Keirov 1 A 
Kavun V H 
. Kazanets I P 
j Kebin 4 1:5 
Keldysh li V 
Khrushchev M 0 
Kirilenko A P 
Kochetov V A 
Kolchik A A 
Kolchina 0 P 
Korneichuk A Ye 
* Kosygin A M 
Koz1o v  F R 
Kucherenko V A 
Kunaev D A 
V'Kuifsinen (I V 
Lazur k. i no I) A 
•;:L.eonov P A 
Malenkov G M 
; J Malinovsky R Ya 
v Mazurov K T 
,• Mikoyan A I 
‘ Mbletov V M 
Mukhi tdinov M A 
Mfchavandadze V P 
: Hal i vai ko 0 A 
’ Novi kov 1 T 
Mtlriev 7. N 
Olshansky M A 
Ozerov B 
Pavlov B P 
Pelse A Ya
h i n li 0 
F I'l 
hv N V
DOB DDF' BA or
— .....- --- ...
1 9 1! < 19 ‘13 ..*>
.1 924 .19*33 1 V>
.1 9 J 6 I 739 0 0
19 1 .1 94b 4
19<»: 5 I 77-1 1
19.1 o .1 94 0 3 b
1 90 A 
1 89b
.1 73 1 
1 91 7
n 3
1900 1 9V!0
0
1
0
19 1 0 1939 o 0
.1910 1 937 q e 1
.1 9 1. 2 1 940 3 4
1 9 1 0 1 930 0 4
1 9 3 ’.:! I9F.7 0 o
1 91 3 1 943 3 b
1 9 i :> 1 9 40 0 0
1 900 1 9 1 B
0 0
1 90!*. .1 997 .;> r:
190) I 932 0
19.10 1 943 0
17 1 1 l 930 0 3
1 909 193.1 o
q  e 4
I 90 t 1 924 0 r.
190,9 1 924 4
1 093
.1 09 5
1 94 3 
I9 1 1
0
1 093 1 9.1 7 0
1.990 1 9b 4 o
1 91 B 194*1 qe i
I 703 1927 0
1 9 I J 1 909 0
109*1 1 9 10 4 4
1 906 1 931 0 b
19 1 2 .1944 0
0
0
0
19 1 0 1946 ~r. r.-, I
1 900 .1 94 O 4 4
190 4 1 927 0 2
1 9 OB 1 9.26 3
1
4
1
1 9 1 2* 1 939 q e 1
100 I 1 90 *1 0 I
i 902 qe 4
1 9 | e J 9 4 4 v> er
1 90.2 1 920
J 070 1 926 7 4
1 9 1 /| 1940 v*> !"•
109b I 9 J b 8 3
.1 090 1 906
19 I 7 194 2 8 7
1 902 J 927 q e 2
1 9 1 0 194 b 0
1 906 1 9.76 .1 1
19 1 b 1 939 0 b
1900 1 932 3 b
1 9 1 b 1939 0
1929 J 9b4 0
1099 1 9 J. b 3 ...
1 904 1 91 9
.1 096 q e 4
1 903 .1 930 4 4life
• r/ o . U ^ Q  r ^ C . v U ,  (vlfV
> NAME . .  }---)>nn new SA BI-RAM
j : ' 7 ...  .... .. ... ........ . ........
.Abramov G G .1 91 M .1 943 3 1
Adzhubei A T 192*1 1 933 1 I
Akhui iiJd v V Yu ' 19.10 1 v.sv <> 1
Basov A V .19 1 2 I 9 MG *1 1
BeshcheV B P 1 9071 1 92*1 .1 .1
Bodiul I I .1 9 .1 B 17*10 3 3
Br ez hiiev 1: .1 1 90 0 .1 931 0
Bulganin M A \ H95 1 7 1 7
Chernyshev V Ye 19 on .1 72G 3 1
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